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The recent debate over the supernatural has proved intractable in part because of a 
failure to distinguish two irreducible-but-linked problems of the supernatural, one 
medieval and one modern. The first is a metaphysical problem concerning the 
cooperation of humans with God. Bernard Lonergan’s retrieval of St. Thomas Aquinas’s 
solution to this problem indicates that a grasp of divine concursus is integral to a theory 
of nature and grace.  
 
A metaphysics of universal cooperation with God implies a pair of ambiguities 
about creaturely being. The general ambiguity is that, because the fundamental 
explanatory term for creaturely causation is both universal and transcendent, it remains 
possible to gain adequate causal knowledge of the world while merely assuming that the 
universe is intelligible. The specific ambiguity applies the general ambiguity to human 
action. If the ground of every human enterprise is universal and transcendent, then we 
may wonder whether this ground makes any difference in our practical projects.  
 
A modern philosophical mentality helps spell out the significance of these 
ambiguities. Maurice Blondel and Jean-Paul Sartre present opposed interpretations of the 
specific ambiguity. Blondel presupposes the complete explicability of human action, 
arguing that the ground of human action is entirely supernatural. Sartre, by contrast, 
denies that being needs any explanation, and by extension denies that human action 
admits of any transcendent ground. Which posture one takes towards human action will 
depend on what pre-philosophical choice one makes about the specific ambiguity.  
 
Even if one takes the positive pole of the ambiguities, there remains a modern 
problem of the supernatural. It cannot be reduced to metaphysics, because its appearance 
depends on a solution to the medieval problem. Still, an effort to answer the modern 
problem by metaphysical means offers two important determinations of the modern 
problem. Because human freedom is rational, human actions emerge from a process of 
deliberation and are formally constituted by meaning. Thus, discerning what God is doing 
in human action is a diachronic and hermeneutical task. Taking the full scope of human 
enterprises, the modern problem of the supernatural calls out for a theological 
hermeneutics of culture.  






Jonathan Robert Heaps 
 
 
First and foremost, I thank my wife, Annie, for her patience, encouragement, 
support, and steadfast love throughout my research and writing for this project. Without 
her, it would have been simply impossible. Thanks to our two small children, Oskar and 
Josefine, whose pure, uncomplicated love proved lifeblood at the end of each day of 
wrestling with these sometimes-convoluted questions. Thanks as well to our families for 
providing material and emotional support while we finished this final stretch of my 
studies. Special thanks to my parents, Craig and Patti, for always fostering my curiosity, 
respecting my ideas, and providing me with the time and space in which to wonder at big 
questions.  
 
Thanks to my directors, Danielle Nussberger and Robert Doran, for having faith 
in this project and for trusting me to tackle it. Special thanks to Fr. Doran for his tireless 
efforts in editing the Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, several recent volumes of 
which proved absolutely essential to my thinking on this project. Thanks to Mark 
Johnson and Joseph Ogbonnaya for serving on my board and for their many hours of 
helpful conversation along the way. Thanks as well to Andrew Tallon for facilitating a 
reading course in preparation for this project and for being willing to serve on the board. 
  
This kind of project cannot come to life without a whole network of committed 
conversation partners who donate their time, their attention, their questions, and advice to 
it. Among such interlocutors, I would like to thank Ryan Hemmer, Anne Carpenter, 
Jakob Rinderknecht, Eric Mabry, Brian Bajzek, Robin Boeré, Chris Lilley, Luke Togni, 
Gene Schlesinger, Jeremy Blackwood, Paul Monson, John Brittingham, Jeremy Wilkins, 
Neil Ormerod, and no doubt others who, in the coming months, I will think of while 
doing the dishes or walking the dog and cringe that I could have been so forgetful.   
   
 
ii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS……………………………………………………………….………..i 
CHAPTER 1: THE PROBLEM(S) OF THE SUPERNATURAL ...................................... 1	
1. The Theorem of the Supernatural ........................................................................ 1	
2. The De Facto Intractable Contemporary Controversy ........................................ 8	
2.1. The Recent Anglophone Controversy Over the Supernatural .............. 9	
2.2. De Facto Intractability ........................................................................ 16	
3. The Problem(s) of the Supernatural .................................................................. 28	
3.1. Medieval and Modern Elements in the Controversy .......................... 29	
3.2. Elements of the Medieval Problem .................................................... 35	
3.3. Anticipating the Modern Problem ...................................................... 39	
4. A Problem of Cooperation ................................................................................ 41	
5. Philosophies, Theologies, and Ambiguities ...................................................... 45	
CHAPTER 2: A MEDIEVAL SOLUTION ...................................................................... 49	
1. The Dialectical Position: Grace and Freedom ................................................... 51	
2. The Development of the Theological Material ................................................. 54	
2.1. The Necessity of Grace ...................................................................... 55	
2.1.1. Phase 1 ................................................................................. 56	
2.1.2. Phase 2 ................................................................................. 57	
2.1.3. Phase 3 ................................................................................. 58	
2.1.4. Phase 4 ................................................................................. 62	
2.1.5. Phase 5 ................................................................................. 64	
2.1.6. Phase 6 ................................................................................. 64	
2.1.7. Phase 7 ................................................................................. 66	
3. The Development of the Philosophical Material ............................................... 68	
   
 
iii 
3.1. Aristotle’s Position ............................................................................. 70	
3.2. Thomas’s Commentary ...................................................................... 72	
3.3. Thomas’s Augmentation .................................................................... 74	
4. Action’s Required Order ................................................................................... 77	
4.1. Degrees of Causality in the Order of Action ...................................... 81	
5. The Theory of Cooperation or “Concursus” ..................................................... 88	
6. Lonergan’s Synthesis of Thomas on Divine Concursus ................................... 94	
6.1. God’s Efficient Causality ................................................................... 94	
6.2. God’s Transcendent Causality ........................................................... 98	
6.3. God’s Artisanal Governance ............................................................ 101	
6.4. Divine Operation in the Human Will ............................................... 104	
6.4.1. The Nature of Habits ......................................................... 107	
7. Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 114	
CHAPTER 3: MEDIEVAL AMBIGUITIES, MODERN MENTALITY ...................... 118	
1. The General Medieval Ambiguity ................................................................... 119	
2. The Specific Medieval Ambiguity .................................................................. 124	
3. Realizing the Medieval Ambiguities ............................................................... 129	
3.1. The Modern Philosophical Mentality ............................................... 131	
3.2. Subordinated Philosophy .................................................................. 132	
3.3. Separated Philosophy ....................................................................... 134	
3.3.1. Descartes’s The Discourse on the Method ........................ 136	
3.4. Maurice Blondel’s Modern Philosophical Mentality ....................... 140	
3.4.1. Blondel’s Modern Philosophical Method ......................... 141	
3.4.2. Blondel’s Modern Form of the Medieval Problem ........... 146	
3.4.4. Blondel’s Modern Form of The Medieval Solution .......... 150	
   
 
iv 
3.4.4. Blondel’s Modern Articulation of the Specific Medieval 
Ambiguity .................................................................................... 153	
3.4.5. Blondel’s Contribution ...................................................... 157	
3.5. Sartre’s Modern Philosophical Alternative ...................................... 159	
3.5.1. The Generic Medieval Ambiguity and Sartre’s Being and 
Nothingness ................................................................................. 161	
3.5.2. The Specific Medieval Ambiguity in Being and Nothingness
 ..................................................................................................... 167	
4. Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 172	
CHAPTER 4: THE MODERN PROBLEM OF THE SUPERNATURAL .................... 177	
1. The Natural Desire to Know God ................................................................... 178	
2. A Metaphysical Attempt to Answer the Modern Problem .............................. 190	
3. The Impossibility of a Metaphysical Answer ................................................. 194	
3.2 Metaphysical Analysis of Free Human Action ................................. 195	
3.2 What is Rationality? .......................................................................... 198	
3.3 The Rationality of the Will ................................................................ 214	
2.3 Some Conclusions About Free Human Actions ................................ 225	
4. Articulating the Modern Problem of the Supernatural .................................... 227	
4. Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 231	
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION ........................................................................................ 233	
1. Summary of the Foregoing Constructive Proposal ......................................... 236	
2. The Axes of Critical Cooperative Methodical Theology ................................ 242	
2.1. Transcendence .................................................................................. 243	
2.2. Context ............................................................................................. 245	
2.3. History .............................................................................................. 248	
3. The Demand and Challenge of Theological Cooperation ............................... 250	
BIBLIOGRAPHY………………………………………………………………………254
   
 
1 
CHAPTER 1: THE PROBLEM(S) OF THE SUPERNATURAL 
1. The Theorem of the Supernatural 
There is an old computer science joke that goes, “there are 10 kinds of people in 
the world: those who understand binary and those who do not.” It is gauche, of course, to 
explain one’s joke. Perhaps it will suffice to note that those who do not understand binary 
will not only miss the humor here, but also the principle of division separating them from 
those who do. A similar problem can afflict discussions of the natural and the 
supernatural. When one lacks or mistakes the principle of distinction, one can swiftly lose 
the plot, miss the point, and begin to wander into thickets of confusion. The above joke 
works because it presupposes the apprehension of a single insight out of which all the 
various concepts of our digital world tumble. The card is punched or it is not. The circuit 
is open or it is not: yes or no, 0 or 1, and so on. The two basic terms originate in an 
alternative grasped by a single insight, a unitary understanding. Without it, I would be 
writing this paragraph on a typewriter instead of a laptop computer. The problem of the 
supernatural is similarly anchored in a pair of terms issuing from a single insight. Bernard 
Lonergan called this single idea “the theorem of the supernatural.”1 Whatever life they 
may have had before and after the emergence of this theorem, the terms natural and 
supernatural derive their explanatory meaning from an exhaustively dichotomous 
alternative grasped by a single insight. 
                                                
1 Bernard Lonergan, Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas,  
eds. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, CWL 1 (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2000), 12, 15, 
17, and passim. 
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This distinction and its principle are most famously associated with the fraught 
pair, “nature and grace.” The theorem of the supernatural names the entitative 
disproportion of the former to the latter. Lonergan discovered that much as the digital 
binary can move beyond computational cards or tape to more plastic media (circuits, 
lasers, etc.), this theorem’s terms can be specified by any matter among which the basic 
relationship of disproportion obtains. In Grace and Freedom, Lonergan notes that the 
theorem of the supernatural controls not only the distinction between grace and nature, 
but also Thomas’s speculative theology of Creator and creatures.2 In Insight, he carries 
the theorem yet further, to analogize between the relatively and absolutely supernatural.3 
Despite the myriad instances and variations of biological process, all relate to their 
underlying chemical processes according to this basic theorem. What occurs 
systematically in a living cell, for example, is relatively supernatural to what by the laws 
of chemistry occurs merely coincidentally. So it goes too between chemical and physical 
processes, to say nothing of the relation between intelligent, deliberative consciousness 
and psycho-sensitive consciousness.4 All of these various metaphysical subtleties rest on 
the theorem of the supernatural applied in its full generality: two terms, one 
hierarchically disproportionate to the other, originating in a unitary principle of 
distinction grasped by a single insight.  
Just because something is simple does not mean it is easy. The theorem of the 
supernatural emerged into Roman Catholic speculative theology at the culmination of a 
                                                
2 Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, 81–2. 
3 “Relatively supernatural” names the emergent relation obtaining between the various 
metaphysical strata of emergent probability; see Bernard Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human 
Understanding, eds. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, CWL 3 (Toronto, University of Toronto 
Press, 1992), 657–9.  
4 Lonergan, Insight, 144–51. 
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long intellectual slog. As we will see in Chapter 2, Philip the Chancellor, St. Albert the 
Great, and St. Thomas Aquinas set down their speculative accomplishments in the face of 
long-standing aporia.5 The theorem of the supernatural arrived on the scene thanks to the 
combined force of their considerable intellects brought to bear upon fertile intellectual 
materials newly arrived on the European theological scene.6 Such intellectual 
achievements are not just the products of single human minds or of single cultures, but 
they are also an inheritance from one generation to the next and sometimes from one 
culture to the next. But what one inherits, one can fail to appreciate. What one inherits 
one can squander.7 In the course of several centuries, the mobility of the theorem of the 
supernatural was lost. Its subtle influence on Thomas’s account of divine concursus 
ebbed as schoolmen found themselves living within a cosmos newly conceived as matter 
in motion.8 Thomas’s elegant hierarchy of coincident causes flattened and so shattered on 
the felt of billiards-table physics. So flared the sixteenth-century de auxiliis controversy 
about how and if human and divine freedom could operate in the world.9 The ensuing 
disagreement famously proved at once so heated and so intractable that only papal 
                                                
5 Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, 3–20, 193–251.  
6 See David Burrell, Towards a Jewish-Christian-Muslim Theology (Malden, MA: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2011). 
7 “Not only is the new development accepted by some and rejected by others—there is the 
formation of schools—but the new schools then tend to splinter, to have periods of decay and revival. What 
is happening in a period of decay within a school? The words of the master are faithfully repeated, but the 
meaning has been devaluated and contracted to fit into a narrower horizon, a lower stage of development.” 
Bernard Lonergan, Topics in Education: The Cincinnati Lectures of 1959 on the Philosophy of Education, 
eds. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, CWL 10 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), 95–
6. 
8 For an account of the place astrology held in the period between the medieval hierarchical 
cosmos and the infinitely “horizontal” universe of modernity, see Louis K. Dupré, Passage to Modernity: 
An Essay in the Hermeneutics of Nature and Culture (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993), 50–
64.  
9 For a recent history of the de auxiliis controversy, see R. J. Matava, Divine Causality and Human 
Free Choice: Domingo Báñez, Physical Premotion and the Controversy de Auxiliis Revisited (Boston, MA: 
Brill Academic, 2016).  
   
 
4 
intervention drew it to a close in 1598. The answers to such questions must be left to 
historians, but I find it hard to resist the suspicion that, absent an appreciation for the 
theorem of the supernatural applied in its full breadth, Molina and Báñez were left to 
construct ad hoc solutions to ever-multiplying conceptual problems until ultimately the 
enterprise seized altogether.10 To resolve such a debate is not to pick a winner, but to 
question its very terms. Indeed, the failure to question the terms of the problem has 
rendered it intractable even still.  
In retrospect, those engaged in the de auxiliis controversy were led from the 
medieval problem of merit to broader cosmological problems by proto-modern concerns. 
The challenge posed to sixteenth-century physics by Thomas’s thirteenth-century 
metaphysics presaged a wider fissure to form between the medieval speculative mentality 
and modern ideals of scientific knowledge.11 The medieval problem of grace found itself 
squarely in this modern horizon with the Surnaturel controversy of the 1940s. In a France 
divided between (among other parties) secular Republicanism, old-guard Catholic 
monarchism, and the emergence of a scattered-but-lively Social Catholicism, the 
quandaries of nature and grace took on a renewed relevance for contemporary fights 
about social and political authority in a pluralistic society.12 Whether it was Blondel 
arguing with Pedro Descoqs about extrinsicism or Henri de Lubac with Reginald 
Garrigou-Lagrange about a natural desire to see God, Catholic philosophers and 
theologians argued about where and how God’s redemptive agency—and so authority—
                                                
10 See n. 7 above. 
11 See Bernard Lonergan, “Dimensions of Meaning” in Collection, eds. Frederick E. Crowe and 
Robert M Doran, CWL 4 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 232–45. 
12 See Paul Misner, Social Catholicism in Europe: From the Onset of Industrialization to the First 
World War (New York: Crossroad, 1991); Catholic Labor Movements in Europe: Social Thought and 
Action, 1914-1965 (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2015).  
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can be discerned in the world. It was (and remains) tempting to tear “natural” and 
“supernatural” from their place in the discourse of speculative theology and, as though at 
the edge of Solomon’s sword, to offer the former to the state and the latter to the Church. 
Conversely, we might suppose drawing any distinction between nature and grace would 
produce a death-dealing vivisection of an integral Christian doctrine (and, by extension, 
politics). In the last century, magisterial authorities themselves vacillated with regard to 
this alternative, at times condemning opponents of the Action Française and, at others, 
condemning collusion with its founder, Charles Maurras.13 Analogously, the theological 
controversy seemed to be resolved first in one direction by a none-too-subtle repudiation 
of Surnaturel in the pages of Humani Generis, but then in the other by Gaudium et Spes 
22 and the much-discussed (but little defined) “post-Vatican II consensus” in Roman 
Catholic theological anthropology.14  
Over the last 20 years or so, this controversy has reemerged primarily in the 
anglophone context, first as an intra-Thomist argument and then spilling over into the 
wider scene. Its basic theological and philosophical terms have not much changed since 
                                                
13 See Peter Bernardi, Maurice Blondel, Social Catholicism, and the Action Française: The Clash 
Over the Church’s Role in Society During the Modernist Era (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University 
of America Press, 2009).  
14 Compare Humani Generis (“It is well known how highly the Church regards human reason, for 
it falls to reason to demonstrate with certainty the existence of God, personal and one; to prove beyond 
doubt from divine signs the very foundations of the Christian faith; to express properly the law which the 
Creator has imprinted in the hearts of men; and finally to attain to some notion, indeed a very fruitful 
notion, of mysteries” [Pius XII, Humani Generis, encyclical letter, August 12, 1950, 
http://w2.vatican.va/content/pius-xii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xii_enc_12081950_humani-
generis.html, sec. 29]) with Gaudium et Spes 22 (“In reality it is only in the mystery of the Word made 
flesh that the mystery of man truly becomes clear… For since Christ died for all, and since all men are in 
fact called to one and the same destiny, which is divine, we must hold that the Holy Spirit offers to all the 
possibility of being made partners, in a way known to God, in the paschal mystery” [Vatican Council II, 
Gaudium et Spes, Pastoral Constitution of the Church in the Modern World, December 7, 1965, 
http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-
ii_const_19651207_gaudium-et-spes_en.html, sec. 22]). See also William L Portier, "Twentieth-Century 
Catholic Theology and the Triumph of Maurice Blondel." Communio vol. 38, no. 1 (Spring 2011): 103–37. 
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the 1940s, but the background concerns about modernity have matured. The internecine 
divisions of Republican France seem quaint and parochial when compared to the 
concerns about globalization, multiculturalism, decolonization, and pluralistic democracy 
shaping early-twenty-first century Catholic theological anxieties. On both sides of the 
contemporary debate over the supernatural, the metaphysical strategies of the 1940s 
persist. Answers to a medieval speculative problem of the supernatural are expected to 
more-or-less directly address the modern problem of discerning God’s work in a 
pluralistic world. A cadre of neo-de Lubacians put forward the categories of “gift” and 
philosophical paradox to liberate the supernatural from what they view as neo-scholastic 
captivity and secular modernist complicity. While this can appear anti-metaphysical by 
contrast with its neo-scholastic opponents, all of the neo-de Lubacians—John Milbank’s 
post-modern elision being noted below—stake out a metaphysical position on the 
problem of the supernatural.15 Indeed, Milbank is explicit that a mistaken theory of the 
natural/supernatural relation can render political theology impossible per se.16  
The neo-de Lubacians are opposed in this effort by a band of neo-neo-
scholastics—sometimes called “ressourcement Thomists” or “Thomists of the strict 
observance”— who resolve the problem of the supernatural by rehabilitating the concept 
of ‘pure nature.’ At their vanguard is Steven A. Long who, although sympathetic to De 
Lubac’s concern about pervasive secularization, thinks the rejection, let alone the 
                                                
15 See John Milbank’s argument that de Lubac’s account consists in a “non-ontology” that is 
“articulated between the discourses of philosophy and theology, fracturing their respective autonomies, but 
tying them loosely and yet firmly together.” John Milbank, The Suspended Middle: Henri de Lubac and the 
Renewed Split in Modern Catholic Theology, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2014), 4–5. 
16 John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 2nd ed. (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006), 206–9. 
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marginalization of natura pura was precisely the wrong approach.17 Long argues that 
recognizing pure nature and its proportionate end reveals philosophically (and so, he 
implies, publically) the “theonomic” character of our nature and all creation with it. 
Metaphysical anthropology set against the backdrop of an explicitly Thomist ontological 
hierarchy provides the basic position, known with natural certitude, from which God’s 
legislative intentions can be discerned and—because it is a matter of philosophy and not 
sacred theology—then thematized in law. Long insists that this does not prevent it from 
serving a kind of apologetic purpose in an ostensibly pluralistic society. Still, the only 
viable pluralism Long admits is that among Thomist natural law theists and Roman 
Catholics obedient to the Magisterium on all matters of faith and morals.   
 An assumption undergirds this debate and it is shared by both the neo-de 
Lubacians and the neo-neo-scholastics. Nearly every player in the contemporary 
anglophone controversy over the supernatural sets out constructing, retrieving, or 
elucidating a metaphysics of the natural/supernatural relation, usually in a medieval or 
Renaissance mode, and very often implying (but only occasionally spelling out) the 
adequacy of these metaphysical positions to addressing modern concerns like secularism, 
atheism, individualism, etc. Nearly all parties on all sides of this debate assume a basic 
reducibility of Christianity’s neuralgic problems with modernity to whether or not the 
correct position on the metaphysical relation of nature to grace or of human nature to its 
end prevails in Christian theology. We will explore some of the forms this assumption 
takes below. We will find evidence that there are in fact two problems of the supernatural 
at work in the contemporary debate: a medieval problem and a modern one. It will suffice 
                                                
17 Steven A. Long, Natura Pura: On the Recovery of Nature in the Doctrine of Grace (New York, 
NY: Fordham University Press, 2010).  
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for now to see that there are two problems. In Chapter 4, I will present a largely 
metaphysical argument for why the modern problem is irreducible to and so irresolvable 
by metaphysical solutions.  
For now, let us set about discerning a) that the contemporary debate is in fact 
intractable and b) that there are in fact two distinct problems at play in the twentieth- and 
twenty-first-century controversies over the supernatural. 
2. The De Facto Intractable Contemporary Controversy 
 The recent Anglophone literature on the controversy over the supernatural is a 
shimmering, swirling vortex of vortices, sounding with the clattering and reclattering of 
Patristic, Thomistic, Renaissance, twentieth- and twenty-first-century theological and 
philosophical material. Article after article, book after book has tried to capitulate and 
recapitulate, again and again, Thomas’s philosophical and theological achievements, the 
various clarifications and obfuscations, retrievals and misrememberings of the 
Renaissance commentarial tradition, early-twentieth-century transformations and 
reactions in theological method, the myriad appraisals of their post-Conciliar 
consequences (regarding which, for every 3 theologians, there are 5 opinions), and the 
fractal perspectives of each figure trying to at once offer his or her (but usually his) subtle 
refinement of any or all of the aforementioned, while at the same time defending his 
(usually his) pet figure from the attacks of the others. There are, in this cloud of 
witnesses, some truly masterful works. Still, in surveying 20 years of scholarly writing on 
the topic, I cannot find a single work that masters the debate itself. If it can be mastered 
at all, I know for sure that I cannot do so here or, I confess, probably at all. This is just as 
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well. As becomes more or less immediately evident in surveying the controversy, the 
scholarly community does not need one more rehearsal of the debate. They are ample.18  
In what follows, I will briefly sketch the unfolding of the controversy in the recent 
anglophone literature, explore both the evidence for the intractability of the contemporary 
anglophone controversy over the supernatural, and then turn to the evidence that there are 
two problems at play therein, not just one. We will return to my stronger claim that the 
modern problem is irreducible to the medieval one in Chapter 4.  
2.1. The Recent Anglophone Controversy Over the Supernatural 
At the turn of the twenty-first century, the question of the supernatural was mostly 
a matter of intra-Thomist debate. In a 2000 article in The Thomist, Steven A. Long 
engaged dialectically with the work of Denis Bradley on the various loci of the debate: 
the notion of obediential potency, the reality of a purely natural end for human beings, 
the natural desire to see God, whether this latter is in vain, whether it is specifically in 
vain apart from grace, and how Christ reveals the profundity of our nature and its ends to 
us.19 These are treated primarily as exegetical, hermeneutical, and logical matters internal 
to Thomas’s writings. In 2004, Sapientia Press published the first edition of Lawrence 
Feingold’s The Natural Desire to See God According to St. Thomas Aquinas and His 
Interpreters, which offers a compendious survey of the commentarial tradition on the 
                                                
18 For an in-depth review of the contemporary controversy, see Christopher Smith, "Surnaturel 
Revisited: Henri De Lubac’s Theology of the Supernatural in Contemporary Theology,” PhD dissertation 
(Pamplona: Universidad de Navarra, 2013). For a more brief, but still excellent review, see Edward T. 
Oakes, "The Surnaturel Controversy: A Survey and a Response." Nova et Vetera (English Edition) vol. 9, 
no. 3 (Summer 2011): 625–56. 
19 Steven A. Long, "On the Possibility of a Purely Natural End for Man," The Thomist vol. 64, no. 
1 (2000): 211–37. 
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question, as well as dialectical engagement with Henri de Lubac and the Nouvelle 
théologie.20 
There is, at the same time, a parallel discussion about the reception and 
interpretation of Henri de Lubac among Anglo-Catholics. In the 1990’s, John Milbank’s 
Theology and Social Theory bracketed what he considered reactionary “integralism” to 
focus on the theological conditions of possibility for a genuine Christian socialism. He 
sought to adjudicate between ostensibly-Rahnerian Liberation Theologies and the 
promise of a semi-Blondelian/de Lubacian/Balthasarian post-liberal political theology.21 
A decade later, Milbank evidently felt compelled to address a wider range of Christian 
ontologies and with them a wider array of political theologies, sketching out his 
radicalized neo-de Lubacian position in the “suspended middle” between them. Thus, 
John Milbank’s The Suspended Middle appears in 2005, revisiting his approach to the 
question of the supernatural in Theology and Social Theory. Milbank takes up Henri de 
Lubac’s Surnaturel (and its reworked thesis in The Mystery of the Supernatural) to 
advance his postmodern troubling not only of the natural/supernatural distinction, but 
also of fundamental ontology per se.22  
Milbank was not the only Anglo-Catholic theologian turning to de Lubac in the 
early 2000s on matters of church, politics, and church politics. Hans Boersma in 2007 
published "Sacramental Ontology: Nature and the Supernatural in the Ecclesiology of 
                                                
20 Lawrence Feingold, The Natural Desire to See God According to St. Thomas Aquinas and His 
Interpreters, 1st ed. (Naples, FL: Sapientia Press, 2004). 
21 John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 206–56. 
22 John Milbank, The Suspended Middle: Henri De Lubac and the Debate Concerning the 
Supernatural, 1st ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2005). 
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Henri de Lubac," in New Blackfriars, noting the political context and questions of de 
Lubac’s work, but also avoiding dialectical discourse with de Lubac’s Thomist critics.23   
Although Guy Mansini presciently brought the neo-neo-scholastic and neo-de 
Lubacian approaches into conversation with his 2002 Gregorianum article, it was a 2007 
issue of Nova et Vetera devoted to Lawrence Feingold’s book that touched the match to 
the fuel of the contemporary controversy.24 Steven A. Long and Reinhard Hütter’s 
contributions anchored the book symposium, both taking a stand on Feingold’s 
considerable research to intervene in the debate. Long took on de Lubac’s interpretation 
of Thomas and Hütter in turn criticized Milbank’s radicalization of de Lubac.25 Long and 
Hütter would remain at the core of the neo-neo-scholastic response to the “de Lubac-ian 
consensus.” Their arguments from this symposium would reappear (in whole or in part) 
as chapters in their own books addressing (in whole or in part) the controversy over the 
supernatural in the twenty-first century.26  
The conversation spilled over into Communio and Theological Studies in 2008. 
Nicholas Healy’s article in Communio tried to resituate the discussion of de Lubac’s 
work in a more properly theological context than the usual framing in formal ontology.27 
                                                
23 Hans Boersma, "Sacramental Ontology: Nature and the Supernatural in the Ecclesiology of 
Henri De Lubac," New Blackfriars vol. 88, no. 1015 (2007): 242–73. 
24 Guy Mansini,  "Henri De Lubac, the Natural Desire to See God, and Pure Nature." 
Gregorianum vol. 83, no. 1 (2002): 89–109. 
25 Steven A. Long, "On the Loss, and the Recovery, of Nature as a Theonomic Principle: 
Reflections on the Nature/Grace Controversy." Nova et Vetera vol. 5, no. 1 (2007): 133-83; Reinhard 
Hütter, "Desiderium Naturale Visionis Dei—Est Autem Duplex Hominis Beatitudo Sive Felicitas: Some 
Observations About Lawrence Feingold's and John Milbank's Recent Interventions in the Debate over the 
Natural Desire to See God," Nova et Vetera vol. 5, no. 1 (2007): 81–131. 
26 Long, Natura Pura; Reinhard Hütter, Dust Bound for Heaven: Explorations in the Theology of 
Thomas Aquinas (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2012). 
27 Nicholas J. Healy, "Henri de Lubac on Nature and Grace: A Note on Some Recent 
Contributions to the Debate," Communio vol. 35, no. 4 (Winter 2008): 535–64. 
   
 
12 
Raymond Moloney sought to bring Lonergan’s interventions to bear on the renewed 
debate in the pages of Theological Studies, perhaps with an eye to correcting Mansini’s 
rather narrow comparison with Feingold in Nova et Vetera.28 Hütter and Mansini, in turn, 
would take up complementary questions in the pages of the The Thomist, the former 
giving a detailed exegesis of Thomas’s method and conclusions regarding the desire for 
God in the Summa Contra Gentiles (with a particular eye to isolating the properly 
philosophical elements of Thomas’s position) and the latter underlining the ongoing 
significance of de Lubac’s theology for good or ill in Roman Catholic thought.29  
In 2010’s Natura Pura, Steven A. Long did for Feingold what Milbank had 
previously done for de Lubac: briefly and polemically radicalize the basic outlook 
embedded in the accumulation of theological data.30 The first chapter offers a lightly 
edited version of his Nova et Vetera defense of natura pura. Then Long widened his 
scope to criticize Hans Urs von Balthasar’s treatment and criticism of natura pura. Long 
also considers the moral and political theological proposals of three fellow Roman 
                                                
28 Raymond Moloney, "De Lubac and Lonergan on the Supernatural," Theological Studies vol. 69, 
no. 3 (2008): 509–27. No one has managed to make Lonergan’s contributions to the controversy of the 
1940s a central voice in the contemporary debate. Lonergan’s interventions were at some remove from the 
heart of the original controversy and some of the relevant texts were not widely available until the 
publication of “De ente supernaturali” and “De scientia atque valuntate Dei” in translation in 2011 (Bernard 
Lonergan, Early Latin Theology, eds. Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour, trans. Michael Shields, 
CWL 19 [Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011], 52–255; 256–411).  
29 Reinhard Hütter, "Aquinas on the Natural Desire for the Vision of God: A Relecture of 'Summa 
Contra Gentiles' III, C 25, Après Henri De Lubac," The Thomist vol. 73, no. 4 (2009): 523–91; Guy 
Mansini, "The Abiding Theological Significance of Henri De Lubac's 'Surnaturel'," The Thomist vol. 73, 
no. 4 (2009): 593–619. 
30 “[The] first chapter [is] an essay written on the occasion of a symposium honoring the 
distinguished and profound contribution of Dr. Lawrence Feingold’s The Natural Desire to See God 
According to St. Thomas Aquinas and His Interpreters. I have deliberately retained the character of this 
essay as part of the symposium largely verbatim (with two significant exceptions), both because Dr. 
Feingold merits that his original and lengthy manuscript be read in its entirety by every soul interested in 
this question, and because this essay presents arguments that are virtually unknown by many who are 
accustomed to the rhetoric surrounding the nature/grace dispute but not the profound and clear teaching of 
St. Thomas Aquinas.” Long, Natura Pura, 3.  
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Catholic thinkers in light of his thesis about the centrality of natura pura. Against 
Jacques Maritain, Long argues that a practical consensus cannot be made with those who 
reject the “theonomic” character of reality both undergirded and made manifest by the 
philosophical discernment of natura pura in “precision from grace.” Against Jean Porter, 
he argues for the perennial nature of this theonomicity’s content, such that any effort to 
historicize moral reasoning as a capacity must run aground on its stubborn teleological 
structure and so, again, its determinate content. Long finds that David Schindler Sr. 
“underemphasizes the realization that the core and architectonic elements in 
sociopolitical, legal, and cultural life, when they have been healthy in the West and 
particularly in North America, have comprised a strong subset of the theoretic inheritance 
of Christendom (the praembula fidea and the truths of the natural law).”31 In the words of 
D. Stephen Long, for Steven A. Long, “The Catholic doctrine of pure nature fulfills 
Protestantism and America.”32 Long’s argument, that natura pura funds a) the thick 
conception of the natural law required for the moral life and b) a return to the 
confessional state required for justice to flourish, presents with admirable clarity the 
moral, social, and political theological questions that are always waiting in the wings of 
the debate about the supernatural.  
While Long tried to drag the controversy closer to the center of Thomist 
philosophy, others aimed to widen the idiom of the debate. Conor Cunningham satirized 
the hypothetical logic of natura pura in the pages of Communio, indicating a world alien 
                                                
31 Ibid., 197. 
32 D. Stephen Long, "Review of Natura Pura: On the Recovery of Nature in the Doctrine of Grace 
by Steven A. Long," Modern Theology vol. 27, no. 4 (2011): 695–98. 
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to Christian doctrine.33 Kathryn Tanner recalled the biblical link between human nature 
and the imago Dei to suggest that we recognize the relevant analogue for the divine in our 
unlimited plasticity. She argued that this malleable historicity is a kind of ontological 
poverty that accords better with the gratuity of both creation and grace.34 Servais Pinkaers 
brought in a phenomenology of friendship to modulate the account of desire implied in a 
“natural desire to see God.”35 Edward T. Oakes made a valiant play to transpose the 
debate into the existential key of Balthasarian theo-dramatics, speaking of an overlooked 
“natural hostility to God.”36 Sean Larsen’s article in Modern Theology was perhaps the 
most impressive foray, going to great lengths to enter into the mentality of both Milbank 
and Hütter, then measuring them both against the challenge posed by Walter Mignolo’s 
de-colonial re-narration of modernity.37 Even Larsen, who made the most responsible 
report on these two major figures in the debate and also the most radical challenge from 
beyond the controversy’s usual bounds, ultimately sides with Hütter on metaphysical and 
epistemic grounds and only gestures in conclusion to the idea that perhaps de Lubac’s 
central point was never really metaphysical after all.38  
                                                
33 Conor Cunningham, "'Natura Pura,' The Invention of the Anti-Christ: A Week with No 
Sabbath," Communio vol. 37, no. 2 (2010): 243–54.   
34 Kathryn Tanner, "Grace without Nature," in Without Nature: A New Condition for Theology, 
eds. David Albertson and Cabell King (New York, NY: Fordham University Press, 2010), 363–75. 
35 Servais Pinckaers, "The Natural Desire to See God," Nova et Vetera (English Edition) vol. 8, no. 
3 (Summer 2010): 627–46. 
36 Edward T. Oakes, "The Surnaturel Controversy.” 
37 Sean Larsen, "The Politics of Desire: Two Readings of Henri De Lubac on Nature and Grace," 
Modern Theology vol. 29, no. 3 (July 2013): 279–310. 
38 “My proposal—only a very brief suggestion here—is that a post-metaphysical reading that does 
not see de Lubac primarily through what he received from Blondel or Maréchal but rather as cobbling 
together a theological response to mid-twentieth-century politics may be a fruitful way forward in current 
debates about nature and grace. In this way, I have tried to provide a prolegomena for a constructive 
reading of de Lubac as neither a Jansenist, nor a Thomist, nor a radical Buglakovian Origenist neoplatonist, 
but rather as an Augustinian.” Larsen, “The Politics of Desire,” 310. 
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Still, others have been content to continue hashing out the problem in strictly 
Thomist terms. Bernard Mulcahy’s book, Aquinas's Notion of Pure Nature and the 
Christian Integralism of Henri de Lubac, took an unapologetically Thomist line, although 
it ultimately did not make much of an impression on the debate, save a review alongside 
Long’s Natura Pura in Nova et Vetera.39 Thomas Joseph White entered the fray in 2010 
as well, engaging admirably with the problem of historicity and historicism, though still 
offering a basically Aristotelian response to Foucault and Nietzsche: nature is the 
intelligibility of substance, and so is required to even recognize historical transformation 
as change per se.40 As mentioned above, Hütter’s Dustbound for Heaven returned to the 
topic after three chapters on Thomist political theology. However, as we will see below, 
the tendency remains, even among those who venture beyond merely exegetical 
questions, to settle the challenges of history, morality, society, and polity in exclusively 
metaphysical terms.41 Of late, the parties have retreated to their corners. Articles by 
Thomists are increasingly exegetical and historical.42 An interesting issue of Nova et 
Vetera considered the legacy of Matthias Scheeben through the lens of the nature and 
grace debate. Unfortunately, many of the speculative avenues suggested by Scheeben’s 
                                                
39 Bernard Mulcahy, Aquinas's Notion of Pure Nature and the Christian Integralism of Henri de 
Lubac: Not Everything is Grace (New York, NY: Peter Lang Publishing, 2011); Thomas M. Osborne, 
"Natura Pura: Two Recent Works," Nova et Vetera (English Edition) vol. 11, no. 1 (Winter 2013): 265–79. 
40 Thomas Joseph White, "The ‘Pure Nature’ of Christology: Human Nature and Gaudium Et Spes 
22," Nova et Vetera (English Edition) vol. 8, no. 2 (Spring 2010): 283–322. 
41 Christopher J. Malloy, "De Lubac on Natural Desire: Difficulties and Antitheses." Nova et 
Vetera (English Edition) vol. 9, no. 3 (2011): 567–624. 
42 Joshua R. Brotherton, "The Integrity of Nature in the Grace-Freedom Dynamic: Lonergan's 
Critique of Báñezian Thomism," Theological Studies vol. 75, no. 3 (2014): 537–63; Thomas Joseph White, 
"Imperfect Happiness and the Final End of Man: Thomas Aquinas and the Paradigm of Nature-Grace 
Orthodoxy," The Thomist vol. 78, no. 2 (2014): 247–89; Shawn M. Colberg, "Aquinas and the Grace of 
Auxilium," Modern Theology vol. 32, no. 2 (2016): 187–210. 
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work are, as of now, still waiting to be taken up.43 On the other side of the debate, David 
Grummett’s 2015 article carried de Lubac’s thesis toward Augustinian doctrinal 
questions and away from metaphysical or political questions, and so also away from the 
conflict with interpreters of Thomas.44 The debate, though hardly settled, seems in 
remission.  
2.2. De Facto Intractability 
The narrative above, insofar as it begins with and returns to scholarly siloes, 
implies that the contemporary debate over the supernatural is intractable. One obvious 
strategy for demonstrating (rather than merely implying) its intractability would involve 
showing how the controversy is conceptually or logically intractable. In other words, I 
could present first an analytic of the arguments on offer, then some synthesis of the 
opposed positions with due caveats for where this ideal type breaks with the data set, and 
a line of inference indicating why the positions as stated and so opposed cannot be 
brought to some final, adjudicated position. In other words, I could labor to show that the 
contemporary controversy over the supernatural is per se intractable. This approach poses 
several serious problems. First, I am not certain that this conclusion follows from the 
facts, though neither am I certain that it does not. Second, it would require a Herculean 
(and, if it proved correct, Sisyphean) scholarly task that would occupy the entire length of 
this study, preventing me from turning to both an interpretive and constructive reframing 
                                                
43 Edward T. Oakes, "Scheeben the Reconciler: Resolving the Nature-Grace Debate," Nova et 
Vetera (English Edition) vol. 11, no. 2 (Spring 2013): 435–53; Thomas Joseph White, "Good Extrinsicism: 
Matthias Scheeben and the Ideal Paradigm of Nature-Grace Orthodoxy," Nova et Vetera (English Edition) 
vol. 11, no. 2 (Spring 2013): 537–63. 
44 David Grumett, "De Lubac, Grace, and the Pure Nature Debate," Modern Theology vol. 31, no. 
1 (January 2015): 123–46. 
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of the problem. Third and finally, to be preoccupied with the problem as it stands, even to 
show that the problem is per se intractable, would cover over what, in my view, is the 
problem with the problem of the supernatural: it consists in two problems and not just 
one. We need to face up to this problem with the problem in order to move the whole 
issue forward, rather than merely explaining why it is not moving.  
Instead, I will show that the controversy is de facto intractable.45 Whether or not 
the debate can move forward on the present terms, in fact it has not. To this end, I 
compare the present debate to the debates of the 1940s and especially those debates as 
they approached their near-term cessation in the promulgation of Humani Generis. Aidan 
Nichols’s excellent short history of the tête-à-tête between the Jesuits of Lyon and the 
Dominicans of Toulouse from 1946 to 1949 will serve as a representative sample of our 
debate’s prior instantiation.46 This may not seem like the most relevant excerpt, when 
compared to the more famous (and arguably more pertinent) conflagration between Henri 
de Lubac and Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange subsequent to the publication of Surnaturel in 
the summer of 1946 or even the prior debates over the notion of Christian philosophy in 
the 1930s.47 However, the vignette selected by Nichols serves better here. It is less 
narrowly preoccupied with the specific metaphysical quandary of the natural desire to see 
God, enveloping the wider and equally integral questions of theological method, its 
relationship to philosophy, and the merits of engaging with modern movements in 
thought. This more capacious subject matter allows a wider range of correlations to be 
                                                
45 Nor am I alone in this assessment. Oakes agreed in 2013 that, “this debate has now reached a 
kind of stalemate.” Oakes, "Scheeben the Reconciler," 435. 
46 Aidan Nichols, "Thomism and the Nouvelle Théologie," The Thomist vol. 64 (2000): 1–19. 
47 On the latter, see Gregory B. Sadler, Reason Fulfilled by Revelation: The 1930s Christian 
Philosophy Debates in France (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2011). 
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drawn with the contemporary debate, my main purpose in this section. We will find the 
major players in the debate of the 1940s like Garrigou-Lagrange, Marie-Michel 
Labourdette, Jean Daniélou, and Henri de Lubac making theological, philosophical, and 
methodological moves that presage the approaches taken by the likes of Steven A. Long, 
Reinhard Hütter, Servais Pinkaers, and John Milbank. My intention in drawing these 
parallels is to suggest that the contemporary debate is not so much advancing its mid-
century predecessor as reenacting it. This should serve as warrant for judging that the 
debate is de facto intractable as it stands, resting on terms that hew so closely to those of 
the 1940s.  
Nichols begins his history of the conflict at the 1946 publication of Labourdette’s 
essay, “La théologie et ses sources” in the Revue Thomiste. Labourdette takes aim at the 
Source Chrétiennes (edited by Daniélou and de Lubac) and Théologie monograph series, 
and so by extension at the Jesuits of Lyon from whom the series issue. Labourdette 
expresses “grave reservations” about both series and calls for a debate as to the “nature 
and task of Catholic theology.”48 He found them both, in Nichols’s words, “animated by 
a spirit of disapprobation of, and even contempt for, the Scholastic and especially the 
Thomist achievement, and worse still by a depreciation of intelligence in its search for 
abiding truth.”49 The previous year and with reference to the wider Continental culture, 
Charles Journet wrote to Jacques Maritain, “In this disintegration of the world, if you try 
to stay faithful to St. Thomas, they think you’re mad.”50 This shift away from the 
centrality of Thomism (and Thomists) to the intellectual life of France was read by the 
                                                
48 Nichols, “Thomism and the Nouvelle Théologie,” 2–3. 
49 Ibid., 3. 
50 Ibid., 7. 
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Thomists concerned as, in Maritain’s phrasing, “anti-intellectualism.” It took on this cast 
especially insofar as, in their view, it “put between brackets the conceptual formulation of 
maybe even the revelation but certainly the theology and philosophy we have received 
from the Middle Ages(.)”51 
The echoes of this sentiment return, in our day, most strongly and most clearly 
from the work of Steven A. Long. In addition to a persistent tendency to quote from St. 
Thomas as though that alone settles matters both of philosophy and theology, Long quite 
explicitly holds up the Thomist commentarial tradition as the achievement of true 
metaphysical knowledge in both the natural and the supernatural orders. Deviation from 
this tradition of Thomist thought “constitutes a veritable Rosetta stone in deciphering the 
intelligible causes and narrative of post-modern, pluralist theological fragmentation(.)”52 
He claims that the very thing de Lubac aimed to accomplish in opposing secularist 
materialism and individualism “truly is achieved… in the doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas 
and of the Thomistic commentatorial tradition that de Lubac misapprehended.”53 But 
Long is not alone here. Thomas Joseph White has on more than one occasion taken up 
the Dominican mantle in this debate to insist that Thomas (and through him, Aristotle) is 
up to the task of providing not just a contemporary, but indeed a perennial philosophy for 
the Church.54 Reinhard Hütter noted relatively early on that Lawrence Feingold’s 
compendious The Natural Desire to See God According to St. Thomas Aquinas and His 
Interpreters has perhaps proved so provocative to John Milbank and others because it 
                                                
51 Ibid., 7. 
52 Long, "Nature as a Theonomic Principle,” 157; Natura Pura, 27. 
53 Long, “Nature as a Theonomic Principle,” 182; Natura Pura, 50. 
54 Thomas Joseph White, Wisdom in the Face of Modernity: A Study in Thomistic Natural 
Theology (Ave Maria, FL: Sapientia Press, 2009). See also his "Imperfect Happiness and the Final End of 
Man,” 247–89. 
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proceeds in precision from both modern secular thought and more recent, culturally 
dialogical forms of Thomism.55 Hütter does not shy away either from indicating that this 
provocation is compounded by “operating in a mode of discourse very unfamiliar to 
theological readers by now largely unaccustomed to the conceptual precision and rigor 
once cultivated by the ‘schoolmen.’”56 Malloy echoes this accusation against modern 
Catholic theology.57 In any case, we can see that there is a tendency still among the neo-
neo-scholastics to repeat the neo-scholastic linkage of anti- or a-scholasticism with anti-
intellectualism and scholarly decadence.  
But anti-intellectualism or decadent intellectualism was not the only thing, in 
Labourdette’s estimation, that ailed the series emerging from Lyons in the 1930s and 40s. 
He also cites concerns about an historical and experiential relativism manifest in the 
Nouvelle works. As to the former, Nichols notes a tendency to treat truth as only true for 
a particular place and time. He cites Henri Bouillard, who “notoriously, had written at the 
conclusion of his study of St. Thomas’s theology of grace that a theology that fails to be 
contemporary is to that extent false(.)”58 Labourdette was concerned that "a subjectivism 
of ‘inner experience’ or ‘spirituality’ could undermine the objective value of the truths of 
faith.”59 Long and White again most overtly echo this concern about relativism. Long 
takes a much harder line, voicing repeatedly his concern that a “dense” notion of nature 
has succumbed to what he vaguely refers to as “Hegelian dialectic” and so been 
                                                
55 Hütter, "Desiderium Naturale Visionis Dei,” 91. 
56 Ibid., 91–2. 
57 Malloy, "De Lubac on Natural Desire.” 
58 Nichols, “Thomism and the Nouvelle Théologie,” 3. 
59 Ibid., 4. 
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evacuated of meaning.60 White takes the more balanced (and, indeed, more metaphysical) 
view that in order for there to be any kind of intelligible historical process, there must be 
(pace Nietzsche and Foucault) some identifiable, universal, and stable human nature to 
undergo the changes proper thereto. This is a philosophical corollary to his theological 
contention that “pure nature” is needed in order to anchor the medieval theorem of the 
states of human nature (what he calls “states of grace”).61 Still for both Long and White 
and for those of their school, there is an unwillingness “to follow the representatives of 
these alien philosophers onto their own home ground,” and a sense that those who play, 
in Journet’s words, “on a conceptual keyboard borrowed from Hegel and Existentialism” 
are allowing obviously mistaken methods to derail their theologies.62 
Though Labourdette named a number of figures in what would come to be known 
as the Nouvelle théologie (including Boullard, Balthasar, Fessard, de Lubac, and de 
Chardin), it was Daniélou’s essay, “Les orientationes présentes de la pensée religieuse” 
in Études that he took as the “key” to the movement and its pernicious, if subterranean 
agenda. Daniélou, in Nichols’s appraisal, does make a strong argument that neither 
scholasticism, nor even ressourcement are adequate “by themselves (to) guarantee the 
renewal of Catholic thought” demanded in the post-war world. Neo-Thomism, Daniélou 
thought, could serve as a barrier (un garde-fau) against Marxism, existentialism, and 
other modern philosophies antithetical to Catholic faith. But he thought one must reply 
and to reply requires dialogue and dialogue requires some engagement.63 For this task, 
                                                
60 Long, Natura Pura, 2, 4, and passim. 
61 White, "The ‘Pure Nature’ of Christology.” 
62 Nichols, “Thomism and the Nouvelle Théologie,” 4, 7. 
63 Ibid., 4. 
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Daniélou thought scholasticism obsolete. Rather, he proposes a phenomenological 
approach to “religious realities in their concrete form.”64  
Kathryn Tanner’s essay, “Grace without Nature,” is perhaps the contemporary 
contribution to the natural/supernatural debate that resonates most radically with 
Daniélou’s vision. She argues that, because the deepest meaning of humanity is (as per 
Genesis 1) to bear the image of God, an infinite openness and “plasticity” of human 
beings is our most salient feature.65 Moreover, this feature is salient not because it is our 
own, but because it is God’s. In whatever state we find ourselves as humans, it cannot be 
made sense of by distinguishing that which is specifically natural or supernatural to us, 
but rather always in terms of a radical gift that we receive in our unlimited plasticity. She 
argues that once this fact, in deep agreement with both Patristic and contemporary 
thought, is established, Daniélou’s phenomenological approach (coupled, of course, with 
a doctrinal ressourcement) would seem the only appropriate method for investigating that 
which is human. The truest metaphysical word that can be said about human life at any 
moment is that it is, in its relation to God as origin or as end, pure gift. Beyond that, you 
would have to go investigate what state we find ourselves in according to the temporal 
unfolding of our gifted openness. Theological investigation would be no different in this 
respect. Theology must stay close, her theology without nature implies, to our plastic 
concreteness.  
John Milbank’s approach does not excise nature so cleanly as Tanner’s, content 
instead to trouble the notion of nature in a post-structuralist way. In Theology and Social 
Theory, Milbank fights running skirmishes against post-modern social philosophies on 
                                                
64 Ibid., 5. 
65 Tanner, "Grace without Nature," 364. 
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their own ground, aiming to show that this ground was always already Christian. At the 
risk of overextending the metaphor, Milbank’s strategem requires one trust that the 
excision of the theological from modern and post-modern thought made of those thinkers 
poor cartographers, such that they fundamentally mistake the character of these regions 
of life and politics they have all-too-recently colonized. Thus, Milbank very much wants 
Christian theology to engage with material and existential matters and perhaps even 
according to modern and post-modern methods, but always according to a kind of 
Renaissance Augustinian theological program. Thus, when reflecting in a radical (and 
revisionist) way about the legacy of Henri de Lubac’s Surnaturel in The Suspended 
Middle, Milbank asks us to take up a radical de Lubacian “(non)ontology” which sees the 
microcosm of human culture as itself participating in a groundless economy of reception 
and return of “gift”.66 Precisely how culture should appropriately receive and return this 
(non)ontological gift, in both TST and The Suspended Middle, is a matter of concrete, 
practical, and especially aesthetic judgment (informed by devotion to the tradere of 
Christian practice).  
Returning to Nichols, de Lubac had no intention of responding to Labourdette’s 
suspicious accusations and call for debate, but the disagreement spilled beyond the 
borders of France. An ambiguous reference to the “new theology” appeared on the lips of 
Pius XII in de Lubac’s hearing. Apparently, in the preceding months, Reginald Garrigou-
Lagrange briefed the pontiff on Labourdette’s forthcoming article in consorious terms.67 
In July of 1946, Garrigou-Lagrange had written to Labourdette that the opinion in Rome 
                                                
66 Milbank, The Suspended Middle, 53–61. 
67 Nichols, “Thomism and the Nouvelle Theologie,” 9. 
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was that the works issuing from Lyons “are a return to Modernism.”68 Thus, the 
continental politics of the Church put pressure on leadership in the Society of Jesus to 
produce a response. De Lubac would be its main author.69 Published in the French Jesuit 
journal Recherches de science religieuse, the reply was occasionally polemical (“If the 
evil days of Modernism are now, thank God, far from us, the evil days of integralism may 
be coming back”), but in the main it sought to reverse the charges of historicism and 
relativism. Scholasticism was to be held in reproach, on Nichols’s recounting, for its 
historical insensitivity. The accusation of “anti-intellectualism” could, according to the 
Jesuit response, only be maintained from the perspective of a perverse intellectualism.70   
This angle of response could well appear in Theological Studies, Modern 
Theology, Communio, or even occasionally as a minority report in the pages of Nova et 
Vetera today. Most recently, David Grumett defended de Lubac in the pages of Modern 
Theology against both neo-neo-scholastic and overly politicized or culturally theorized 
interpretations by insisting on the deeply Augustinian character of his theological 
position.71 David Burrell’s review of Thomas Joseph White’s Wisdom in the Face of 
Modernity called into question White’s confidence in the preambulae fidae as pure 
philosophy.72 Servais Pinkaers argued that an exclusively metaphysical treatment of the 
                                                
68 Ibid. 
69 As to the external politics, Nichols writes, “In part, if we are to look at the events in terms of 
general history, the political divisions of French Catholicism were beginning to express themselves by 
proxy. De Lubac, deeply committed to the Resistance, was supported by the newly empurpled pro-de 
Gaulle cardinal Saliège of Toulouse against attacks on his theological approach sent semi-clandestinely to 
Rome by the erstwhile supporters of Marshal Pétain and the régime of Vichy, or even, for that matter, by 
members of the nationalist-monarchist Action Française, now thirsting for some form of revenge after the 
years their movement had spent in the ecclesial wilderness.” Ibid., 8–9. 
70 Ibid., 10. 
71 Grumett, "De Lubac, Grace, and the Pure Nature Debate." 
72 Burrell, David B. "On Thomas Joseph White's Wisdom in the Face of Modernity." Nova et 
Vetera (English Edition) vol. 10, no. 2 (Spring 2012): 531. 
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natural desire for God overlooks the existential data on our desire for friendship with God 
and so misses the point.73 Conor Cunningham makes an absurdity out of hypothesizing 
about natura pura as a speculative intellectual exercise, insisting that the world 
hypothesized cannot be squared with the vision of creation set down by the Church 
Fathers.74 Hans Boersma presents de Lubac’s ontology as inseparably tied up with his 
ecclesiology.75 These are but a sample of the ways in which the Jesuit response to the 
Dominican accusations of 1946 have been from various angles repeated in the past two 
decades. The neo-De Lubacians and their allies continue to argue that there is some 
historical (in the widest sense) element to the question of the natural and the supernatural 
that cannot be settled at the level of metaphysical reduction to principles. To settle for 
metaphysical reduction and thereby think one has said everything that needs to be said on 
the matter (or, at least, that what remains is a small matter of prudentially mopping up 
accidental particularities) leaves out something essential and, moreover, essentially 
Christian.  
In 1947, the controversy only became hotter and more widely adverted to. In the 
Swiss journal Liberté de Fribourg, the Polish Dominican Innozent Bochenzky “spoke of 
the new theology as a radical evolutionism and irrationalism which would warm up the 
tired remains of Modernism.” Garrigou-Lagrange’s famous article, “La nouvelle 
théologie, ou va-t-elle?” appeared in the pages of Angelicum. At this, Labourdette’s more 
hardline superior forced a further salvo, although this was in lieu of publishing Garrigou-
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Lagrange’s article in the Revue Thomiste and thereby inviting “a Roman intervention.”76 
Nichols summarizes their response as follows: 
They maintained that the metaphysics of St. Thomas is, quite simply, true, not just 
as an hypothesis or as the expression of a mentality but objectively and by the 
nature of things. Moreover, they claimed of Thomism that it was not only a 
theology of nature and essence but also a theology of event and therefore in a real 
sense a theology of history; they accepted that theology is not revelation, and 
however perfect it may be leaves open spaces that premature appeal to the 
magisterium ought not to foreclose; they state nonetheless that they cannot be 
regarded as mere partisans, for Thomism is not a party but the philosophy and 
theology of the Church herself—even if what is most profoundly at stake in the 
present quarrel is not the rights of the doctrine of St. Thomas so much as those of 
theology itself when considered as a veridical science of God and his relations 
with the world.77 
If this identification of scholastic method with theology per se proved the final battle line 
for the relatively moderate Dominicans like Labourdette and his superior Nicholas, then 
there can be little surprise that hardliners like Bochenzky and Garrigou-Lagrange saw any 
departure therefrom as necessarily a return to Modernist error. Within this Thomist 
foundationalism, there was room to integrate new knowledge. But, in their view, “better 
than anyone before him Thomas grasped the foundational truths of metaphysics and how 
to build on them a synthesis which would be all the more hospitable to every truth 
precisely because dependent on a true metaphysic.”78 Because the ideal of theological 
science was settled in his synthesis, any departure in method could be at best a regression 
to pre-scholastic approaches or, at worst, a poisonous collaboration with the perverse 
mentalities of alien, indeed hostile parties.79 But all this controversy was making the 
French episcopacy nervous, and so in 1947 “Labourdette wrote an irenic piece conceding 
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the liberty of the various theological schools but not their parity,” which was faint praise 
to the ears of the Jesuits and rather too conciliatory for his fellow Dominicans. Still, there 
was not much more to be said. In 1950, Humani Generis seemed to settle the matter and 
in the Dominican’s favor—at least for a while.80  
It is worth noting how much the ecclesial situation was, in the main, inverted by 
Vatican II and the apparent vindication of de Lubac in Gaudium et Spes 22. As we noted 
above, neo-neo-scholastics will still appeal to a Thomist notion of scientia and its rigor to 
defend their positions against more phenomenological, historiographic, and even 
sociological approaches to Catholic theology. But for some time now, they have been at 
pains to note how few in the wider Catholic theological audience are willing or (they 
suspect) able to engage with this mode of theologizing. Whether this evaluation is 
accurate or not, it is certainly the case that much of Catholic theology in the anglophone 
context has moved away from thinking of their task as wissenschaft unburdened by the 
significance of intellectual birthdates or addresses. Daniélou’s concern for a theology 
attentive to the proximate exigencies of its time(s) and its place(s) has been well taken 
since the council.  
Nonetheless, it is not only Thomist neo-neo-scholastics, but also their neo-de 
Lubacian interlocutors who continue to debate the problem of the supernatural in terms of 
its various metaphysical loci. The effort of de Lubac to bring both historical and 
phenomenological/existential methods to bear on the problem is only occasionally 
appropriated by his proponents. Even in Sean Larsen’s excellent Modern Theology 
article, when it comes to de Lubac’s thesis, he hardly does more than suggest that 
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perhaps what de Lubac phrased in metaphysical terms was not meant in a properly 
metaphysical register at all.81 Thus there remains a certain irony: although neo-neo-
scholastics sense that between Humani Generis and Gaudium et Spes they were pushed 
up the theological stage and into the background, so now to hold the minority-position (as 
White calls it), the debate has been ineluctably framed according to their native 
theological idiom and method.82 It is with the restriction of the debate to this nexus of 
medieval, metaphysical questions that we will be concerned in the next section.  
3. The Problem(s) of the Supernatural 
Along the way, I have indicated two elements at work in the controversy over the 
supernatural. The predominating element is metaphysical, concerned with ends, natures, 
powers, and orders. It proceeds according to an ancient ideal of science, one that proved 
sufficiently powerful to fund the medieval synthesis of reflection on Christian doctrine 
and philosophical speculation. This synthesis has an enduring relevance and each 
generation of theologians in its wake faces the challenge of appropriating its 
achievements and discerning its respective applications and limitations vis-à-vis 
contemporary questions. But there has been another element at work in the twenty-first-
century debate about the supernatural. This element is recognizably modern. It is not so 
concerned to reduce effects to their principal causes as to make sense of the human 
microcosm on its own terms. It asks about history, society, politics, freedom, and identity 
as in via.83 If the ancient ideal of science aims at synchronic structure, this modern 
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element terminates in a diachronic account of process. If the ancient ideal brackets the 
accidental in favor of the essential, the contingent in favor of the necessary, and the 
particular in favor of the universal, this modern element aims at complete explanation of 
all the relevant data.84 
Both of these elements have been at work in the contemporary controversy, but 
only occasionally have they been adverted to in their distinction from one another. The 
latter modern element is, when treated at all, usually considered either as an occasion for 
asking the medieval metaphysical question or as the arena in which the implications of 
the medieval element play out. The modern problem of the supernatural, in other words, 
is not recognized as a formal problem of its own. Below we will see that even when 
thinkers address the modern element in a serious and sophisticated way, in every case 
they revert back to basically medieval, metaphysical intellectual habits to answer the 
questions that arise. We will have to wait until Chapter 4 to explore why this modern 
element is formally irreducible to its medieval counterpart. For now, I will restrict myself 
to presenting the evidence that there are, in fact, two problems at play.  
3.1. Medieval and Modern Elements in the Controversy 
Early in the contemporary debate, Boersma noted how de Lubac’s theology of 
grace followed Blondel in opposing a theological extrinsicism that, by its regional 
separation of nature and grace, set the stage for a philosophical immanentism. Boersma 
was not alone in noting how this rather academic point served de Lubac’s opposition to 
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secularization and an ecclesiology of domination.85 Of course, contemporary 
secularization takes a slightly different shape than the forms de Lubac faced. The 
secularization de Lubac opposed took a different shape even than that opposed by 
Blondel. Blondel found himself between the anti-clerical liberalism of the French 
Republic and the positivist Monarchism of the Action Française.86 De Lubac faced the 
march (both literal and figurative) of fascism and Marxism in Europe.87 But in each of 
these, we find a question about authority. Whether as an appeal to religion as 
otherworldly myth in Vichy fascism and its monarchist progenitor or as the material 
dialectic of class conflict in Marxism, Blondel’s and de Lubac’s centering of the 
supernatural aimed to undermine justifications of absolute and all-too-worldly power.  
The neo-neo-scholastics share this antipathy to encroaching secularization, 
although—in Steven A. Long’s case especially—it is not clear how they would evaluate 
the case of Action Française or its place in the genealogy of Continental authoritarianism. 
Long praises de Lubac for the seriousness with which he takes the problem of atheistic 
politics, even if he would offer a radically different prescription to treat it.88 In case we 
might be tempted to think that this concern for forms of secularization in matters of 
politics was a quirk of de Lubac’s intellectual biography or an inheritance from Blondel, 
it also appears in those efforts to retrieve Scheeben on the question. Oakes quotes the 
following from Scheeben’s Nature and Grace: 
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[T]he crisis [of secularism] has not yet been completely settled, and it will not be 
settled until the supernatural order is frankly, adequately, and radically 
distinguished from the natural order. . . . Whenever these truths are not assigned 
their own exclusive sphere and are intermingled with truths of the natural order, 
they are necessarily confused with the latter, and therefore not only lose their 
organic union with truths of their own kind but suffer a dimming of their own 
light.89 
Of course, we see here Scheeben distinguishing nature from the supernatural in order to 
unite them, rather than uniting them in order to distinguish them a’la de Lubac. 
Whichever direction one travels between the ideas, it seems a theological concern with 
secularism carries along a concern with the nature/grace relation and, perhaps, vice versa. 
Indeed, chapters 5, 6, and 7 of Mulcahy’s book are organized around different versions of 
this correlation in de Lubac, de Regnon, and Milbank.90   
 It is suspicious, however, that often these concerns about secularization, politics, 
and, ultimately, the process of history are named, only to be abandoned. Boersma raised 
de Lubac’s sense that the ontological, ecclesiological, and political questions are integral 
in his New Blackfriars article, but ultimately only treated the first two, at most gesturing 
towards the political question.91 David Braine, in his 2008 Nova et Vetera article, framed 
the question in terms of original sin and the logical problems relating our two-fold end, 
but eventually turned to the modern, existential analysis of angst and alienation 
considered as “empirical phenomena.”92 However, he responded to this existential, 
empirical, modern topic entirely in terms of metaphysics. When he gestured to ontology’s 
implications for questions of political authority, Braine again considered only 
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metaphysical responses and, in the end, punts on them as beyond the scope of his 
inquiry.93 Nicholas Healy’s 2008 Communio article relegates the entire topic to a 
footnote.94 Raymond Maloney noted the connection for de Lubac between his ontological 
project and his opposition to secularization, Nazism, and Marxism, but never returned to 
it after his detailed treatment of Lonergan’s approach to the ontological question.95 
Mansini explicitly avoids the political question by reducing it to a theological matter of 
metaphysical anthropology in his 2009 article in The Thomist.96 I have already mentioned 
the way in which White responded to the challenge posed by Foucaultian historicism 
with an Aristotelian appeal to intelligible substance.97 In his 2012 article in American 
Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, Christopher M. Cullen mentioned that the foremost 
implication of de Lubac’s thesis is for philosophical ethics, and continues to note a 
number of salient points about the relationship between ontology and the historical 
import of human autonomy, but does not return to address the questions for moral 
philosophy he raised initially.98  
 There are certainly works in the contemporary debate that make no mention of 
those elements of the problem of the supernatural that call out for a modern, diachronic 
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mode of response.99 This is unobjectionable, as far as it goes, although one might be 
concerned that the full breadth of contemporary questions are being held in abeyance. 
Still, there are also several thinkers who have, in the course of the controversy, faced 
these questions of existential, historical, and political concern directly. We have already 
made note of many of them. Milbank devoted an entire chapter to the ontology of natural 
and supernatural in Theology and Social Theory with an eye to discerning the theological 
conditions of possibility for a political theology that was not simply subordinated to 
social theory.100 He returned to this question in The Suspended Middle, making a 
sustained attack on the idea that philosophy could maintain autonomy over the political 
or that (political) theology could simply be a naïve reading of grace at work in the world. 
But Milbank’s answer at every turn, to every difficulty, is to insist again and again on the 
delicate maintenance of the “(non-)ontology” he attributes to de Lubac’s Surnaturel. This 
(non-)ontology holds the key, he thinks, to the historical and political reiteration of a 
Christian culture.101 Thus, as in Theology and Social Theory, we see that for all of his 
wide-ranging engagement with postmodern thought, the argument of The Suspended 
Middle boils down to an apologia for how his politics are controlled by his ontology. An 
answer to the medieval question always provides the answer to modern (and postmodern) 
concerns. 
 Though their politics are diametrically opposed, one may detect an identical 
strategy in Steven A. Long’s sustained discursus on the ontology of natura pura and the 
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theocratic Catholic politics it undergirds. One of the weaknesses of Long’s argument in 
the first chapter of Natura Pura is a tendency, despite his appeals to Thomas’s scientia, 
to take Thomas’s locutions at face value, controlling very little for context or Aquinas’s 
theoretical controls of meaning. Much of the argument boils down to, “Thomas says…” 
However, the strategy in chapter four proves more compelling because Long fits the 
“required hypothesis” of natura pura into a thick and well-wrought scheme for Catholic 
moral and political philosophy. Indeed, so systematic is this vision that sans some 
speculative account of natura pura (even if not precisely under that heading), a morally 
or politically sound social order is portrayed as fundamentally impossible. But we notice 
here too the basic methodical assumption of the whole debate: the synchronic structure of 
ontology determines the shape of moral, social, and political philosophy and theology. 
Answers to the medieval, metaphysical question about how to relate the natural and 
supernatural orders more or less automatically answer diachronic modern questions by 
implication and extension.  
 Sean Larsen’s 2013 Modern Theology article on Milbank and Hütter comes 
perhaps the closest to both distinguishing the medieval and modern elements in the 
debate over the supernatural and addressing them as irreducible to one another. Larsen 
diagnoses in Milbank’s approach a Renaissance romanticism whereby the medieval 
ontology of the natural and the supernatural is “expressed” in the on-going repetition of 
aesthetically-discerned Christian practices. Rather than making logical criticisms of 
Milbank’s (non-)ontology, Larsen brings the genealogical hammer of Walter Mignolo’s 
post-colonial analysis down on Milbank’s nostalgia. Indeed, he directly accuses Milbank 
of identifying the Church and the European Renaissance. Larsen shows how, via 
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Mignolo, this identification has historically fit within a wider conflation of the Church 
and civilization per se.102 Thus, Larsen convincingly indicates how Milbank’s post-liberal 
resistance to totalizing secular reason can be deconstructed as also and at the same time a 
paradigmatically colonial—and so modern—project of erasing Christianity’s “others.” In 
this way, Larsen brings modern methods of analysis to bear on Milbank’s properly 
modern concerns and resists the pervasive habit of reducing them to more “fundamental” 
medieval, metaphysical structures.  
 Unfortunately, when Larsen turns to treat of Hütter’s neo-neo-scholastic account 
of the intellect’s ordering to God, he frames his positive appraisal of its implied openness 
to alterity exclusively in metaphysical, structural terms. From this vantage, it cannot be so 
decisively settled whether, relative to Long’s thickly theocratic political philosophy, 
Hütter’s implied openness is a matter of substantive differences or merely Hütter’s 
reticence to spell out what his speculative account implies.103 Finally, I have already 
made mention of the merely allusive suggestion with which Larsen concludes, namely 
that de Lubac’s purpose was post-metaphysical in the first place. Consequently, the sole 
approach to the controversy that distinguishes its medieval and modern elements and 
approaches them with distinct and corresponding methods still only does so halfway and, 
in the end, without being sustained. 
3.2. Elements of the Medieval Problem 
The astute reader may have noticed that, insofar as it focuses on the medieval 
element, the contemporary anglophone controversy orbits around twin conceptual suns: 
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gratuity and integrity. This can be seen most clearly in a pair of complementary 
questions.  
1) If grace is gratuitous, does it make a necessary difference?  
2) If grace makes a necessary difference, is it gratuitous?  
The neo-neo-scholastics respond that grace adds something of eternal importance and is 
necessary for the attainment of that eternal something, but it does not make a 
fundamental and necessary difference. If it did, then grace—so far from perfecting 
nature—would destroy its integrity. The neo-de Lubacians, by contrast, respond that 
grace makes a necessary difference. Theologies that deny this to preserve the integrity of 
our nature overlook the gratuity of being-a-creature itself and so, despite their protests to 
the contrary, violate the integrity of the unitary graced-creation that is God’s unmerited 
gift. Now, it must be said that the neo-neo-scholastic answer implies that grace is not 
entirely necessary, even if that for which it is necessary is of great consequence. Grace, in 
other words, is not really necessary, but only ‘necessary for…’. The neo-de Lubacian 
answer, however, seems to beg the question why, if gratuity is made the sole defining 
characteristic of grace, creation and grace are different. “After all,” Lonergan asks, “what 
is there that is not a free gift of God?”104  
But both answers imply the same underlying question, albeit in different ways: 
“How does God’s grace make a difference in human beings?” The neo-neo-scholastic 
answer implies it insofar as we might wonder how grace can be necessary for something 
like eternal life without being fundamentally necessary for our being. The neo-de 
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Lubacian answer implies it insofar as we might wonder how grace is differentiated within 
creation at all.  
One can ask a more general form of this question: “How does God’s grace make a 
difference in Creation as a whole?” This more general form of the question is important 
and interesting, but it is not very much asked (if at all) in the contemporary anglophone 
debate over the supernatural. Consequently, I am going to set it aside except to note that 
its existence reveals that the form of the problem of the supernatural with which the 
debate has been concerned is a specific form of what I have been calling the medieval 
problem of the supernatural.  
If God, by granting us grace, acts in a way that makes a difference both in human 
beings and in creation as a whole, then there arises the question of God’s action in 
general. But we know dogmatically that God acts in at least one other way, namely to 
create creatures, and so it becomes clear that the medieval problem of grace (as pertains 
to both the specific case of human beings and creation in general) is itself a specific 
instance of a more general problem. Thus, in addition to the specific medieval problem of 
the supernatural that pertains to grace, there is a generic medieval problem of the 
supernatural that pertains to God’s ad extra agency in general.105  
This generic medieval problem of the supernatural can further be expressed by a 
general and specific question. The generic form of the generic medieval problem of the 
supernatural asks, “How does God’s action make a difference in creation?” The specific 
form of the generic medieval problem of the supernatural asks, “How does God’s action 
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make a difference in human beings?” The answers to this generic medieval problem of 
the supernatural are not at all irrelevant for the specific medieval problem of the 
supernatural that pertains to grace. Insofar as grace is an element of God’s ad extra 
agency, the determinations of God’s ad extra agency will pertain to it. Nor does this 
reduce God’s grace to God’s general ad extra agency, for the determinations that pertain 
to the latter will not preclude, nor be adequate to reveal that by which grace is 
specifically differentiated within God’s ad extra agency as a whole.  
Let us schematically recall the distinctions made thus far: 
The Medieval Problem of the Supernatural 
1) Specific Medieval Problem: “How does God’s grace make a difference…?” 
A) Generic Form: “…in Creation?” 
B) Specific Form: “…in Human Beings?” 
2) Generic Medieval Problem: “How does God’s action make a difference…?” 
A) Generic Form: “…in Creation?”  
B) Specific Form: “…in Human Beings?”  
Now, the existence of a question implies the possibility of an answer and the 
existence of a problem implies the possibility of a solution. Extant specific forms of the 
solution to the specific medieval problem (1.B.) will be the concern of chapter 2. In brief, 
I am persuaded that it can be found in Thomas’s position in Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 
109, a. 2. As the generic form of the specific problem (1.A.) is not much at play for 
parties in the contemporary anglophone controversy, I will not bother addressing it here. 
Bernard Lonergan’s Grace and Freedom has convinced me as well that there exist in 
Thomas’s corpus generic and specific forms of a solution to the generic medieval 
   
 
39 
problem of the supernatural. In brief, the answer to the generic form of the generic 
medieval problem (2.A) is Thomas’s theory of universal causal cooperation with God. 
The answer, in turn, to the specific form of the generic medieval problem (2.B.) is 
Thomas’s theory of free cooperation with God. Lonergan shows why both are integral to 
Thomas’s position on the specific form of the specific medieval problem (1.B.) and I am 
arguing that all of these together constitute a medieval solution to the medieval problem 
overall, at least as it is raised in the contemporary debate. The elements of this wider 
solution, however, are rather diffuse in Thomas’s corpus. In Chapter 2 we will see how 
Lonergan gathered them together. I will present the position first analytically and then 
synthetically. 
3.3. Anticipating the Modern Problem 
We do not yet possess the conceptuality we need to articulate the modern problem 
and why it is irreducible to its medieval counterpart. Nonetheless, it may suffice to note 
that the modern problem pertains to human freedom and its products. Moreover, it is a 
problem that emerges only once one has a solution to the medieval problem because it 
presupposes it. In other words, once one knows how God makes a difference in creation 
generally and in human beings specifically, it follows one can ask exactly what that 
difference is. But in chapter 2 we will see that in part the difference God makes is to 
make creatures to be in general and human beings to be free in particular. From this 
affirmation emerges the possibility of what I will call the medieval ambiguities. One 
might characterize these ambiguities by noting that, if God causes beings to be and 
human beings to be free, this effect need not necessarily be read as a “difference.” Or, 
more precisely, we might say that the “difference” God makes by making creatures to be 
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and human beings to be free is different from nothing. The whole argument cannot be 
made yet, but affirming that this “difference” in fact makes a difference is a pre-
philosophical decision. But if one makes this affirmation, one also affirms that the 
universe of being has a sufficient reason and that human freedom has a fundamental 
meaning and purpose. That God makes human freedom to be means also that God makes 
the products of human freedom to be. Moreover, God renders both intelligible. Within the 
horizon established by this affirmation it is sensible to ask what concretely God is making 
human freedom and its products to be. But, as we shall see, this is a hermeneutical 
question: what do human freedom and its products mean? 
All of this will occupy us in detail in chapter 4, but for now it will have to suffice 
to sketch out as best we can the basic elements of the modern problem of the 
supernatural. The modern problem of the supernatural is not a speculative problem, but a 
hermeneutical one. Consequently, it does not ask ‘how?’ but ‘what?’ The modern 
problem is not a synchronic metaphysical problem (for it presupposes a metaphysical 
solution), but a diachronic historical problem. Consequently, instead of asking, “what 
difference does God make…?” it asks, “what difference is God making…?” The modern 
problem is concerned both with human freedom and the products that depend upon its 
exercise. Consequently, the modern problem asks both, “what difference is God making 
in human freedom?” but also “what difference is God making in the products of human 
freedom?” Since, as we will see in chapter 2, a cause and its effects are necessarily 
distinct, these questions pose distinct problems. The former problem I call the “existential 
modern problem of the supernatural.” The latter I call the “artificial modern problem of 
the supernatural.” The existential modern problem is “existential” in the same sense that 
   
 
41 
existential philosophy is, i.e. concerned with the way in which human freedom 
determines itself. The artificial modern problem is not artificial in the sense of being 
“false” or somehow fraudulent. Rather, the artificial modern problem is artificial insofar 
as it is concerned with the artifacts of free human making.  
We can summarize these anticipatory determinations of the modern problem of 
the supernatural as follows: 
The Modern Problem of the Supernatural 
Modern Problem: “What difference is God making…?” 
Existential Form: “…in human freedom?” 
Artificial Form: “…in the products of human freedom?” 
4. A Problem of Cooperation 
 Thus, we have two problems, not just one. It is undeniable that something 
irreducibly medieval is at work in the controversy. It is, as we saw above, the more 
evident and more developed part. When I have called this part medieval, I do not at all 
mean to be pejorative, but intend to name an excellence, a perfection accomplished in the 
Catholic intellectual tradition through the metaphysical subtlety of St. Thomas Aquinas 
and his contemporaries. But there is also something irreducibly modern about these 
questions that has been suppressed in the various ways discussed above and which I have 
tried to make evident nonetheless. The irreducibility of this modern part demonstrates the 
limits of the medieval element and so of the solutions on offer. It indicates, at a 
minimum, the heuristic place into which an adequate theology of the supernatural would 
realize a modern achievement. But to settle for this merely heuristic placeholder would be 
too stingy an assessment of modern intellectual achievements. There are genuine modern 
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virtues which theology in general and a speculative theology of the supernatural 
specifically would mutilate itself by excluding.  
All of this is to say that there is needed some cooperation between the medieval 
and modern philosophical and theological enterprises if the medieval and modern 
problems of the supernatural will be addressed both in their distinct irreducibility and 
their intimate, indeed inseparable connection. This cooperation is not reducible to 
rendering medieval and modern approaches to the supernatural coherent. It is not enough 
to show that they are compatibly parallel descriptions of the same data, answering the 
same question from different perspectives, for there are two irreducible problems and not 
just one. Questions that really differ require really different answers. Nor is this 
cooperation reducible to arguing for the continuity of medieval and modern answers to 
the problem of the supernatural, for such continuity would, whether it were a formal or a 
merely material continuity, always only be grounded in the identity of a single question 
to which the Catholic intellectual tradition has labored cumulatively and progressively to 
answer. Such continuity may well exist, but to make it the central issue would occlude 
rather than solve the distinct problems of the supernatural. 
Cooperation is required because there are two problems of the supernatural and 
not only one. Moreover, the irreducibility of these problems to one another owes to the 
asymmetrical bond that holds them together. Without the medieval problem and its 
adequate solution (in part, a theory of trans-natural cooperation between God and 
creatures we shall see in Chapter 2), there can be no adequate recognition of the modern 
problem in its full theological scope. Still, as we will see in Chapter 4, the integrality of 
the medieval problem and solution with the modern problem owes precisely to the 
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former’s inadequacy to the modern problem it reveals. Theologians and philosophers 
could spend lifetimes refining the medieval solution in light of intervening developments 
and still never adequately address the modern problem. The inadequacy of any medieval 
solution owes, fittingly enough, to the disproportion of the modern problem to medieval 
speculative techniques. In brief, the modern problem is relatively supernatural to the 
medieval solution. Just as the theorem of the supernatural governs Thomas’s theory of 
divine concursus and thus his solution to the medieval problem, so it will govern my 
effort to articulate and sketch the outlines of a solution to the modern problem in Chapter 
5, my conclusion. Much as our natural powers are elevated by cooperation with God’s 
grace to habits and acts that merit what we could not without God’s help, so we will see 
that the medieval solution finds an enlarged and enriched horizon in cooperation with the 
theoretical developments constitutive of the distinctly modern problem. Indeed, the 
horizon of the modern problem will be so much enriched and enlarged that theologians 
may feel it is beyond their power to address. But here too the theorem will be at work, 
reminding us that it is not just in the first-order work of our living, but also in the second-
order vocation to scholarly reflection that we need God’s grace to heal us from the 
confinement of sin, to elevate us beyond the circumscriptions of finitude, and to stitch us 
into the supernatural community through which God is at work in the world.  
We will see that, as there is a specific obediential potency in human beings for 
receiving the help of grace, also there is a kind of specific obediential potency in 
Thomas’s solution to the medieval problem. Thomas’s account of rational process 
indicates the place that the mediation of meaning has in our knowledge of the real. When 
this epistemic account finds its proper place in Thomas’s faculty psychology of deliberate 
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action, we can appreciate the place that the mediation of meaning has in Thomas’s 
account of human agency and therefore the place it has in his account of human 
cooperation with God. What I will call a ‘modern philosophical mentality’ in Chapter 3 
offers us a chance to recognize that not only does meaning mediate the fully human 
world of thought and action, but it also constitutes that world. The constitutive function 
of meaning rests at the heart of the modern problem, for it places human freedom beyond 
itself, not just in the agency by which human beings act, but also in the objects about 
which it deliberates. Where the medieval problem asked in a metaphysical register where 
and how God’s ad extra agency can be discerned in the nature of human freedom, the 
modern problem asks where and how God’s agency can be discerned in the various 
nexuses of human action’s products that we call, in general, “culture.” Of course, the 
metaphysics of divine concursus can only tell us ‘that’ and ‘how’ God is at work in our 
cultures, but some other approach is needed to appreciate ‘what’ God is up to therein. A 
solution to the modern problem must stand on the synchronic metaphysical structure of 
the medieval solution in order to attempt some hermeneutics of God at work in history. 
The medieval and modern theological cooperation I have in mind will consist in 
answering both the ‘that’/’how’ question and the ‘what’ question in a critical and 
methodical way.  
The relatively supernatural character of the modern problem of the supernatural 
with regard to its medieval counterpart should not, however, be read as an uncritical 
baptism of modern philosophy or theology as a whole (if one could even synthesize such 
an aggregate in the first place). It is, instead, to engage in a bit of positive dialectic, 
selecting that which is authentic in two epochs of the Catholic intellectual tradition and 
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advancing them through critical, methodical inquiry and constructive cooperation. Of 
course, one could engage in the negative dialectics that seeks to diagnose what has been 
inauthentic—which is to say, oblivious, obtuse, irrational, or irresponsible—in the 
unfolding of the Catholic speculative tradition, whether in its medieval or modern 
phases.106 One would no doubt find much to reverse. However, because facing up to the 
modern problem requires cooperation with the medieval synthesis, we are better served to 
discern what has been genuine and successful in both epochs and promote them for the 
sake of traction on this fundamental issue. Where counter-positions stand in our way, we 
should not shy from venturing our best judgment, but I will not be on the hunt for a 
sweeping diagnosis of all that ails either the modern or the medieval mind on this 
question or others. Though it would require another study altogether to say precisely 
why, I am further inclined to say with regard to modernity that it is entirely too early to 
render sweeping judgments for or against. Modernity is not, in my opinion, a project in 
its wrap-up phase about which we may declare success or failure. My patient reader will 
have to wait until the concluding chapter to get a sense precisely why, but I am of the 
opinion that modernity is, in the broader historical sense, just getting going and we have a 
role to play in whether it works out well or not.  
5. Philosophies, Theologies, and Ambiguities 
A final methodological note: what follows will pivot frequently between 
philosophy and theology. Moreover, it will shift between medieval and modern ideals of 
philosophy and theology. These transitions are significant, for a thinker’s methodical 
                                                
106 Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology, eds. Robert M. Doran and John D. Dadosky, CWL 14 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017), 22–3.  
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frame stands to their ideas as questions stand to answers, insofar as they create a context 
of validating conditions and an implied criterion of relevance. Moreover, changes in the 
relationship between methodical frames modify their relative significance in a project of 
inquiry. We will see that the separation of philosophy from its subordination to 
speculative theology transformed philosophy’s self-understanding radically, such that 
whole new frames of investigation became possible. If that were not complicated enough, 
developments in theology can occasion new questions and new answers in philosophy, 
just as developments in philosophy can set the stage for new advances in theology. In 
Chapter 2 we will see how questions and answers in the theology of grace transform the 
philosophy of divine transcendence and ad extra agency. This rebounds to allow the 
theology of grace to be reconfigured as a systematic account of habitual and actual grace. 
In some cases, these developments are sufficiently momentous that they transform not 
just the content of one discipline or the other, but also their respective self-
understandings. We will see in chapter 3 that the theorem of divine transcendence that 
emerged from this dialogue between medieval theology and philosophy sowed seeds of 
an ambiguity that at once helped to justify an autonomous and separated modern 
philosophy and also undermines the possibility that its autonomy can be anything more 
than relative.  
In a similar way, the development of a modern scientific ideal for philosophy—
that it should endeavor to explain the diachronic processes of history, of morality, 
society, and politics in their concreteness—has tendered to theology a new set of 
questions and techniques that it still struggles to integrate within its methodical self-
understanding. We will see how these questions and techniques apply to a new way of 
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asking about divine ad extra agency in general and God’s grace specifically that cannot 
be adequately addressed only according to medieval metaphysical techniques. Indeed, in 
Chapter 4, we will have applied these very metaphysical techniques to the question to 
show that they do not dissolve the problem’s force. This irreducibly modern problem of 
the supernatural will demand a novel set of questions and techniques. But this set cannot 
be a mere aggregate and still aim at the unity intended in every intellectual enterprise. 
Thus, in chapter 5, I will suggest a heuristic that at once unifies these modern questions 
and, thereby, sets their coordination as a criterion for the adequacy of any theology that, 
on the matter of the supernatural, aspires to do for the twenty-first (or twenty-second) 
century what Thomas Aquinas did for the thirteenth.  
Still, we cannot overlook the way in which this cooperation that runs from 
modern philosophy to modern theology also rebounds back upon modern philosophy. In 
the face of the ambiguity medieval philosophy revealed, the pre-philosophical decision to 
pursue complete explanation by way of a modern philosophy cannot itself be completely 
explained within an autonomous human method of inquiry. It will always beg its own 
originating question. Nor can theology undo this basically undecidable decision at 
philosophy’s beginning. Instead, theology makes explicit its heteronomy by beginning in 
the “yes” of faith to the created communication of God’s transcendent nature. In this way, 
theology avows what modern philosophy must always hold in brackets, and so speaks a 
prophetic word to those modern philosophies that would make of their relative autonomy 
an absolute tyranny over both subject and object, over being itself. Modern theology can, 
at the same time, model for modern philosophy the practical humility required to realize 
the dizzying scope of its orienting aspiration to complete explanation. Finally, we can 
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note that this vulnerable posture of intellectual risk before the ambiguity of being should, 
if nothing else, disabuse philosophies and theologies of the illusion that their own 
modernity consists in a triumph over their medieval forebears. They have carried us and 
we have the responsibility to, cooperatively, take our turn carrying them.
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CHAPTER 2: A MEDIEVAL SOLUTION  
Towards the end of Chapter 1 (§3.2), I briefly sketched out some elements of 
what I called the medieval problem of the supernatural. I framed these elements in terms 
of operative questions. There is a specific medieval problem of the supernatural and it has 
both a generic and a specific form. It is this latter, specific form of the specific medieval 
problem with which my reader no doubt spontaneously associates the problem(s) of the 
supernatural. “How does God’s grace make a difference in human beings?” This specific 
medieval problem can be framed in a more generic form that asks after the difference 
God’s grace makes in creation as a whole. With this question we are not presently 
concerned. My contention, however, is that the traction Thomas Aquinas gained on this 
specific form of the specific medieval problem of the supernatural was due in no small 
part to the advance he made on a more fundamental and philosophical generic problem of 
the supernatural: How does God’s action make a difference in creation in general and 
human beings specifically? In what follows I argue that Thomas’s solution to the specific 
form of the specific medieval problem of the supernatural consists in the application by 
analogy of a prior, philosophical solution to the generic problem of the supernatural. I 
was tipped off to this undergirding philosophical position by Bernard Lonergan’s 
reconstruction of Thomas’s theory of operative and cooperative grace, as well as his 
detailed treatment of divine agency, knowledge, and volition.1 
                                                
1 Bernard Lonergan made a lengthy study of Thomas Aquinas’ works in the late 1930s and 
through the 1940s. This resulted in a number of texts. Some are exegetical works concerned with reporting 
what Thomas thought on the basis of what he wrote, like Lonergan’s dissertation, Gratia Operans: A Study 
of the Speculative Development in the Writings of Thomas Aquinas and the heavily revised Theological 
Studies article into which he transformed it. See Bernard Lonergan, Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace 
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The hinge between Thomas’s theory of divine agency and his theory of grace is 
his account of divine and human cooperation. This chapter, thus, takes as its primary 
purpose the exposition of Thomas’s position on concursus. In order that this position be 
shown with adequate clarity, and so that its character as a solution to the medieval 
problem(s) of the supernatural be manifest, a great deal of ink will be spilt on the prior 
and foundational notions that are its material. In what follows, we will first acknowledge 
the theological problematic that plants the notion of cooperation with God in the fertile 
soil of Christian speculation: the apparently contradictory dual affirmation of the need for 
God’s grace and the reality of human freedom. Then we will follow Lonergan’s seven 
phases of development in the theological material that made his synthetic solution to this 
problem possible. This solution rests upon two foundational ideas: a theorem of the states 
of human nature and, most importantly for our purposes, what Lonergan calls the 
“theorem of the supernatural.” From these theological materials we turn to Lonergan’s 
lengthy and complicated account of the philosophical material that Thomas appropriated 
and augmented to fund his position on divine agency. Because the development of these 
philosophical materials is sufficiently unwieldy, I will follow up the account of their 
development with Lonergan’s synchronic and synthetic presentation of the same notions 
from his supplementary textbook, “De scientia atque voluntate Dei.” Finally, I examine 
                                                                                                                                            
in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas, eds. Frederick E. Crowe, Robert M. Doran, CWL 1 (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2000). Others from roughly the same time period are supplementary Latin-
language texts Lonergan provided to his seminary students in order to augment the assigned manuals and to 
aid their understanding of Thomas’s synthetic positions on important theological loci, like providence, 
predestination, and grace. See Bernard Lonergan, “God’s Knowledge and Will,” in Early Latin Theology, 
eds. H. Daniel Monsour, Robert M. Doran, CWL 19 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011), 256-
411. What I will present here is no more than “Lonergan’s Thomas.” Moreover, I present the positions he 
advanced in order that they should be measured by their adequacy to the speculative problems they address, 
rather than by their fidelity to my reader’s sense of what surely Thomas meant.  
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philosophically the solution to the specific form of the generic problem of the 
supernatural: free cooperation between human agents and God.   
1. The Dialectical Position: Grace and Freedom  
Speculative theology, Lonergan posits, begins from “dialectical positions.”2 These 
Lonergan conceives on analogy with “methodological positions” in the natural sciences. 
Scientists will “maintain incompatible theories simultaneously,” such as that light is both 
a wave and a particle, in order to both indicate what is known, but also that element 
which is as-yet-unknown. Lonergan’s notion of a dialectical position does something 
similar with the truths or “doctrines” of the Christian faith. Because “truth is one, and 
God is truth,” apparently contradictory doctrines are affirmed by the speculative 
theologians even when the theoretical mechanics of their unity as yet escapes theological 
articulation. But Lonergan’s notion of dialectical positions is “more radical” than the 
methodological positions held by the scientist. The theories affirmed by the scientist may 
be overturned in a later paradigm that clarifies the unity of the two apparently opposed 
accounts. The doctrines of the Christian faith, though they may develop in their 
expressions, are permanent in their meaning. Complete explanation of the universe is, at 
least in principle, a proportionate aim for the scientist. Complete positive comprehension 
of God in God’s transcendence is not a proportionate aim for the theologian. And so the 
as-yet-unknown moment in theology’s dialectical positions cannot ever be entirely 
eliminated, even as the imperfect understanding (or, more precisely, the negative 
coherence of explicitly articulated non-contradiction) continues to prove intellectually 
                                                
2 Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, 166.  
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fruitful. The theorems and techniques of speculative theology are instruments for 
achieving this imperfect but fruitful understanding, and so for discerning that element in a 
dialectical position which is susceptible to explanation by analogy and that element 
which remains mysterious and so hidden in God. 
The problem of the supernatural has its roots in Christian late antiquity. The 
conjunction of two apparently contradictory affirmations in Christian doctrine generated 
controversy at the end of the fourth century. St. Augustine in De gratia et libero arbitrio 
argued for both the reality of human freedom and the gratuity of God’s grace. Pelagians 
prioritized the Christian affirmation of human freedom and moral responsibility to make 
the merit of human action a condition of God’s grace. By contrast, there were monks at 
Hadrumetum who so prioritized God’s grace that human freedom was denied altogether.3 
Against the Pelagians, Augustine offered an incipiently speculative distinction between 
operative and cooperative grace. Lonergan summarizes it as follows:  
God cooperates with good will to give it good performance; but alone he operates 
on bad will to make it good; so that good will itself no less than good performance 
is to be attributed to the divine gift of grace…Thus God operates to initiate us in 
the spiritual life, and he cooperates to bring us to perfection; alone he works to 
give us good desires, and together with our good desires he labors to give us good 
performance.4  
Whether God operates a bad will or cooperates with a good will, God’s grace is always 
the cause of our meritorious actions. Against the opposite error, Lonergan notes 
Augustine’s insistence that the will is just as free when God is cooperating with a good 
will as when God replaces a heart of stone with a heart of flesh. This is a matter of 
                                                
3 Ibid., 7. 
4 Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, 5; Augustine, De gratia et libero arbitrio, cc. 14–17, §§27–33, 
897–901. 
   
 
53 
biblical witness for Augustine.5 Still, he does not paper over this apparent difficulty. 
Lonergan writes, 
How, Augustine asks, can God say both dabo vobis and facite vobis? Why does 
he give, if man is to be the maker? Or why does he command, if he himself is to 
be the giver? To this the answer is the celebrated paradox: the will of man is 
always free but not always good: either it is free from justice, and then it is evil; 
or it is liberated from sin, and then it is good.6 
Appeal to paradox does not solve the difficulty; it only clarifies its terms. Paradox serves 
to acknowledge that two apparently contradictory terms are actually coincident and so the 
contradiction must be merely apparent. Paradox indicates that there is a dialectical 
position confronting the theologian. Moreover, it indicates that there must be a 
speculative solution to the apparent contradiction. It does not of itself provide one.  
Augustine’s appeal to paradox can only be considered a speculative failure if his 
text indicates that he had set out to provide a speculative theory of grace. Lonergan does 
not think De gratia et libero arbitrio can be considered to have such a speculative 
purpose. Rather, Lonergan finds Augustine argued in an essentially dogmatic manner, 
“marshaling such an array of [biblical and patristic] texts that the [doctrinal] claim is 
obviously true.” In Augustine’s words, “Not I, but scripture itself has argued with you.”7 
That humans are free and that grace is beyond any desert of ours is something one assents 
to when one affirms the teaching of the Church. That affirmation need not, and for many 
centuries did not include an understanding of how exactly both of those things were true 
                                                
5 “(God) has revealed to us through his holy scriptures that there is free choice of will in man.” 
Augustine, De gratia et libero arbitrio. c. 2, §2, 882.  
6 Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, 6. 
7 Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, 7; Augustine, De gratia et libero arbitrio, c. 20, §41, 905–906. 
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without contradiction. If Augustine’s readers struggled to understand what he put forward 
on the basis of what God has revealed, “they were not to dispute but to pray for light.”8   
Although the apparent antinomy of grace and freedom was shown to be no 
justification for straying from orthodox belief, the antinomy itself was not made to 
disappear. If God’s grace is gratuitous and so beyond our power to merit (as the Church 
teaches), how does receipt of it not impinge on or even obliterate our freedom (which the 
Church also affirms)? How can it be that grace really changes the person who receives it, 
but also it does not thereby deprive that person of his or her agency? Still, these twin 
doctrinal commitments—to the reality of human freedom and to the absolute gratuity of 
God’s grace—are explicitly part and parcel of the Christian endowment at least as early 
as St. Augustine. So began a centuries-long effort at a coherent speculative theology that 
would not only affirm both, but also show how what is affirmed can be understood 
together.  
2. The Development of the Theological Material 
Recall that the dialectical position on grace and freedom has its origins in 
Augustine’s polemics against the Pelagians, where the central issue was the necessity of 
grace. Augustine coined the distinction between gratia operans and gratia cooperans to 
indicate the universal necessity of grace. Lonergan traced the development of the 
problem to which this distinction is an answer. He organized his inquiry into the 
theological development of gratia operans from Augustine through Aquinas around five 
general phases. Within these he constructed a seven-phase scheme for development on 
                                                
8 Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, 7. 
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the theorem of the necessity of grace specifically. In Lonergan’s view, this theorem made 
Thomas’s final theological position on grace possible. Tracing this development will 
allow me to present relevant developments in the philosophy of God as they emerge in 
cooperation with the theology of grace. These developments in the philosophy of God 
will, in the longer term, make possible the position on concursus in which Thomas’s 
solution to the medieval problem of the supernatural consists.  
2.1. The Necessity of Grace 
For Lonergan, an adequate account of the necessity of grace rests on a set of two 
cognate theorems: the theorem of the supernatural and the theorem of the states of human 
nature. I will be concerned mainly with the theorem of the supernatural, but in the context 
of speculation on grace, Lonergan calls this the “generic” theorem, because it considers 
humans as creatures in general. The theorem of “the states of man,” however, considers 
specifically different initial starting positions for attaining eternal life, and so Lonergan 
calls it the “specific” theorem. Lonergan’s seven-phase scheme takes this distinction, 
between the generic and specific theorems, as a hint at the formal structure of the 
speculative development behind Thomas’s position on grace. He notes that learning 
begins from the particular and then moves to the general, only to then return to the 
particular. 9 By underlining the place of the particular within a larger horizon, one can 
reveal significant features of the particular.10 Lonergan’s seven-phase scheme, then, finds 
                                                
9 Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, 179. 
10 Indeed, this is my strategy in this project: to show how a renewed emphasis on the generic, 
fundamental, and philosophical problem of cooperation helps to reveal significant features of the specific 
medieval and modern forms of the problem of the supernatural that pertain to grace and God’s redemptive 
work in history. 
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this movement concretized in the development of the above theorems, from the specific 
to the generic and back to the specific.  
2.1.1. Phase 1 
The first phase of development begins from a question: why is grace necessary? 
Development per se does not begin with the naked perplexity of a problem, but only 
when a possible solution to the problem, a possible answer to the question, is adverted to 
and analyzed. Lonergan again points to Augustine as the font of development in De 
correptione et gratia. There, Augustine notes a significant difference in Adam’s need for 
grace from our own. The first man, he notes, had been given the ability not to sin and so 
was “righteous in that good in which he was created(.)”11 By contrast, the predestined do 
not have this same help that enables them to avoid sin (“perseverance”). To the extent 
that they do have perseverance, they have it by a different “gift” without which they 
could not persevere in avoiding sin.12  Augustine also says that “a greater liberty is 
needed” against temptations that did not exist in the pre-lapsarian paradise. Adam was 
created with a free will that he “made a slave to sin,” whereas the predestined have a will 
that “had been a slave to sin” but was liberated by Christ. This liberation, however, is not 
to the freedom possessed by Adam, but a different freedom provided by the Second 
Adam, Christ—a freedom enslaved to justice and God forever.13 The specific theorem—
                                                
11 Augustine, De correptione et gratia, C. 12, §34, 937. 
12 Ibid.: “'... such a help to perseverance is not given to the predestined, but such that perseverance 
itself is given; not only so that without that gift they are unable to persevere, but also so that by means of 
this gift they are actually persevering and not failing to do so.” 
13 Ibid. §35, 937–38: “A greater liberty is needed against so many and such strong temptations, 
which did not exist in paradise ... To him (Adam) therefore was given without any sin the free will with 
which he was created, and he (Adam) made it a slave to sin; but of these (who are predestined), when 
(their) will had been the slave of sin, it was liberated by him who said, If the Son has set you free, then you 
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the theorem of the states of human nature—first peeks onto the scene on this hunch that 
grace is needed because of a specific difference in our state from that possessed by our 
first parents after their creation and prior to their fall into sin. We need a gift they did not 
need and a freedom they did not have.  
2.1.2. Phase 2 
The second phase generalizes the basic tendency of the specific theorem into a 
full articulation of the difference between our need for grace and that of our first parents. 
The tendency in Augustine to treat grace and liberty as correlates gets taken up and 
extended into an account of the four states of, not human nature in general, but human 
liberty specifically. Lonergan follows Landgraf in locating this scheme’s full articulation 
in Lombard’s Sentences. The first state of human liberty is possessed ‘before sin.’ 
Nothing impedes the good, nothing impels evil, reason can proceed without error, and the 
will can desire what is good without difficulty. The second state is possessed ‘after sin 
without grace.’ We are able to sin, unable to not sin, and our concupiscence oppresses 
and conquers us. The third state is possessed ‘after reparation’ by grace. Though we are 
still oppressed by concupiscence, we are not conquered by it, so that in our liberty and 
weakness we are able to sin, but in our liberty and God’s grace we are once again able 
not to sin. The fourth state is possessed ‘after confirmation’ in grace. We are unable to be 
                                                                                                                                            
will be truly free (John 8.36) ... To this sin (of final impenitence) they are no longer slaves, not free in that 
first state as he was, but by the grace of God set free through the second Adam, and in that liberation 
having the free will by which they are slaves to God, not that by which they are taken captive by the devil. 
For set free from sin they are made slaves to justice (Romans 6.18), in which they will stand to the very 
end.” 
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either conquered or oppressed by concupiscence, and so have the inability to sin.14 One 
can see, then, how when the need for grace is addressed by a fully generalized theorem of 
the states of man, the whole discussion proceeds in terms of liberty, but without an 
articulated theory of liberty itself. In other words, freedom is not considered in terms of a 
nature distinct from grace. That grace and freedom (and so human nature) are compatible 
is affirmed, but still not explained. 
2.1.3. Phase 3 
In the third phase, Augustine’s tendency to treat grace and liberty as correlates 
becomes codified in an established theorem and the specific theorem alone is applied to 
the question of the need for grace. As a result, a number of speculative inadequacies 
appear more clearly. The need for some further speculative apparatus becomes manifest 
as the specific theorem raises further questions it is inadequate to answer.  
First, there is inadequacy on the question of merit. In Lonergan’s view, Lombard 
states the doctrine of merit quite correctly. Adam and Eve need grace because, though 
they are adequate to the avoidance of sin as created, they are not adequate to merit eternal 
life; for that another grace besides creation is needed. The problem remains, however, 
why avoiding sin without further grace is not meritorious.15 The specific theorem alone 
                                                
14 Peter Lombard, Libri IV Sententiarum, 2, d. 25, c. 6: "And four states of free will can be noted in 
man. For before sin there was nothing to impede the good, and nothing to impel to evil ... then reason was 
able to judge without error, and will able without difficulty to desire the good. But after sin, before the 
reparation of grace, (man) is oppressed by concupiscence and conquered ... he is able to sin and unable not 
to sin, even to the incurring of damnation. But after reparation ... (man) is oppressed by concupiscence, but 
is not conquered ... so that because of liberty and weakness he is able to sin, and because of liberty and 
helping grace he is able not to sin ... But after confirmation (in grace) ... he will be unable either to be 
oppressed or conquered, and then he will have the inability to sin.” 
15 Lombard speculates that post-lapsarian humans merit eternal life when we avoid sin, but 
because we have difficulty doing so. In the state of original innocence, there was no difficulty and so no 
merit. Lonergan attributes St Albert’s befuddlement at this position to Albert having fully absorbed the 
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cannot explain this. A distinction between naturalia and gratuita, though commonplace, 
is left similarly without speculative support. If the specific theorem is the only available 
speculative scheme on hand, it is perfectly logical (as Radulphus Ardens had it) to argue 
that all virtues were originally natural, but were lost by original sin, and are only now 
gratuitous for us in our present state.16 Of course, this means that although gratuita is 
strongly affirmed, it is at the expense of naturalia, which is effectively denied. From this 
follows claims like that without charity, there are no virtues at all, that besides charity 
there is only cupidity, and that nature is per se crooked.17 From this denial of nature 
emerges a further inadequacy with regard to the definition of grace. Now, the doctrinal 
definition was established. No one disagreed that “grace is what is due to God's free gift 
and not due to man's desert.” The speculative difficulty was to say what, on that 
definition, was not grace—“after all, what is there that is not a free gift of God?”18 
Cardinal Laborans, for example, variously defined grace first as “everything man either 
has at birth or receives after birth,” then more specifically, “everything that the elect have 
at birth or receive afterwards,” finally landing on the virtues of the elect.19  The tendency, 
in other words, to resolve the question by an undifferentiated appeal to ‘gift’ is not a 
uniquely modern, nor a forgotten Patristic insight. 
Further, a purely psychological description of grace—as healing fallen reason and 
will—leaves the practice of infant baptism in a mess of controversies. Lonergan notes 
                                                                                                                                            
generic theorem of the supernatural without realizing it was a development without which Lombard had 
labored. See Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, 185, n. 51; 217. 
16 Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, 186. See also Artur Landgraf, 'Studien zur Erkenntnis des 
Ubernatürlichen in der Frühscholastik,' Scholastik 4 (1929): 212; alternatively, see Dogmengeschichte der 
Frühscholastik (Regensburg: Verlag Friedrich Pustet, 1952), 180. 
17 Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, 186. 
18 Ibid., 15, 186. 
19 Ibid., 15–16. 
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that forgiveness of sin and justification are in scripture attributed to conversion, faith, and 
charity, which do not on their face seem to be habits, but psychological acts. However, 
baptism of infants “opens the gates of heaven.”20 It seems to follow, then, that the 
baptized infant is justified. Evidently the essence of justification could not lie in the order 
of acts. What it is about the “sacrament of faith” that infants receive in baptism that 
justifies them remained unclear until the thirteenth century. Lonergan believes that, in 
part, this difficulty persisted so long because the speculative question itself went unasked 
by many. More importantly, when it was asked, the requisite theoretical materials were 
simply unavailable. Certainly the Aristotelian theory of habit was not on the scene, but 
also, in the absence of the more wide-ranging theorem of the supernatural, the effort to 
apply only the theorem of the states of liberty to the question distorted the entire 
enterprise. It leaves Lombard indecisive, for instance, about whether virtue is an act or a 
habit and inclined many to the view that the notion of virtue as a habit was simply 
inconceivable. Lonergan speculates that this may have led to the mistaken distinction 
between remission of sins in infants and the infusion of grace in adults.21 It is only when 
Waldenses and Cathari begin to demand re-baptism of adults baptized as infants that the 
issue is resolved dogmatically in a condemnation of the above distinction.22 The lack of a 
speculative solution remained however. Continued correlation of liberty (in terms of 
reason and will) and grace (exclusively understood as the reparation of fallen reason and 
                                                
20 Ibid., 175. 
21 Ibid., 177, n. 33. 
22 Ibid., 178. 
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will) left firmly entrenched the psychological approach to grace that created the problem 
of infant baptism in the first place.23  
The final inadequacy, then, is the decisive one: though grace is defined in terms of 
liberty, no adequate philosophical theory of liberty can emerge into the speculative 
theological enterprise. Thus, the theory of grace is rendered viciously circular. A 
philosophical theory of liberty is needed to shed analogical light upon the speculative 
problem of grace and generate synthetic (rather than merely analytic) approaches thereto. 
Lonergan speculates that the condemnation of Abelard’s position on liberty (“That free 
will is enough by itself for (doing) some good”) may have led to Lombard’s definition: 
“free will is the faculty of reason and will by which the good, with the help of grace, is 
chosen, or evil (is chosen) when grace is lacking.”24 If the question, “why is grace 
necessary?” stood alone, this could perhaps prove a satisfying definition. However, the 
foregoing has labored to show how the speculative question about the necessity of grace 
serves an ulterior, indeed prior aim: explaining the coherence of affirming both the 
universal need for grace and the reality of human freedom. Lombard’s definition simply 
restates the dialectical position in its paradoxical form. St. Anselm and St. Bernard had 
the same problem.25 This is not to say that there was no philosophical definition of liberty 
at hand (Lombard quotes Boethius’s definition, for example), but the problem is how to 
                                                
23 “[Anselm] gave the problem of infant baptism a solution which, if brilliant and containing an 
essential element of the truth, nonetheless tended to postpone indefinitely the true solution. Briefly, his 
position was this: the infant cannot have justice, for it elicits no act of will; but this incapacity is sinful 
before baptism because of Adam's sin; on the other hand, because baptism removes the culpa, the infant's 
incapacity becomes excusable.” Ibid., 177. 
24 Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, 173–4; Lombard, Sententiae, 2, d. 24, c. 3. 
25 Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, 174, n. 15. 
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deploy it in such a way that the natural element and the revealed element are affirmed 
coherently and not just paradoxically.26  
2.1.4. Phase 4 
In small part, the entrance of the notion of habitual grace onto the scene helped to 
crack open a number of these problems. The more momentous advance was the theorem 
of the supernatural and with it a governing tendency to distinguish two different orders, 
one disproportionate to the other. With it, the fourth phase of speculation on the necessity 
of grace could begin. Lonergan finds the first hints of its speculative efficacy when 
Stephen Langton links gratum faciens, gratuitum and meritum. This linkage begins to 
suggest that grace is not merely a matter of healing the psychological effects of sin, but 
also of making the created soul somehow fit for eternal life. Praepositinus makes more 
headway “by pointing out that reason is the highest thing in nature, yet faith is above 
reason.”27 This begins to make more explicit a distinction between ontological orders. 
But it was, in Lonergan’s view, Philip the Chancellor who established the significance of 
the theorem of the supernatural permanently by breaking with St. Bernard and Hugh of 
St. Victor to affirm a distinction between a natural amor amiritiae erga Deum and charity 
as the meritorious love of God.28 In doing so, he further distinguished two kinds of 
appetite, natural and rational:  
[He] asserted the former to be self-regarding, the latter to tend absolutely to the 
honestum; and then subdistinguished two rational appetites, one following reason, 
                                                
26 Ibid., 174–5.  
27 Ibid., 16 - 7; 185. 
28 Ibid., 17; 185. 
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another following faith; the former of these is dilectio naturalis, the latter is 
charity.29 
Lonergan finds that Philip gave an articulation of the theorem of the supernatural, in this 
case applied to the question of a meritorious love of God. To the “familiar series of grace, 
faith, charity, and merit,” Philip the Chancellor systematically correlated “nature, reason, 
and the natural love of God.” His is a “theory of two orders, entitatively 
disproportionate(.)”30 This structure of two disproportionate orders is the generic theorem 
of the supernatural at work. It will, in Lonergan’s estimation, crack open the question of 
the necessity of grace and by extension the question of gratia operans et cooperans. It 
also facilitates a more adequate articulation of divine transcendence and immanence that 
leads to what I am calling the solution to the generic medieval problem of the 
supernatural and, as we will see in Chapter 3, its attendant ambiguities.  
Lonergan goes to some lengths to insist that the theorem of the supernatural is not 
some new doctrinal element added to the definition of grace. It does not add any data to 
the problem. As a theorem, it is the intelligible nexus organizing the data into a coherent 
unity. Thus, when Philip addresses the question of merit by delineating two orders, he is 
not introducing a supernatural character to grace that was not already affirmed. In phase 
three, we saw how gratuitas was never in danger, but often it was affirmed at the expense 
of naturalia. What Philip achieved “was the creation of a mental perspective, the 
introduction of a set of coordinates,” making it possible to intelligently affirm “the 
validity of a line of reference termed nature.”31 It became possible to recognize that the 
root inadequacy in the specific theorem consisted in an inability to distinguish in thought 
                                                
29 Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, 185; Landgraf, Dogmengeschichte, 197–99. 
30 Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, 17; Landgraf, Dogmengeschichte, 182, 197–99. 
31 Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, 17. 
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what in the concrete is given all together (the gift of grace and the nature of freedom). 
The theorem of the supernatural made this possible. The general need for gratia elavans 
and the specific need for gratia sanans could eventually be coordinated on firm 
speculative ground. 
2.1.5. Phase 5 
In the fifth phase, as in the second, there is the generalization of the newly 
emergent theorem to its full articulation and application. Once Philip the Chancellor 
introduces the theorem of the supernatural onto the speculative scene, it can (like the 
specific theorem before it) be generalized and so extended to a number of extant 
problems. Alexander of Hales takes it up to resolve the problem of merit in pre-lapsarian 
humans that Lombard had failed to address. Albert the Great develops a theory of 
sanctifying grace, resolving the issue of infant baptism and also providing some clarity to 
the respect in which divine virtues were divine. Finally, we come to Thomas Aquinas’s 
direct statement of the need for grace in terms of the disproportion of the divine essence 
to the powers of any created being in the Summa contra Gentiles: “Quidquid excedit 
limites alicuius naturae, non potest sibi advenire nisi per actionem alterius.”32  
2.1.6. Phase 6 
In the sixth phase, as in the third, there is the tendency to utilize one theorem to 
the exclusion of any other. But now it is the generic theorem that is given pride of place. 
So the force of the theorem of the supernatural in explaining the need for grace in our 
first parents to merit eternal life and the efficacy of sanctifying grace in baptized infants 
                                                
32 Ibid., 17–18. 
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to the same effect eclipsed the problem of moral impotence in St. Albert’s Sentence 
commentary and the early works of St. Thomas.33 According to Lonergan, “both attempt 
to reduce the non posse non peccare to the sinner's inability to obtain the remission of his 
sins without grace.” In their historical moment, the issue was reconciling non posse non 
peccare with liberty. In that sense, a generalized application of the generic theorem to the 
problems that occasioned the specific theorem meant a certain subterranean Pelagianism 
loomed. Without the specifications of our concrete situation—namely, the moral 
impotence proper to a fallen nature—Thomas’s rather direct statement that “man is able 
to fulfill through free will that good which is proportionate to human nature” becomes 
dangerously ambiguous.34 Even Thomas’s follow up remark, “but although man can 
perform good works of this kind without the grace that makes him pleasing (to God), still 
he cannot perform them without God,” does not quite snatch the issue back from the 
brink. Habitual grace called out for a distinct notion of actual grace as the theological 
analogue to the Aristotelian pair, habit and act, but initially Thomas allows a general 
notion of divine providence to carry the whole issue.35 Consequently, it is not fully clear 
if grace is concretely needed to perform naturally virtuous acts or merely providence. It is 
not clear if grace is both operans and cooperans as elevans and sanans in both habit and 
act.  
                                                
33 Ibid., 188, n. 63. 
34 Ibid., 184, n. 41; see also Thomas Aquinas, Super II Sententiarum, d. 28, q. i, a. 2. 
35 This point will receive elaboration below when we directly consider Thomas’s mature position 
on providence, Deus operans, and the question of cooperation. 
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2.1.7. Phase 7 
In the seventh phase, Thomas is able to synthesize the generic theorem of the 
supernatural and the specific theorem of the states of nature into a compound theorem of 
the necessity of grace. The paragraph from the Prima Secundae is so clear in its 
application of both theorems to the question that I feel compelled to present it in its 
entirety here: 
Thus, then, there is one respect in which man in the state of integral nature needs 
a gratuitous power superadded to the power of nature, namely, (the power) to do 
and will a supernatural good. But in the state of fallen nature, there are two 
respects (in which he needs something gratuitous added): namely, for healing, and 
further to perform a good work of supernatural power, which is meritorious. 
Further still, in both states man needs divine help in order to be moved by that 
help to act righteously.36 
First, there is presented an answer to the question why we need grace in terms of the 
generic theorem of the supernatural. The powers of our human nature need a gratuitous, 
supernatural power added to them in order to be proportionate to desiring and performing 
supernatural goods. Without this elevation of our natures, they are disproportionate to the 
divine order in which they would participate. Second, there is the restatement of our need 
for grace in terms of our specified state of nature—namely, fallen. Concretely, we are 
both disproportionate to the supernatural good, but also so wounded by sin that we are 
morally impotent with regard to both disproportionate and proportionate goods. Further, 
in the light of the generic theorem, the blanket statement non posse non peccare can now 
be specified. In general, there are goods to which human beings are created proportionate, 
but, specifically, fallen humans are unable to will and do these without the help of 
healing (gratia sanans). Finally, because of this commerce between the two theorems, we 
                                                
36 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 109, a. 2. 
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can identify two sets of two respects in which human beings need divine help to act 
righteously: both to elevate and to heal and both to do the proportionate good and the 
disproportionate good. Thus is laid the foundation of a distinction between the help of 
general providence and the help of grace, operative and cooperative, healing and 
elevating, habitual and actual. But this last point gets me out ahead of myself. The 
theorem of the supernatural turns out to have significance beyond the questions of merit 
and the necessity of grace. This significance regards God’s general providence, the theory 
of divine operation, and the question of free human cooperation with God. All of these 
play a central role in the medieval solution to the medieval problem of the supernatural 
and the ambiguities we will see in Chapter 3 that follow therefrom. But what do the 
generic and specific medieval problems of the supernatural share in common? Both 
puzzle over the integral cooperation between two disproportionate orders. Consequently, 
the generic medieval solution is a theory of cooperation and Thomas applies it by analogy 
to the specific medieval problem, as evident in ST 1-2, q. 109, a. 2.   
But before a theory of co-operation can be derived, there is needed a prior account 
of operation itself. It is fitting, then, that I turn now to Lonergan’s retrieval of Thomas’s 
theory of operation, both in general and specifically on the matter of divine operation. 
First, I will consider Thomas’s appropriation and augmentation of Aristotle’s theory of 
action. Second, some consideration will be given to Thomas’s adaptation of Aristotle’s 
theory of praemotio physica and the argument that effective action requires ‘application,’ 
or an order that brings agent and patient into proper disposition. Third, the notion of 
hierarchical degrees of causality will be explicated so that, fourth and finally, Thomas’s 
theorem of divine cooperation or “concursus” can at last be laid out with some clarity. 
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Indeed, with the theorem of divine concursus, we are finally getting down to the business 
at hand: explicating the theory of divine and creaturely cooperation that at once 
undergirds the medieval solution to the medieval problem of the supernatural, but at the 
same time reveals the medieval ambiguity waiting behind an adequate philosophy of 
divine agency. 
3. The Development of the Philosophical Material 
Whether one is investigating the question of God’s general auxilium or the 
specific question of God’s grace, attributing agency to God can carry a problematic 
implication: does God, in acting, change? If so, at the very least God’s simplicity, 
infinity, and eternity are all called into question. On the other hand, if God does not 
change, how can there be meaningful free cooperation between human beings and God? 
Would not God’s unchanging agency determine the human will such that any hint of 
freedom is excluded? Again, the same problem appears whether one takes up the topic of 
providence or of grace because it is a problem that hounds talk of divine agency in 
general. For Lonergan, this problem haunts the theology of providence and of grace alike 
because it has its roots in philosophical assumptions about agency itself. This, after all, is 
the nature of speculative theology: “it constructs its theorems with respect to the 
supernatural order by appealing to the analogy of nature.”37 Thus, when Lonergan 
approaches the problems of divine action in his dissertation, he tackles the philosophical 
question of agency first out of the gate.  
                                                
37 Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, 252. 
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The fundamental question is whether, in passing from posse agere to actu agere, 
an agent undergoes change qua agent. On its face, there seems good reason to think so. 
“Now it is evident,” Lonergan writes “that the two propositions, potest agere, actu agere, 
cannot both be true with respect to the same agent and the same activity at the same time. 
The two, as defined, are contradictory: the first means that (one) is not acting; the second 
that (one) is acting.” There must be, then, some real difference in the objective situations 
described by the respective propositions, “(for) contradictory propositions cannot be 
verified in identical situations.”38  However, to assume that a real change in the agent qua 
agent provides this difference creates a problem for any Thomistic or Aristotelian 
philosophy: it excludes a motor immobilis. If one affirms a change in the agent passing 
from posse agere to actu agere as a priori necessary, one has to also accept the 
implication that this change is a priori universal. If that is the case—if omne movens 
movetur—then there is excluded the possibility of a motor immobilis and so, by dint of 
infinite regress, neither can there be motion, nor by extension can there be action.39  
Perhaps there is a theological reason we can affirm a real change in the agent 
actually acting. Have we not already gone to great lengths to show the mark left on 
Thomas’s thought by the theorem of the supernatural? Perhaps there is a difference 
between the agency of the Creator and the agency of creatures on the question of posse 
agere and actu agere. Lonergan denies that Thomas thought so. True, the Creator acts in 
virtue of a substantial act and the creature an accidental one, as Thomas indicates in ST 1 
q. 54, aa. 1–3, but Lonergan insists there is no evidence that He also “places in the 
                                                
38 Ibid., 252. 
39 Ibid., 253–4. 
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creature a real distinction between a posse agere and actu agere.”40 Thomas’s account of 
agency is a completely general philosophic account. In addressing the position Thomas 
held, Lonergan briefly exposits the Aristotelian doctrine of agency Thomas appropriated 
and then turns to Thomas’s commentary, which includes first a defense of the doctrine 
and then an important augmentation. This augmentation regards how action is predicated 
of an agent and it seems meant to head off the very misunderstanding with which we are 
concerned here—namely, the attribution of a real difference in one actu agere. 
3.1. Aristotle’s Position 
First, then, there is Aristotle’s position on motion.41 Lonergan summarizes it as it 
appears in Physics III, boiling it down to seven definitions and a six-step exposition. 
Notice how Lonergan breaks down Aristotle’s philosophical position into its basic terms 
and defines them by their relation to one another, only then fitting them into a 
theorematic scheme.  
First, the definitions:  
1) An actively moving thing (motivum) is that which can move something 
(movere). 
2) A mover (movens) is that which moves something (movet). 
                                                
40 Ibid., 254. 
41 Thomas initially sides with Avicenna against Aristotle on the question of actio, treating an 
action as an accident that must be double because it cannot reside in two different subjects at once, even if 
the movement itself is one. But again, Lonergan insists that, even before Thomas abandons this position of 
the Sentences and De potentia, he never explicitly asserts that this inherence of actio as an accident 
amounts to a real change in the agent qua agent. ⁠ In Lonergan’s estimation, however, Thomas comes around 
to Aristotle’s position in his commentaries and in the Summa theologiae. The strong implication is that the 
later position is the mature position, and indeed the position that makes a successful analogy from the 
nature of agency possible in the speculative theology of grace. Though Thomas sticks to his own 
terminology (actio rather than motus), Lonergan shows how he presents, defends, and helpfully augments 
Aristotle’s position in the commentaries on the Physics, De anima, and the Metaphysics. See ibid., 254–60. 
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3) A movable thing (mobile) is that which can be moved (moveri). 
4) A moved thing (motum) is that which is moved (movetur). 
5) Movement (motus) is the act of something existing in potency (potentia) 
insofar as it is in potency. 
6) Action (actio) is a movement… as from the agent (ut ab agente). 
7) Passion (passio) is a movement… as in the patient (patiente).42  
Lonergan then exposits in six steps how these terms fit together into a single 
theorematic scheme to explain what motion is. The first three steps delineate which terms 
in the above definitions constitute real and adequate distinctions and which do not. First, 
between a mover (movens) and an actively moving thing (motivum) there is no real 
distinction. Second, there are adequate real distinctions between a mover and a movement 
(motus), between a mover and a movable thing (mobile), and between a moveable thing 
and a movement. Third, there is a real, but inadequate distinction between a moveable 
thing and a moved thing (motum) and between a movement and a moved thing.  
The latter three steps of Lonergan’s exposition make more explicit how the above 
definitions fit together into a full theory of agency. Fourth, then, the reality of a 
movement is common in both action (actio) and passion (passio), such that there is only 
one entity, but it is called an action when considered from its relation to its origin and it is 
called passion from its relation to its subject. Fifth, the active potency of a thing moving 
(motivum) and the passive potency of a moveable thing both move from potency to act, 
but this transit involves only one act. This act is the same movement in the moveable 
thing (as passio) and from the mover (as actio). Sixth and finally, the distinction between 
                                                
42 Ibid., 261; I have slightly modified the translations provided in the Lexicon of Latin and Greek 
Phrases provided by the editors, (ibid., 493–514). 
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action and passion is thereby maintained even though the reality, the motus, is a single 
entity. This is because the movement has two terms: its origin and its subject. When the 
movement is considered from the origin, it is called action. When it is considered in the 
subject, it is called passion.43  
For Aristotle, motion is a single entity that can be considered from the vantage of 
its origin or from the vantage of its subject. Though both the origin (movens) and the 
subject (motum) transit from potency to act—actually moving and actually moved, 
respectively—there is only one act, the movement itself. This inheres in the moved 
subject, but is merely “from” the moving origin. This turns out to be the fundamental 
point in Aristotle’s theory of agency as appropriated by Thomas. Thus, the distinction 
between actio and passio is maintained, but as notional rather than real. In other words, 
the distinction survives despite Aristotle demoting its ground from the assumed 
substantial difference to a difference of relation.  
3.2. Thomas’s Commentary 
Thomas clarifies Aristotle’s account by distinguishing between a mover moving 
as mover and a mover “happening to be moved when moving.”44 He insists on the 
theoretical control of meaning at work in Aristotle’s definitions: “still movement is not 
the act of the thing moving but of the movable thing insofar as it is movable.”45 To recur 
to definition 5 above: Movement (motus) is the act of something existing in potency 
(potentia) insofar as it is in potency. That the mover is concretely moving does not mean 
                                                
43 Ibid., 261–2. 
44 Ibid., 262 (emphasis added). 
45 Ibid. 
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that it is moving qua mover, and so the abstractions of Aristotle’s doctrine are liberated 
from the ostensible “self-evidence” of the way things appear—the very “obviousness” of 
which gave rise to the quandaries of physics in the first place.  
Thomas also underlines what I noted above: since the movement as passio is in 
the patient and only from the agent, the act of a movement inheres in the moved because 
“the act of anything at all is in that to whom the act belongs.”46 Now, the movement is 
still caused by the mover or agent, even though the movement—and so the act of the 
movement—is in the patient. But this leads to something of a subtlety in Thomas’s 
commentary. Because the mover is also moving, which is to say that it has movement in 
it in another respect (than as agent), it must also have act in some respect. Thus the 
question is raised: is this movement in the mover the difference or change needed to 
explain the transit from posse agere to actu agere?47 Thomas’s answer is worth quoting 
at length: 
He (Aristotle) shows that the same act is act of the mover and the moved. For 
'mover' is said insofar as something acts, but 'moved' insofar as it is changed; but 
it is the same thing which as mover causes by acting and which as moved is 
changed by receiving. And this is what he says (in stating) that the mover is the 
'active force of the movable thing,' that is, it causes the act of the movable thing. 
And therefore it is necessary that there be just one act of the two, namely, of the 
mover and of the moved; for it is the same thing that is from the mover as from 
agent cause, and is in the patient as receiver.48 
We see with Thomas the pay-off of Aristotle’s control of theoretical terms. Movers cause 
by acting, but receiving this active force changes the moved. Thus, the act is shared in the 
movement from agent to patient, but only the patient is changed. What, though, about the 
movement in the agent? Is not that a change in the mover qua mover, in the agent qua 
                                                
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid., 263. 
48 Thomas Aquinas, In Aristotelis libros Physicorum, III, lect. 4, §306. 
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agent? Aristotle denies this on the basis of the objection already noted above: if it were, 
then every mover would also be moving and there could be no unmoved mover. As 
Lonergan puts it: “Parmenides would have won.”49  
Lonergan adverts to another, a posteriori argument Thomas uses to bolster the a 
priori argument from infinite regress. Thomas notes in his commentary on the De anima 
that the faculty or organ of hearing receives its act from sounding, but the act of both 
sounding and of hearing are in the organ of hearing, that which is according to its 
potency.50 Were the act of sounding not received by that which has the potency of 
hearing, there could not be an act of hearing, and so the act of both must be in the faculty 
or organ as recipient or patient. This carries as a corroborating, negative implication what 
Thomas had stated explicitly as early as De potentia: the patient is related to the agent in 
such a way that, should the act of the patient cease or be removed, the agent is 
unchanged.51 If an act of hearing ceases, the concrete sounding from which it received its 
act need not cease or change. It can ring on, unaffected. Indeed, to be unaffected is what 
it is to be the mover and not the moved. 
3.3. Thomas’s Augmentation 
Having seen Aristotle’s basic position on motion and Thomas’ clarifications, we 
can now consider Thomas’s augmentation of Aristotle’s position. His augmentation 
concerns how action is properly predicated of an agent and rests on a parallel of logic and 
metaphysics. The ten genera or “predicates” of being are not, Thomas notes, divided 
                                                
49 Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, 264. 
50 Ibid., 265. 
51 Ibid., 258–9. 
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univocally the way that species within a genus are. Instead, he writes, they are divided 
“…according to the diversity in (their) mode of being.”52 That is to say that they are 
divided in proportion to the modes of predicating. Hence, they are called “predicaments.” 
Not all the kinds of predicament are of the same nature and Thomas distinguishes three 
basic kinds. There are predicaments of substance, which regard the essence of a thing. 
There are “inhering” predicaments, such as quantity (which regards the matter of a thing), 
quality (which regards the form of a thing), and relation (which regards being by 
reference to another). Finally, there is what he calls “extrinsic” predication, which 
regards a thing “by way of some denomination.”53 This notion of extrinsic predication or, 
as Lonergan sometimes calls it, “extrinsic denomination”, is crucial for avoiding the error 
that would assume transit from possibly acting to actually acting involves a real change in 
the agent. Indeed, Lonergan says that extrinsic predication “attacks the very root of the 
error.”  
This third, extrinsic kind of predication is the kind of predication that pertains to 
agency. The predicament of passion is denominated from the agent, “for to suffer is 
nothing else than to receive something from the agent.”54 Contrariwise, the predicament 
of action is denominated from the patient, “for action is an act (going) from the agent to 
another.”55 Without this notion, it is too easy to assume that the “objective real difference 
involved by the transition from the truth of one proposition [posse agere] to the truth of 
                                                
52 In III Phys., lect. 5, §322. 
53 In III Phys., lect. 5, §322; Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, 266. 
54 Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, 266. 
55 Ibid. 
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the other [actu agere]” inheres in the agent.56 But this is merely an assumption and an 
incorrect assumption at that. Lonergan writes: 
What is overlooked is that the emergence of the effect does supply such a real 
difference in the objective field. And the reason why it is overlooked is that it is 
assumed that all predication is of exactly the same nature, that ens divides 
univocally into the ten predicaments the way a genus divides into its species. Such 
a blunder cannot be attributed to St. Thomas.57 
On Lonergan’s read, not only does Thomas affirm Aristotle’s account of actio and 
underline the core, controlling theoretical elements in his commentaries, but he also 
augments Aristotle’s position with an explication of the unspoken element in these 
metaphysical problems that might lead one to reject Aristotle’s doctrine. If one supposes 
that all predicaments are denominated of a subject in the same, inherent way, then the 
problem becomes insoluble. But if one recognizes the logical and metaphysical 
legitimacy of extrinsic predications, it becomes possible to see why not all movers are 
moving.  
Lest Thomas’s defense and augmentation of Aristotle’s position leave any doubt 
as to whether he also appropriated this same philosophical position in his mature 
speculative theology, Lonergan directs us to two passages in the Prima pars that indicate 
Thomas has. On the topic of divine procession and having just mentioned Aristotle’s 
Physics, Thomas summarizes the Aristotelian doctrine thusly: 
…although action is the same as movement, and similarly passion, still it does not 
follow that action and passion are the same; because in action there is implied a 
reference 'as that from which there is movement in the movable thing,' but in 
passion (the reference is) 'as that which is from another’(.)58 
                                                
56 Ibid., 267. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Summa theologiae, 1, q. 28, a. 3, ad 1m; Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, 268. 
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On the theory of creation as well, one finds the Aristotelian position (if not Aristotle’s 
terminology) organizing the argument, such that “since actio is motus ut ab hoc and in 
creation there is no motion [of itself], it follows that creatio is simply the relation.”59  
In summary, then, the notion of extrinsic predication clarifies the logico-
metaphysical relation of patient to agent. An agent is denominated as acting from the 
patient who receives the act of its inhering movement. The patient’s receipt of the act of 
movement does not involve a real change in the agent and this can be seen both a 
posteriori in the fact that passio can cease without a change in the agent and a priori 
from the proximate implication that all movers would have to be moving and the remote 
and subsequent implication that there could thus be no motor immobilis, and so no 
motion at all. Agency, then, is a matter of the patient’s dependence for its act upon 
another and so the transit from posse agere to actu agere is verified in the changed 
patient rather than any change in the agent. This general position on agency must be held 
in mind as we move through the following section. If it is lost, the subsequent accounts of 
application, of universal instrumentality, and of Creator/creature cooperation will fall into 
irretrievable incoherence and the medieval solution will be lost with it.  
4. Action’s Required Order 
The above account of agency explicitly abstracted from the motion of the mover. 
The motion of the mover was noted only insofar as Thomas followed Aristotle in 
insisting this motion is not in the mover qua agent. But such an account is insufficient to 
explain actual motion, because to be an actually moving thing is part of the definition of 
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what it is to be what can actually move something.60 Thus, the above position on agency 
merely explains the form of any possible movement or change without giving a full 
account of actual motions. For any particular possible movement to become actual there 
is required some situation or mutual relation or disposition of the mover and the moved. 
Aristotle’s doctrine of physical premotion serves to provide an explanatory frame for how 
such situations, mutual relations, or dispositions are provided to the possibly moving and 
possibly moved such that the active power of the mover-as-cause can be applied to the 
moved-as-effect.61  
On this point, Lonergan again adverts to Thomas’s commentaries on Aristotle. 
Thomas says, commenting on the Physics, that all things that act (whether according to 
nature or understanding) or suffer are possible agents and patients. They cannot just move 
or be moved in any disposition or situation, but only in some determinate relationship or 
“propinquity” to one another. Only under these proper circumstances does one move and 
is the other moved.62 But as we have already seen, if omne movens movetur, there cannot 
be a first motion.63 In Aristotle’s cosmology, this problem is resolved by making the first 
mover a motor immobilis. The heavenly spheres, then, are that which is primarily moved 
and move eternally, sustaining the earthly eternal series of generabilia and corruptibilia 
that are sometimes, but not always moving. The mediation of the corpus caeleste is 
required because the first mover cannot cause terrestrial quandoque moventia. It would 
have to act differently at different times and that would itself require motion, negating its 
                                                
60 This is to say that to be posse agere in the first place means being in act and not to contradict the 
above position on change in agents qua agents when they transit from posse agere to actu agere. 
61 Ibid., 278–9. 
62 In III phys., lect. 2 sect. 978. 
63 In III phys., lect. 2, sect. 976 
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very character as motor immobilis. Instead, what Aristotle calls “physical premotion” is 
sustained by the ever-wheeling corpus caeleste, bringing mover and moved together, 
with the first mover serving as final cause.64 For change in the world to be maintained, 
there must be and always have been a source of constant motion bringing those situations 
about, changing the disposition of or relations among movers and moved. For Aristotle, 
the physical premotion of the corpus caeleste is universal, because in every coincidence 
of worldly mover and moved, there has to have been an ordering premotion of this kind. 
Thomas, for his part, adopts this doctrine of physical premotion in his account of 
God’s providential agency, but transforms it significantly by resituating its first mover to 
the horizon of personal theism. Lonergan underlines a hint from Thomas’s commentary 
on the Metaphysics to exactly how he will appropriate the doctrine of premotion—under 
the heading, “application”. When the passive element in a movement or change is 
brought into sufficient proximity to the active element, the act of the mover/agent can be 
communicated to the moved/patient. For example, when something combustible is 
applied to an open flame, the actual combustion is communicated to the combustible 
material. Without this application—that is, without this spatiotemporal ordering of the 
combustible to that which is already burning—there cannot be any actual movement, 
change, action, or passion.  
Thomas takes up this way of speaking (applicatur) with reference to how God 
“moves all things to their appointed end by His intellect.”65 As Thomas says in a number 
                                                
64 Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, 281–2, n. 65. 
65 Thomas Aquinas, De substantiis separatis, c. 14, §129. 
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of places, Deus omnia applicat.66 In one respect, this is a straightforward appropriation of 
Aristotle’s teaching. Thomas quite logically affirms universal application, because for 
Thomas God is not less than first mover in Aristotle’s sense, and the first mover causes 
all motion and premotion.67 But to identify premotion with universal application by 
divine providence already assumes the horizon of personal theism. Strictly speaking, 
universal divine premotion is not yet providence. Aristotle’s first mover acts simply as 
final cause and the corpus caeleste only ensures change continues perpetually. Thomas’s 
God acts by his intellect and that means God is furthermore “the causa per se of every 
coincidence of mover and moved, every conjunction of causes, every combination of 
effects.”68 Thomas writes in the Prima pars, 
But God is not the cause of something except as he is intelligent, for his substance 
is his understanding ... And everything acts through the mode of its substance. 
God therefore moves all things to their proper ends through his intellect. But this 
is to be provident.69 
In this way, God’s application is Aristotelian premotion, but also rather more. God causes 
each particular motion in the further sense that God’s mind plans and God’s will intends 
“the endless premotions that constitute the dynamic pattern of the universe(.)”70 Thus, for 
                                                
66 Summa contra Gentiles, 3, cc. 67 [§2418] and 70 [§2464]; De potentia, q. 3, a. 7; Summa 
theologiae, l, q. 105, a. 5. 
67 Moreover, because Thomas accepted Aristotle’s cosmology, he deduces several consequences 
of universal application. First, though God is the sole cause of esse, creatures are the cause of fieri. Second, 
the execution of providence is mediated. Third, the execution of providence is a motion. Fourth, there are 
no motions not intended by divine providence. Fifth and finally, if God did not control the wills of angels 
or of human beings, there could be no providence in the spiritual or material world. On Lonergan’s read, all 
of this follows from the affirmation of universal premotion for everything except God as first mover. God, 
therefore, is the cause of action of every natural thing as moving and applying a power to its action. These 
deductions, then, are synthesized with Thomas’s comments on the Physics in the Summa Contra Gentiles, 
where Thomas affirms that God’s application is in every particular application of an active power to its 
action (Summa contra Gentiles, 3, c.70). 
68 Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, 285; Summa contra Gentiles, 3, c. 94; Summa theologiae, l, q. 
19, a. 6; q. 103, a. 7. 
69 Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, 287; De substantiis separatis, c. 14, § 129 
70 Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, 285. 
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Thomas’s theory of providence, an intellectually intended premotion simply is an 
application, such that Deus omnia applicat.  
Thomas’s appropriation and augmentation of Aristotle’s theory of premotion 
helps to highlight an aspect of God’s providential agency that is sometimes overlooked. 
We have focused in this section primarily on the influence that Aristotle’s philosophy had 
by providing natural, philosophical elements as material for a theological position on 
grace and freedom. But Thomas’s augmentation of Aristotle’s theory of premotion gives 
us an example of that influence running the other direction in the commerce between 
philosophy and theology. The Christian insistence on a personal God, with a mind and a 
will, transforms Aristotle’s theory even as it accepts its basic theorematic shape and the 
cosmology in which it is ensconced. Thomas’s God does not simply create beings with 
certain natures and powers and then leave them to the exercise of these with the on-going 
underwriting of divine conservation. Thomas understands God’s providential agency as 
not just creating and conserving, but also applying these entities to their effects within a 
cosmic order. It is the order that meets the conditions required for possible motions to 
become actual motions. God intends it eternally, but it unfolds temporally. Thus, as 
Lonergan reads Thomas, God’s will not only creatively intends the existence of things, 
but also the order from which they emerge over time, and so (by extension) those things 
in their mode of emergence. As we will see below, in the case of human beings, this 
means God wills our exercise of free agency as well.  
4.1. Degrees of Causality in the Order of Action 
To call God the causa per se of premotion implies that every created thing is an 
“instrument” of providence. Once again, Lonergan notes that Thomas appeals to a 
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perfectly general philosophical theory (of causality, in this case) to provide the 
intellectual structure undergirding his speculative theological account. The trail of this 
implication begins with the nature of causality. Following Thomas’s account in the De 
Veritate, Lonergan notes that being a cause qua cause has two aspects. 
1) it must be something in act: omne ens agit quatenus est actu.  
2) the something that it is must be proportionate to the effect intended: omne 
agens agit sibi simile.71 
With regard to the second aspect, Lonergan lists four ways of being proportionate to an 
intended effect. First, something can be proportionate to its effect in virtue of that 
something’s natural form and, second, in virtue of a more eminent form. Thus, fire is 
proportionate to causing heat by virtue of its natural form, while the corpus caeleste, 
neither hot nor cold in itself, “is the principal cause of all emergence of heat, cold, 
humidity, and dryness(.)”72 Third, something can be proportionate to its intended effect in 
virtue of an idea in the mind and, fourth, in virtue of an idea transitioning from a mind to 
the effect. Thus, an architect’s intention (vis artis) for a building is proportionate to the 
building as an effect as in his or her mind, but the same idea distributed (virtus artis) 
through the division of labor (to electricians, steel workers, etc.) in the building’s 
construction is also proportionate to this effect.73  
This enumeration is also a hierarchy of degrees. Lonergan explains it by analogy 
from motion as esse incompletum. Motion, on this Aristotelian approach, “is not 
                                                
71 Ibid., 288. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Thomas Aquinas, De veritate, q. 27, a. 7 
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'something' but a process 'towards something.’”74 The analogy goes, “as a motion is the 
esse incompletum of its term … so also the proportion of the instrument is an incomplete 
realization of the proportion of the principal cause.” In other words, instruments rely on 
another, more eminent cause to complete their proportion to an effect. Thus, 1) fire is 
proportionate to producing heat per modum naturae completae and 2) the corpus caeleste 
per modum naturae completae et eminentioris. By its nature fire produces heat, but the 
premotion of the heavens is required for it to actually be in the disposition to do so, and 
so it is in a sense an instrument of the order of the heavens, even though its nature is in 
complete proportion to the effect of producing heat. Hence the corpus caeleste is a more 
eminent cause than the flame itself.   
In the realm of intellectual causes, then, we have 3) the architect who is 
proportionate to his or her effect as an intellectual agent, per formam apprehensam and 4) 
the various instruments of his or her design that are proportionate to the effect per modum 
naturae incompletae, per quoddam esse incompletum.75 The form of the architect’s 
understanding is proportionate to the building as its effect, but the mediation of his or her 
various laborers is instrumental insofar as they are proportionate to welding, electrical 
work, etc, but not to the nature of the desired effect: a complete building. The efficacy of 
the artist’s intentions resides in the workers as in a medium—per modum quo colores 
sunt in acre, et virtus artis in instrumento artificis.76 And so, Lonergan says, it becomes 
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75 Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, 288. 
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possible to define ‘instrument’: “an instrument in the strict sense is a cause that is 
proportionate to its effect per modum naturae incompletae.”77  
Hence it is that Thomas affirms God’s providence as being proportionate to its 
effects per modum naturae completae et eminentioris because God is first mover, but also 
per formam apprehensam because God is an intellectual agent.78 Not only do the forms 
of creatures participate in the divine ideas, but so too does the order of cosmic unfolding 
participate in God’s providential design.79 We also get a clearer sense of what it meant to 
say above that “the execution of providence is mediated.”80 Fate, this cosmic ordering, is 
the artistic vision of God according to another mode of existence, one embedded in 
secondary causes such that they produce God’s desired effects.81 Recall, moreover, that it 
is embedded in the secondary causes as their “disposition or series, that is, (their) 
order(.)”82  
                                                
77 Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, 288. 
78 Ibid., 290–3; “Knowledge in its character as knowledge does not imply any causality, otherwise 
all knowledge would be a cause; but insofar as it is the knowledge of the artisan using things, in this way it 
has the character of a cause with respect to the thing used by art. And therefore as there is causality in the 
artisan through his art, so must be considered the causality of divine knowledge.” See also Super I 
Sententiarum, d. 38, q. l, a. i. 
79 De veritate, q. 5, a. l, ad im. 
80 “…divine providence executes its effects through mediate causes. That ordination of effects can 
therefore be considered in two ways. In one way, as it exists in God himself, and then this ordination of 
effects is called providence. … But according as the aforesaid ordination is considered in mediate causes 
ordained for the production of some effects, in this way it has the character of fate.” Summa theologiae, l, 
q. 116, a. 2 c. 
81 Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, 295; “And therefore it has to be said that fate, from the 
viewpoint of secondary causes, is changeable; but as subject to divine providence, it shares in 
unchangeableness, not indeed that of absolute necessity but of conditioned; in the way in which we say that 
this conditional is true or necessary, 'If God knows this will be, it will be.'” Summa theologiae, l, q. 116, a. 
3 c. 
82 “...fate is called a disposition, not that which is had in the genus of quality, but according as 
disposition designates an order, which is not a substance but a relation. And that order, considered in 
comparison to its principle, is one; and in this way fate is called one. But if it is considered in comparison 
to (its) effects or to those mediate causes, then it is multiplied, in the way in which the poet said, 'Your fates 
draw you.'” Ibid, ad 1m, ad 3m. 
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As we have already seen, to be the patient of an action is to be in a relation of 
dependence upon the communicated act of the agent, and so we know that the mediation 
of the secondary causes does not add anything to or change anything about God’s agency. 
Thomas says, “the efficacy of the principal agent is found instrumentally in all the 
instruments ordered to the effect, as being one in a certain order.”83 Rather than 
something added to God’s agency by arithmetic composition—that is, in a sense where 
“God does this much and creatures do this much”—Thomas is describing a hierarchy of 
qualitative degrees of causality, in all of which God’s agency is immanently efficacious. 
As we turn now to consider this hierarchy explicitly, it will become evident how holding 
both kinds of causal proportion in mind—per modum…eminentioris and per formam 
apprehensam—is essential to Thomas’s philosophical appropriation and theological 
augmentation of Aristotle’s theory of physical premotion. 
What has not been explained yet, however, is precisely what is meant by 
“eminence”. For if both God and a creature are proportionate by nature to some effect, 
why is God a “higher” cause of that effect than the creature? Lonergan adverts to 
Thomas’s commentary on the Liber de causis to address this question. Lonergan notes, 
“it is argued that the higher cause prius intrat, vehementius imprimit, et tardius recedit.”84 
This locution is impressionistic, to be sure, but Lonergan finds the context suggests a 
rather restrained interpretation—that “the activity of the higher cause is a presupposition 
of the activity of the lower”85—and it is an elaboration of a more general metaphysical 
principle. In the same commentary, Thomas writes, “if whiteness were separate, simple 
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85 Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, 298.  
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whiteness itself, and not something participating in whiteness, it would be the cause of all 
white things insofar as they are white,” and so accordingly, “the Platonists held that that 
which is being itself is the cause of being for all things(.)”86  
What if there are a plurality of relevant causes for some given predicate? How 
then does one proceed? Thomas summarizes Aristotle’s answer as follows: 
We must always take the media which are nearer the subject in which we seek the 
cause of that common effect; and we must proceed in this way until we come to 
that which is immediate to the common effect. And he assigns the reason for this, 
namely, that that which is from the side of what is contained under something 
common is the cause for its being under that common (predication): for example, 
if D is under B, and if C is the cause for D that B is in it. And from this it follows 
further that C is the cause that A is in D; and B is the cause that A is in C. But A 
is in B itself per se and immediately.87 
Lonergan helps walk us through what this means: 
Here 'immediate' has its etymological sense of 'nonmediated,' 'logical first.' Thus, 
Socrates is mortal, because he is a man; a man is mortal, because he is an animal; 
an animal is mortal, because its material cause is composed of contraries. The 
three middle terms are 'man,' 'animal,' 'with material cause composed of 
contraries.' The first of these is the least general. The last is the real cause of 
mortality: not only does it make 'animal,' 'man,' and 'Socrates' mortal; it also is the 
cause of 'animal' making 'man' mortal, and of 'man' making 'Socrates' mortal.88 
It becomes clear in light of the above what it means to say that a higher cause “arrives 
first, makes the greater impression, and leaves last.” Human beings are mortal even if 
they are not Socrates, and animals are mortal even if they are not human, and animals are 
not the only beings possessed of “a material cause composed of contraries” such that they 
one day die. The higher cause precedes the lower as a condition. It is the difference that 
makes a difference. It persists even if lower media are logically excluded. To put it more 
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veritate, q. 5, a. 9, ad 7m 
87 Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, 300; In Aristotelis libros Posterior analyticorum, II, lect. 19, 
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briefly, its activity is the presupposition of the activity of lower causes. A cause is higher 
to the extent that it is a more fundamental presupposition of effect in consideration. Thus, 
the scale of causal eminence terminates in causal ultimacy. 
This is simply good Aristotelian metaphysical analysis by which things are 
reduced to their causes, but it also suggests the way in which higher causes do not 
compete with lower causes for explanatory “space” in Thomas’s theory of action. This 
has significant pay-off for Thomas’s theory of Deus operans et cooperans. Another 
somewhat lengthy quote merits reproduction here insofar as it makes this connection 
explicit for us:  
Let A, B, C be three causes in an ordered series so that C is the ultimate one 
performing the action. It is clear that C performs the action by its own power; and 
the fact that it is able through its own power to (do) this, this is through the power 
of B and further through the power of A. And therefore if it is asked, Why does C 
act? the reply is, Through its own power. And why through its own power? 
Through the power of B. And so on till (the series) is reduced to the power of the 
first cause, to which the Philosopher, in book n of the Posterior Analytics, text. 
22, and book n of the Physics, text. 38, teaches (us) to resolve questions. And thus 
it is clear that, since God is the first cause of all things, his power is most 
immediate to all things.89 
There can appear now the conjunction between the cosmic spatiotemporal ordering 
effected by the eternal and universal application of God’s providential intention and the 
logically ordered series of agents that constitute the hierarchy of causes. Because God’s 
providential ordering of the cosmos and its creaturely inhabitants is a condition of the 
efficacy of those creatures as agents, God’s providential ordering is the ultimate, 
“highest” cause of any and every created effect. We can see this conjunction by the 
ambient light of Thomas’s appropriation and augmentation of Aristotle’s theory of 
                                                
89 Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, 302; Super I Sententiarum, d. 37, q. l, a. l, ad 4m (emphasis 
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motion and agency. Because agency is extrinsically predicated of agents, God can have 
this immediate relationship to the agency of creatures without Himself having to be 
moved. God can be at once the highest and the most immediate cause, all without 
displacing “lower” creaturely agents in the explanation of cosmic unfolding. Most 
importantly, we are now prepared to discuss Thomas’s theory of cooperation, the last of 
the theorematic materials required for both the philosophy of divine and human agency 
and the theology of operative and cooperative grace in which the medieval solution to the 
medieval problem of the supernatural consist. 
5. The Theory of Cooperation or “Concursus” 
We can turn now to what Lonergan calls the “central theorem” in Thomas’s 
theory of gratia operans: his notion of cooperation. I hope that my reader has not been 
too tried by the above forays into the theory of actio, of premotion and application, of 
instrumental participation and the hierarchy of causes. For Lonergan, these are important 
scaffolding for the theory of cooperation. They prevent the errors that can emerge 
because of the “somewhat ingenuous assumption that everyone knows precisely what it is 
to 'cause,' 'operate,' 'cooperate.’”90 They are important also as philosophical material in 
the cooperation between the ancient mind of the philosopher Aristotle and the medieval 
mind of the theologian St. Thomas Aquinas. It is this tradition of dialectical appropriation 
and augmentation that makes Thomas’s solution to the medieval problem of the 
supernatural possible.  
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The general notion of cooperation is that two or more causes combine to produce 
a single effect. This occasions a question: if each cause has its own actio (which it must 
by definition), how do the actiones of these relate? Lonergan enumerates three kinds of 
cooperation. The first he calls “coordinate cooperation,” as when two people pull a boat 
together. This is cooperation in the sense denied of creaturely cooperation with the 
Creator above: person A pulls this much and person B pulls this much and in so doing 
they move the boat together. The actiones of each cause are combined by (vectoral) 
addition. However we might imagine cooperation with God, Lonergan will not even 
briefly consider that coordinate cooperation applies here. “With it we are not 
concerned.”91 The second kind of cooperation Lonergan calls “accidental cooperation,” in 
which there are two distinct actiones and they produce two effects, as when Abraham 
begat Isaac and Isaac begat Jacob. Lonergan is not going to consider this kind either.  
What Lonergan calls “serial cooperation” pertains to the divine concursus. Serial 
cooperation involves three actiones, but a single product, as when (on Lonergan’s 
example) Peter kills Paul with a sword. Here, we have three actiones. 
1) Peter moves his sword to strike a death blow. 
2) His sword, so moved, kills Paul. 
3) Peter kills Paul. 
Recall again that agency is predicated extrinsically from the existence of the effect. Peter 
is the mover of his sword because the sword so moves. The sword is the slayer of Paul 
because Paul dies in receiving its actio. Lastly, Peter is also (and no less) the slayer of 
Paul because, in receiving Peter’s actio in the medium of the sword, Paul dies. Thus it is 
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that there can truly be distinguished three actiones, but only the one really distinct 
product (the death of poor Paul) and one notionally distinct product (a moved sword). 
There is, however, no third product. Indeed, if you do not have only one really distinct 
product of more than two really distinct actiones, you do not have an instance of serial 
cooperation. Finally, the third actio is the cooperation itself.92  
Lonergan distinguishes this basic philosophical notion of cooperation in 
preparation for what he views as Thomas’s central theorem on ad extra divine agency: 
Deus operatur in omni operante. In brief, created agents cannot have actio without 
attributing the same actio to God. Lonergan distinguishes in Thomas’s presentation a 
direct and an indirect statement of the theorem. The direct statement is, as already stated, 
that God operates in all operation. The indirect statement, then, is that unless God moves, 
creatures cannot operate.93 We will follow Lonergan in presenting a number of passages 
from Thomas’s corpus in which these two forms of the theorem appear.  
First, we turn to the direct statement of the theorem. In the De veritate, it appears 
as the general form of God’s operation in the will: 
(As) every natural action is from God, so every action of the will, insofar as it is 
an action, is not only from the will as acting immediately, but from God as the 
first agent (and the one) who makes a stronger impression.94 
                                                
92 Lonergan makes an important point about the two potential errors this account of cooperation 
invites and how they seem to have produced the opposed positions of Durandus, Báñez, and Molina. He 
writes, “Now these two errors  [denying that there is a third actio and affirming a third product] correspond 
to the two positions between which St. Thomas steers a middle course. He does not deny a third actio, and 
so differs from Durandus, who is reputed to have held that God merely creates and conserves. He does not 
affirm a third product, and so he differs from Báñez, who posits a praemotio physica, and from Molina, 
who posits a concursus simultaneus. The point to be grasped is that to deny the position of Báñez or of 
Molina is not to affirm the position of Durandus.” Ibid., 303–4. 
93 Ibid., 304–5.  
94 De Veritate, q. 22, a. 8. 
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We see here also the impressionistic language of the commentary on the Liber de causis 
(“vehementius imprimit”) deployed with precisely the same theoretical control as before, 
insisting on the immediacy of the higher cause to the lower as its presupposition. Thus, 
God operates in the will as God acts in all of nature, with the plain implication that God 
then operates in all operation. 
The Summa contra gentiles has an entire chapter devoted to the proposition quod 
Deus est causa operandi omnibus operantibus and Lonergan notes that it begins with the 
statement, “Deus est causa omnibus operantibus ut operantur.” Thomas gives six reasons 
why this is true. First, insofar as creatures act virtute divina, they can of themselves be 
causes of being. Second, because “God is the cause of the virtus from which proceeds the 
creature's operatio,” and thus God is its cause.95 Third, the divine conservation of the 
virtus is necessary for the virtus to enable the actio, and so God causes the act. Fourth, 
divine application is required for any actual actio and passio, and so God is the cause of 
both. Fifth, because all lower agents act in virtue of their higher causes, “God is more the 
cause of any actio than any subordinate agent.”96 Sixth, because God ordains all things to 
their ends, everything acts virtute divina, and so God is the cause of all actio.  
Three chapters later in the SCG, Thomas explicitly raises the question of 
cooperation. How can two agents do one producing? Here, it is reinforced that the lower 
agent(s) act in virtue of the higher and both produce the whole effect, though in different 
manners.97 The same treatment appears in De potentia q. 3 a.7, in the sed contra, in 
which analogies are drawn from art, generation, and existence to show, in the end, how 
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there is a single product produced by at least two agents. In other words, it shows that 
creatures and the Creator cooperate and, on Lonergan’s analysis, that their cooperation is 
an instance of serial cooperation.98   
Lonergan finds that Thomas, presumably in his maturity, simplifies the 
presentation of this theorem in the Prima pars. Instead of constellating a number of 
interlocking causal reasons to affirm cooperation between Creator and creature in every 
actio, he boils things down to three active causes: final, efficient, and formal. Deus 
operatur in omni operante is affirmed in all three respects, but final cause becomes the 
controlling notion. Lonergan writes,  
[The final cause] is the cause of the activity of the efficient cause; therefore any 
effect is causally related to the final cause; but any causal relation is an actio of 
some sort, and so, even on the ground of finality, God operates in all operation.99 
While the efficiency of this form of presentation is to be admired as a speculative 
accomplishment, it is so general as to be nearly occlusive of the metaphysical mechanics 
at work. The presentation in the SCG is perhaps less systematic, but pedagogically more 
helpful. For Lonergan, the point is to see that the theorem at work is identical.  
Finally, we turn to the indirect statement that, unless God moves, no creature may 
operate. In the De veritate, this principle is presented only in terms of the divine 
operation as creating and conserving the creature.100  
                                                
98 “As art presupposes nature, so nature presupposes God. But nature operates in the operation of 
art... Therefore God too operates in the operation of nature. ... according to the Philosopher man and the sun 
generate a man. But as the operation of man in generating depends on the action of the sun, so also and 
much more fully does the action of nature depend on the action of God. Therefore God operates whatever 
nature operates. ... nothing can operate unless it exists. But nature cannot exist except by the action of God 
... Therefore nature cannot act except by the agency of God. ... the power of God is in any natural thing 
whatever, because God is said to be in all things by his essence, by his power, and by his presence. But it 
must not be said that the divine power as it is in things is otiose. Therefore as found in nature it operates. 
Nor can it be said that (God) operates something different from what nature operates, since nothing is 
found there except the one operation. Therefore God operates in any operation whatever of nature.” De 
potentia, q.3, a. 7, Sed contra. 
99 Ibid., 309. 
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For God is the cause of a natural operation, insofar as he gives and preserves that 
which is the principle of natural operation in the thing, from which by necessity a 
determinate operation follows; as when he preserves gravitation in the earth, 
which is the principle of downward motion.101 
By the Prima secundae, Thomas has added a further element to the indirect statement of 
the theorem. Created causes, because they are agents in tempore, need the ordering of 
premotion in order to actually act. Thus, creatures act both in virtue of God’s creative and 
conserving agency, but also virtute motionis divinae. See, on this point, the “general 
reason” that human beings need the auxilio gratiae in ST 1-2, Q. 109, A. 9.102  
With the theorem of cooperation in hand, my aggregation of the philosophical 
material behind Thomas’s solution to the medieval problem of the supernatural is 
complete. The notion of serial cooperation clarifies the manner in which the divine 
operation acts in all created operations. Moreover, it becomes evident how Thomas’s 
various appropriations and augmentations of Aristotle’s philosophical advances are 
synthesized into a position on divine agency that so far from impinging upon the agency 
of creatures, is explicitly the existential presupposition of any creaturely agency at all. It 
remains to state Thomas’s synthesis on divine action and providence directly. Then I will 
turn to Lonergan’s retrieval of Thomas’s position on God’s operation not in creation 
generally, but specifically in the human will. That position in concert with the general 
account of divine agency prepares the way to the general ambiguity of created causality 
and the specific ambiguities pertaining to human freedom with which Chapter 3 will 
begin. 
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6. Lonergan’s Synthesis of Thomas on Divine Concursus 
Having laid out in the previous section Lonergan’s analysis of the theological and 
philosophical material in Thomas Aquinas’s theory of cooperation, it becomes possible to 
state directly and synthetically Lonergan’s interpretation thereof. This task will occupy us 
for the remainder of this chapter. 
6.1. God’s Efficient Causality 
God acts. Indeed, God necessarily acts. God is the infinite, eternal, pure act of 
existence. God’s essence is God’s act of existence. Thus, divine action poses no problem, 
per se. Even if one distinguishes within God’s infinite and eternal act the action of 
knowing God’s self or of willing the infinite good that God is, still these acts are likewise 
infinite, eternal, and necessary in God. The speculative problem arises when one asks 
whether God’s infinite, eternal, and necessary act has any effects. Does God, in other 
words, act ad extra? Is God an efficient cause? These questions suggest a perhaps 
difficult implication: If God does have ad extra effects, these effects (because 
conditioned by God’s agency) are contingent and so predicated of God contingently. 
How can a necessary agent cause contingent effects? The short answer is that though God 
acts necessarily, God’s ad extra agency is predicated of God contingently. If God is an ad 
extra efficient cause, God is eternally the efficient cause of every being that is not God. 
But there exist beings that are not God. So, we affirm that God is the efficient 
cause of every being that is not God. Moreover, because they are conditioned by God’s 
efficient causality, every thing that is not God is a contingent thing. It is true, then, that 
being the cause of every contingent thing is predicated of God and God’s agency 
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contingently. The difficulty remains, however: how can a contingent effect be predicated 
of a necessary cause? If God is an efficient cause contingently, how is he such eternally 
and without limit? First, it is important to recall the Aristotelian nature of efficient 
causality in Thomas’s work. Second, we must recall Thomas’s augmentation of 
Aristotle’s theory: the extrinsic mode of predication/denomination. Further, it will also be 
important to distinguish kinds or senses of necessity. 
First, efficient causality is, by nature, an action that produces a passion. Action 
and passion are two aspects of a single reality. This entity is considered ‘action’ as from 
the agent, but passion as in the patient. The agent, then, is the efficient cause of the effect 
in the patient. Its act is communicated to the patient in producing an effect. The 
movement, change, or difference inheres in the patient, but is only ‘from’ the agent. In 
this way, the production of an effect does not produce a change in the agent, for if it did, 
it would in this respect be a patient instead (by definition). Moreover, if it were a 
metaphysical law that agents changed when they acted, then there could be no unmoved, 
first mover, and so no motion at all.103  Thus, to predicate efficient causality of God and 
specifically efficient causality with regard to every existing, contingent thing involves no 
change in God, and so no threat to divine eternality, simplicity, or impassibility.  
Second, agency is not predicated of a subject intrinsically, but as we have already 
seen, extrinsically. It is predicated by denomination from something ‘outside’ or other to 
that subject—namely, its effect. Thus, in order to truly say that God is the cause of every 
contingent thing does not impute any contingency to God, but only predicates efficient 
causality of God contingently. Lonergan writes, “Whatever is predicated of God 
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contingently has its truth-correspondence through extrinsic denomination.”104 Extrinsic 
predication/denomination makes it possible that contingent propositions can be true of a 
necessary being, because they are true by reason of something that is not God. Lonergan 
notes that propositions are called “simultaneous in truth” when “they are true by reason 
of one and the same entity.”105  Extrinsic predication makes possible propositions that are 
simultaneous in truth. The attribution of agency and the acknowledgement of an effect 
are both true by virtue of the existence of the difference produced in the thing affected. 
Thus, the statements that contingent beings exist and that God causes contingent beings 
to exist are both true by virtue of the reality of contingent beings.106  
Third, Lonergan distinguishes three kinds or senses of necessity: 1) absolute 
necessity, 2) that which is necessary upon the supposition of something else, and 3) that 
which is necessary upon the supposition of itself. The first is the necessity proper to 
God’s being and only to God, that which cannot not exist. The second, ‘that which is 
necessary upon the supposition of something else,’ consists in the relationship of 
antecedents and consequents. This second necessity includes metaphysical necessity (e.g. 
that “finite substances cannot exist without inseparable accidents”), physical necessity 
(e.g., the diffusion of heat), and moral necessity (e.g., “if you speak, you tell the truth”). 
But it is the third kind of necessity, ‘that which is necessary upon the supposition of 
itself,’ that provides clarification on this question.107  
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Now, any and every being is necessary on the supposition of itself, because this is 
the minimal necessity that, as long as something is, it necessarily is. This kind of 
necessity pertains to any being, even if it possesses none of the other forms of necessity 
above. For example, Lonergan says, “(take) an action that is both free and 
supererogatory. As long as it exists, it necessarily exists; and yet such an action is neither 
absolutely nor metaphysically nor physically nor morally necessary.”108 None of these in 
the second class of necessity—metaphysical, physical, or moral—or, in their absence, the 
correlate kinds of contingency can be deduced or derived from the presence or possession 
of this third kind. 
In sum, we can say that God causes (as efficient cause) contingent beings such 
that they receive the act of their contingent existence from the infinite, eternal act of 
existence that is God’s being. God, then, is the agent of this action because contingent 
beings depend upon receiving the act of their existence from God. This contingent 
existence, however, inheres in the contingent being and not in God. Efficient causality is 
predicated of God extrinsically because it is predicated of God in virtue of an entity other 
than God. Consequently, the propositions “contingent beings exist” and “God causes 
contingent beings to exist” are simultaneously true by reason of the same entity—namely, 
the existent contingent beings. Finally, these contingent beings exist, at minimum, with 
the necessity of that which necessarily is by supposition of itself. From this necessity, no 
other forms of necessity can be deduced or derived. 
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6.2. God’s Transcendent Causality 
Though above I have focused on God’s agency as an efficient cause, God’s 
agency is also transcendent. This was already hinted at generally when we affirmed that 
God is the cause of every contingent being and every being that is not God is contingent. 
Thus, the distinction between God as cause and everything else as effect is also a 
distinction between Creator and creature. The specific reasons for affirming the 
transcendence of God’s agency come into view at the conjunction of several principles: 
first, the principle of priority; second, the principle of simultaneity of truth; third, the 
irresistibility of divine action; fourth, an inverse insight into the relation between God’s 
causality and created causality.  
First, the principle of priority simply insists that a cause is prior to its effect. God 
is eternal, and so the priority here obviously cannot be temporal priority. God’s causing a 
thing is prior to its existing in the sense that God’s action is a presupposition for its 
being.109 But God is the efficient cause of all things, and so whatever exists comes from 
God’s prior action.  
Second, and from the other direction, the principle of simultaneity in the order of 
truth means that truths that are true through the same entity are true simultaneously. Such 
truths are grounded in extrinsic predication. Any statement predicated of God 
contingently is predicated extrinsically and so posits the existence of an extrinsic 
denominator. Thus, the statement that God causes a universe of contingent beings is true 
simultaneously with the statement that there exists a universe of contingent beings.110  
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Third, these two together imply that God’s creative action is, in the traditional 
Thomist language, irresistible. God is the prior cause of everything that is. By extrinsic 
predication, the statements, “God causes something to be,” and, “it is,” are 
simultaneously true by reason of one and the same entity: the contingently existing thing. 
What God causes to be exists necessarily, but only with the minimal necessity that is 
from the supposition of itself.  
Fourth, the above three points may occasion an inverse insight—indeed, an 
inverse insight at the heart of the medieval ambiguities we will face in Chapter 3. There 
is no contradiction between the statement that what God causes to be in God’s 
transcendence necessarily exists and the statement that what God causes to be is 
contingent. Indeed, these are convertible statements. From God, the action is necessarily 
effective. In the creature it is contingent, because it is conditioned by God’s action. 
Moreover, because the effect is contingent, the agency by which God’s action is 
necessarily effective is predicated of God contingently. If God acts ad extra, God’s action 
is necessarily effective. Though we might expect it to, this simultaneous dual affirmation 
of God’s transcendent agency does not, on its own, tell us anything about the order of 
necessity and contingency, because it regards God’s agency as transcendent. Lonergan 
says, “one cannot determine solely by the irresistibility of (God’s) action whether what he 
…effects is necessary by metaphysical, physical, or moral necessity,” or merely 
contingent in any or all of those respects. The only necessity that can be deduced or 
derived from God’s transcendent agency is that of those things that are necessary by the 
supposition of themselves. This kind of necessity accords equally with contingency or 
necessity of the metaphysical, physical, or moral kind. The affirmation of God’s 
   
 
100 
transcendent causality tells us that God causes the world that is, but not what kind of 
world God has caused.  
These four principles prepare the central notion governing Lonergan’s account of 
God’s transcendent causality: proportion. Agents must be proportionate to their effects, 
and the proportion of an efficient cause is determined by its nature. As we affirmed at the 
beginning, God and only God exists by nature, which is why God is the only absolutely 
necessary being. Not only is God the cause of every contingent being, but also the only 
being proportionate to causing existence.111 This general disproportion between creatures 
and the Creator to being the cause of existence is the most general form that the theorem 
of the supernatural takes. The act of existence is received by and inheres in creatures as 
patients of God’s transcendent action. Moreover, it is communicated gratuitously, both 
because creatures are not by nature proportionate to operatively apprehending existence, 
but more fundamentally because without its gratuitous communication, creatures do not 
exist to operate at all.  
At this point one can see most clearly the service paid by theology to the 
philosophy of God. The effort to figure out why pre-lapsarian humans required God’s 
grace produced this distinction between entitatively disproportionate orders. This 
distinction, then, possesses the theoretical mobility proper to a theorem, such that it can 
serve to control the relation of terms in the philosophy of God as well. Although the 
theorem of the supernatural emerged historically in the speculative theological context 
and so is temporally prior to any separated philosophy of God, the present project rests on 
the insight that its general philosophical application to the question of the cause of 
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existence is theoretically prior to its specific speculative theological application on the 
aporia of grace. It also highlights why the theorem of the supernatural is not enough to 
explain our need for grace on its own. The problem, as we already saw, is distinguishing 
God’s grace from anything else. “What, after all,” as Lonergan says, “is not a free gift of 
God?”  
6.3. God’s Artisanal Governance 
So far, however, we have only established that God’s ad extra agency creates and 
conserves the existence of beings if and when they exist. Lonergan, following Thomas, is 
able to derive further significance from God’s action by applying the analogy of an 
artisan working with instruments. This analogy opens up the question of God as cause to 
not just the totality of existent beings, but also to the order that obtains between them, and 
so of God as not just operating, but operating in the operation of creatures.  
The question arises, if God is the cause of every contingent thing, is the totality of 
created beings itself an intelligible, complete unity? Are these myriad beings, in other 
words, parts in a whole? Does the universe have an order? Lonergan says yes. When one 
asks after the totality of created beings without exception, one heuristically takes the 
vantage of eternity. From this heuristic vantage, not only does one anticipate that the 
universe possesses an order, but that it has a perfect(ed) order. For Lonergan, every 
possible world conceived in the mind of God is a complete, intelligible unity. God acts 
through intellect and so possible worlds are those that God conceives in wisdom and 
chooses justly. But, Lonergan says, intelligence grasps unity and wisdom arranges things 
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in order. Furthermore, perfect justice leaves nothing incomplete.112 Thus, every possible 
universe, including this actual one, is not just an aggregate of beings, but (from the 
vantage of eternity) a whole with a complete, intelligible order.113 Thus, in both every 
possible world and in this actual world, every being has a relation to the whole as one of 
its parts and is ordered within the whole as such. God causes the actual order of the 
universe, then, as well as the existence of the smaller wholes that make up its parts.  
From the viewpoint of temporal being, however, we find divine action causing the 
order of the universe by instrumentality, by application, and so by cooperation. Because 
no created cause is proportionate to causing the existence of its effects, all created causes 
are causes only in the essential order. They cannot by nature cause their effects to be, but 
only to be this or that or, as Lonergan says, “such.” Nonetheless, created causes do also 
cause their effects to exist. Their act is communicated to the effect and inheres in the 
patient as affected. Such communication, after all, is that in which agency consists. As we 
saw above with regard to existence, every created cause acts per modum naturae 
incompletae, per quoddam esse incompletum.114 Thus, every created cause is also an 
instrument of God’s creative causality insofar as it produces the existence of an existing 
effect.  
This minimal sense of instrumentality, however, is not yet enough for created 
causes to be effective causes. That created beings possess an act to be communicated 
makes them only potentially agents. In order for them to actually produce effects, there is 
further required premotion. They must be brought into a proper relation or disposition 
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with regard to that in which they would potentially produce an effect or else the potential 
patient is not available to receive its act from the agent. Just as from the vantage of 
eternity there is an order of beings as wholes in themselves, as parts of larger wholes, and 
each subsidiary whole as a part in the complete intelligible unity of the universe, so from 
the view of temporal being there is also a correlate order of the spatiotemporal relations 
that are presupposed in each actual instance of created efficient causality.  
In this way, created causes are instruments of God in the further sense that they 
are moved into relations or dispositions for effective causation according to God’s 
governance. Thus, God applies all causes to their effects by the instrument of premotion. 
The opportunities to act and be affected are as caused by God as the form and existence 
in which the power to act and/or the potential to be affected inhere.115 As Lonergan puts 
it, “God wills B should exist because of A.”116 The dynamic spatiotemporal order of the 
universe is also an effect of God’s action through God’s intellect. In this way, God acts 
ad extra per formam apprehensam, and so God’s agency is analogous to the agency of an 
artisan exercising his or her proportionate power and understanding through the 
instrument of either sub-contractors or tools or both. Hence the title of this section: God’s 
artisanal governance.  
Created causes, in their existence, in their movement through the universe, and in 
their efficacy as causes, cooperate with God’s agency. They cooperate by the serial 
cooperation described above. Because God acts irresistibly, created causes cooperate with 
God insofar as they operate at all. God’s action is necessary for all created action. 
Because of God’s transcendence, the necessity of God’s action for all created action tells 
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us nothing about whether those created actions are metaphysically, physically, or morally 
necessary or contingent. Insofar as God acts in them, they are necessary only on the 
supposition of themselves. Neither does God’s universal and unfailing application of 
every cause to its effect(s) provide the means to deduce or derive whether the cause 
produces its effect with metaphysical, physical, or moral necessity or contingency. Every 
potential cause has the occasion for its actual efficacy according to the cosmic order 
effected by God, and so is determined by God. But it is completely determined by God 
and so is determined both in its mode of existence and its mode of emergence. These 
include both contingent and necessary modes (to say nothing yet of the freedom that 
pertains to human causality).  
Distinguishing the necessity for God’s action in created causes and the necessity 
with which created causes produce their effect when God acts in them from the mundane 
forms of necessity and contingency (metaphysical, physical, moral) in the above fashion 
rests on the intellectual force of the theorem of the supernatural. Without the 
disproportion of creatures to the Creator, this radically determining, but not deterministic 
account of God’s ad extra agency would not be possible at the theological or 
philosophical level. Though Lonergan underlines the specific difference the theorem of 
the supernatural makes in the speculative theology of grace, here I want to underline the 
general and indeed foundational difference the theorem makes in the philosophy of God 
and God’s agency. 
6.4. Divine Operation in the Human Will 
A free agent is free in two respects. First, it is the cause of its own determination. 
Because to be free is a mode of agency, action in general is that which is determined by 
   
 
105 
this determination. The source of this determination as determinate is the intellect. It 
makes this determination, primarily, by apprehending some good.117 The apprehension of 
some good is not of itself enough to determine what a free agent will do, because the will 
can act or not act with regard to this or that good, no matter what the object presented to 
it for decision. Lonergan notes that even the infinite good may not move the will 
automatically, depending how one interprets ST, 1-2, q. 10, a. 2. Thus, the will can be 
determined and moved by some good apprehended, but it is not necessarily so 
determined or moved.118  
Second, the will may or may not move itself from potency to act. When the 
intellect apprehends a good, the will is brought into act with respect to this good as an 
end, and then it may move itself from potency to act with regard to the means to that 
end.119 In this way a free agent determines what it will do by its intellect, but whether it 
will act at all the will determines. A will is called free primarily insofar as it may or may 
not move itself to act—which is to say, actually willing the means to an apprehended 
good as its end. Secondarily, it is called free because the means to an end are optional 
rather than necessary, the practical judgment that selects these means is contingent, and 
the bonum apprehensum does not move the will efficaciously but, as I have already 
noted, only formally.120  
But is the free agent’s contingency qua free in contradiction with the affirmation 
already established that God irresistibly acts in every created cause? Lonergan identifies 
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several now-familiar errors that might lead to such a conclusion. Errors, he says, that 
emerge because of anthropomorphism in our thought about God and God’s agency. 
Today, we might call these errors, “cognitive defaults,” and expect them to crop up 
regularly. First, there is a tendency to think of God’s agency as temporal instead of 
eternal, and so to mistake the priority of God’s action for sequential, rather than causal 
priority. Because God is eternal, God does not act ‘before’ human action, as there is no 
‘before’ or ‘after’ for God.121 Second, because God is infinite in every respect, human 
acts cannot add anything to the being of God. For this reason, contingency cannot be 
introduced into God because of the contingency of human agency aggregating to God by 
additional cooperative acts.122 Further potential objections are headed off by adverting to 
the already established notions of extrinsic predication and those things that are necessary 
on the supposition of themselves. Human acts do not change God because agency is 
extrinsically predicated of agents, and so true propositions about God’s causal role in 
human acts are true of God by reason of the existence of the human acts and not some 
transformation in God. Finally, the necessity with which free human acts are produced by 
God’s action is the aforementioned necessity upon the supposition of itself, by which it is 
said that insofar and as long as something exists, it necessarily exists.123  
All of this is to say in various ways that God stands outside the order of all other 
causes. God’s effects are, in themselves, necessary or contingent at God’s choice. If God 
does ‘this’, it must be. But the necessity of a ‘this’ can be absolute or it can be 
hypothetical (as when God wills that B should exist because of A). Which ‘this’ in fact is 
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depends on God’s chosen action. As chosen, then, these acts are intended, i.e. foreknown 
with the priority of causal priority. Whichever ‘this’ is, contingent or necessary, as from 
God’s action it necessarily is.124 Thus God’s operation in every created operation is ad 
modum naturae. Indeed, it must be, because deus operatur in omni operante is a theorem, 
not a datum. By extension, God operating in the human will does not prevent human 
minds from causing their own acts formally, nor deprive our wills of the freedom to 
contingently act or not to act. God causes our causality in its mode of emergence—
namely, as contingent freedom. At the same time, God irresistibly produces the effect 
God intends, but again in its mode of being, including the mode of freedom/liberty.125 
This is simply the specifically human volitional instance of the general relation of 
temporal and contingent causes predicated of God as the effects of his irresistible action.  
6.4.1. The Nature of Habits 
Additionally, there is the relevance of the dynamic pattern of the universe on the 
question of human freedom. Free causes no less than non-rational agents require 
premotion in order to be applied to their effects. God’s providence intends the cosmic, 
spatio-temporal order and thereby irresistibly creates the circumstances and dispositions 
in which free agents can be efficacious in producing contingent or necessary effects 
contingently or necessarily as the case may be. Still, as God’s instrument, the order of the 
universe produces what God intends irresistibly and efficaciously.126 But this cosmic 
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ordering—application by premotion—has an analogue in the human being as free cause: 
the habit.  
Lonergan notes that perfection in the dynamic order of operation—that is, 
action—is radically one with perfection in the order of being, and perfection in the order 
of being is measured by the proportion of potency and act. God alone is actus purus, 
“with potentiality at zero and act at infinity,” and so only God operates with absolute 
perfection.127 This is the impeccability proper to God and God’s transcendence. Angels, 
for their part, are compounds of potency and act, but are beyond time. Consequently, they 
can fail in their action in some cases, but, as atemporally “created in the full development 
of their natures,” are fixed by a single act towards their goal.128 Humans, though, are 
essentially temporal and so the development of our nature emerges in a series of acts. At 
birth, Lonergan says, our “higher powers are the spiritual counterpart of materia prima.” 
This indeterminate potentiality is ordered to the good in general, but human beings never 
happen upon the good in general. What is good is always concrete. This concreteness 
means that the good is “ever unique” and, by contrast, evil is manifold. In other words, 
there is the right thing to do and then nearly endless ways to fail to do it.129 Humans 
begin with the odds stacked against us morally. We are agens imperfectum.130 We can act 
properly in any and every instance, but because our moral potential is realized in time and 
space, it will in the course of things act properly only, as Lonergan says, “in minori 
parte.”131 It is, to put it in more modern terms, improbable that we will do what is right. 
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The only remedy to this situation is to set about actualizing our moral potential so 
that we act rightly with greater regularity. Habits and dispositions meet this need by 
making the external moral demands of the universe the internal form of our operations. 
Dispositions do this inconstantly, but habits do so more perfectly.  Habits actualize our 
moral potential, determining some principle or power of our nature, “forming a certain 
quality in (it).”132 Because habits are a perfection of an indeterminate potency, their 
immediate effect is formal.133 They make this moral form of the universe, as Lonergan 
put it, our “second nature.”134 
The theorem of the supernatural, which we had previously appealed to in order to 
account for the disproportion between divine agency and created causes, also allows us to 
make a distinction in the order of habits. We may distinguish between acquired habits 
and infused habits. Acquired habits or virtues are those caused by acts. This notion is 
familiar: practice makes perfect. But Thomas’s argument for why it is that acts cause 
habits may seem a bit strange to those not acquainted with it. In ST 1–2, q. 49, a. 2, he 
says that in agents possessing only the active principle of their acts, a habit cannot be 
caused by that agent’s own acts. However, some agents possess both the active and 
passive principles of its acts, as when a human will acts if moved by the object presented 
to it by the intellect. In these agents, acts can cause habits in their agents.  
Why does the introduction of passivity make habit formation possible? First, as 
already stated, effects of action inhere in what is moved—that is, in the patient. The 
passivity of the will to receive determination from a bonum apprehensum is a being-
                                                
132 Summa theologiae, 1–2, q. 51, a. 2. 
133 Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, 48; Summa theologiae, 1–2, q. 49, a. 4. 
134 Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, 46. 
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moved. Thus, if one recalls our discussion of premotion above, what is moved is disposed 
by the action of the agent. Second, acts of the will are free precisely because the will can, 
in principle, act or not act to will the means to the end presented as bonum apprehensum. 
That which acts only out of an active principle cannot have a habit (cannot be 
“accustomed or unaccustomed,” Thomas says), because it cannot fail to act if in the 
proper external disposition or relation to what it would move. But free agents can fail to 
move themselves to act (this is the essence of freedom) and so need not only external 
disposition and relation to what would be moved by its action, but also an internal 
disposition towards moving itself. This internal disposition towards operation we call a 
habit. 
Thus, acquired habits are formed in us by our actions. Now, intellectual habits can 
be formed by a single act, as when one comes to understand something and, coming upon 
the same intelligibility in the future, continues to understand. But volitional habits, 
because the apprehensive powers are, Thomas says, “inclined variously,” require multiple 
successive acts to be formed habitually.135 In so doing, we both actualize our moral 
potential and determine it, concretizing it. Humans, then, as temporal free agents, have 
the opportunity (within the constraint of those ends and means cosmic premotion ordered 
by God’s providence has made available in our time and place) to be the artisanal 
governors of our souls by giving the actualization of our natures a determinate 
character—forming it and realizing it at the same time. In this way, our action is 
analogous to God’s: we finitely and temporally can create the microcosm of ourselves in 
                                                
135 Summa theologiae, 1–2, q. 49, a. 3. 
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much the same way that God infinitely and eternally acts to determine and realize the 
cosmos in its every moment of emergence.  
Of course, what God makes is neither materially nor formally before God makes 
it. What we make and what we cause by our action is materially before we make it. But it 
is important not to hypostatize after the fact the abstraction by which we identify its 
material ‘existence’. What we will is not yet, but what would be.136 That is an essential 
part of what makes the action by which it is caused free. The object of the will is, prior to 
action, an intellectual object. Though it may be part of an extant species (like an 
automobile) or not (like a hyperloop transportation system), it is not yet substantial until 
caused to be in cooperation with God by our action. It is as much a mistake to think of 
what we will in the way that Lonergan warns us not to think of what we know by our 
intellects: as “already out there now” entities.137 To think of what we will as “already out 
there now” covers over the way in which what we efficaciously will and do, we make. 
This point will be of fundamental importance for the modern problem of the supernatural 
in Chapter 4.  
All of this brings us back to the problem of human beings as agens imperfectum. 
Good acts need to occur regularly to inculcate virtue in the appetitive powers of our 
souls. But the structure of our moral nature—as temporal and requiring insight into 
phantasm—make these acts improbable and so irregular. Unfortunately for us, the only 
thing that can make them probable is virtue. But we cannot have acquired virtue without 
                                                
136 The deployment of the subjunctive mood here will prove of central importance when we return 
to consider free human action in more detail in Chapter 4. 
137 On the “already out there now,” see Bernard Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human 
Understanding, eds. Frederick E. Crowe, Robert M. Doran, CWL 3 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1992), 276–8. 
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those acts occurring regularly, at least for a time. Worse, moral failures also have a 
formative effect on the soul, imbuing vices where virtues should be and further impeding 
the actualization of our moral potential. On top of concupiscence, there is moral 
impotence, and on top of our moral impotence, there is our sinfulness. This is not to say, I 
should reiterate, that free, right action is impossible. It remains possible for us by nature, 
but as we already saw in the more general treatment of causality above, possessing 
proportion to an act is, by itself, to be only possibly acting. Actual action requires the 
further ordering of physical premotion for all created causes. Similarly, the proportion to 
free, right action still requires a proper spiritual or psychological disposition—a kind of 
moral instance of application—to be efficacious, to be actual for the most part, and to 
realize itself as an agens perfectum.138  
Happily, the theologian may recognize a second category of habits: infused 
virtues. The theorem of the supernatural does the heavy lifting on this point. We are, by 
nature, proportionate to the acquired virtues, but the proper disposition or relations 
(internal or external, in either case) are likely to be lacking that would allow the 
proportion of our nature to become actually efficacious in the moral realm. The infused 
virtues, then, are entitatively disproportionate to our natures. For one, they are received as 
a gift from God and not by means of our own operation. Second, they transform the 
disposition of our nature under circumstances in which, though perhaps proportionate to 
the operations needed, we lacked the disposition to make them efficacious. Third, they 
can also (in the case of the theological virtues: faith, hope, and charity) communicate a 
moral form that is, in itself, beyond the proportion of our nature to operate or develop 
                                                
138 Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, 46. 
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habitually. In these three ways, the infused virtues address both the specific theorem of 
the need for grace (the state of our nature as fallen) and the generic theorem of our need 
for grace (the disproportion of eternal life in God to our created natures).  
What is important here, however, is that whether one operates according to his or 
her created nature in developing acquired habits (of justice, say, or courage) or one 
receives as grace from God the infused virtues (whether, under our dire moral 
circumstances those virtues proportionate to our nature, but unavailable to our moral 
impotence, or those virtues of faith, hope, and charity disproportionate to our natures), in 
both cases we see the created human agent cooperating with divine agency. Not only 
does God act to create and conserve the human acts that issue from both kinds of habits, 
but God provides both the external and internal relations and dispositions in which the 
habits are acquired, received, and/or consist.  
What Lonergan has provided are the array of philosophical and theological tools 
that Thomas deployed to get a better handle on the ‘natural’ or philosophical element in 
the speculative problem of grace and freedom. From these Thomas could derive 
speculative theological solutions by analogy. My emphasis, however, has been on the 
developments on the philosophical side that accrued from Thomas’s efforts in theology 
by this speculative method. If Lonergan’s read is correct, we have a perhaps permanent 
achievement with regard to the relation of divine and created causality in general, and 
that of divine and human agency specifically. It is a medieval solution to the medieval 
problem of the supernatural in its full generality. 




Tracing Lonergan’s retrieval of Thomas leads to this perhaps surprising double 
conclusion. First, we have seen how the commerce between philosophy and theology in 
the Middle Ages produced advances for both fields. A theological problematic spurred 
Thomas’s appropriation and augmentation of Aristotle on to philosophical developments 
that, whatever dividends they paid in his speculative theological enterprise, stand on their 
own merits. Developments on the specific form of the specific medieval problem 
generated developments on the generic and specific forms of the generic medieval 
problem. These, in turn, rebounded to scaffold Thomas’s eventual solution to the specific 
form of the specific medieval problem of the supernatural. The integration of these, then, 
constitutes a medieval solution to the entirety of the medieval problem of the 
supernatural.   
We will see in the next chapter how the benefit philosophy accrued from its 
commerce with speculative theology also saddled it with a new problem. When separated 
from its cooperative concern with theology, philosophy will discover that these new 
developments suggest a fundamental ambiguity from which it cannot, by its own powers, 
loose itself. There is the general ambiguity regarding the explicability of the universe (if 
any), and alongside it the specific ambiguity of human freedom and its purpose (if any). 
Of course, the theologian may recognize how the doctrines of creation and redemption 
provide a resolution to these ambiguities. However, insofar as these doctrines must be 
affirmed by faith, the theologian cannot absolve us of the philosophically undecidable 
choice to which we are called by these ambiguities. In this way the theologian cannot, so 
to speak, snatch the analysis of this choice and its grounding ambiguity out of the hands 
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of the philosopher. It will remain a perennial ambiguity for philosophy and, as perennial, 
it calls out for a philosophical pluralism that can mediate between those philosophies 
generated out of the existential postures taken by philosophers.  
Above I indicated that what in our free agency we do, we also make in 
cooperation with God. What is made by our action, including the fully human worlds of 
cultural meaning and value, cannot therefore be bracketed out of our philosophical and 
theological inquiries. Chapter 4, then, will indicate how the medieval account of human 
and divine cooperation might itself cooperate with modern concerns about the 
constitutive function of cultures to suggest a modern problem of the supernatural. The 
final chapter, then, will work to sketch a heuristic for an adequately modern approach to 
theologies of the supernatural.
CHAPTER 3: MEDIEVAL AMBIGUITIES, MODERN MENTALITY 
Our path through Lonergan’s mid-century Thomism had an ulterior motive. I 
want to suggest that Thomas’s solution to the medieval problem of the supernatural 
ultimately leads to a pair of ambiguous philosophical conclusions. The first is a general 
ambiguity that regards the intelligibility of the universe. This is the titular ambiguity of 
this study, “the ambiguity of being.” The second is a specific ambiguity that regards the 
meaningfulness of human agency and action. We might call this “the ambiguity of being 
(free)”. For the purposes of keeping their nested correlation in view, however, here I will 
call the former the “general medieval ambiguity” and the latter the “specific medieval 
ambiguity.” As we will see, in one respect these ambiguities are subsequent to the 
medieval solution to the medieval problem of the supernatural, for they are rendered 
thinkable thereby. In another respect, however, we will discover that these ambiguities 
also lurk beneath and behind both the general medieval problem and its solution and 
undermine the notion that the medieval solution consists entirely in an apodictically 
demonstrated fundamental ontology. We will discover that the ontological position on 
human freedom and cooperation with God rests on a more basic, existential, and pre-
philosophical position with regard to the same. 
To appreciate the philosophical force of these ambiguities, it was necessary to 
know both the synthetic philosophical and theological positions that suggest them. It was 
necessary as well to know something of the cooperation between ancient and medieval 
philosophy and theology that produced them in the mind of Thomas Aquinas. Those 
questions occupied us in Chapter 2, but now we may turn to the ambiguities directly. 
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1. The General Medieval Ambiguity  
Lonergan praised the theorem of the supernatural for the release it effected in the 
thirteenth-century theology of grace, enriching the sense in which grace is at once 
gratuitous and necessary. It also cracked open the difficult question of God’s creative and 
providential agency. To say that every created cause cooperates with God’s action to 
bring about the universe that God intends can, for those prone to praying with their 
metaphysics, have profound spiritual significance. But this same theological insistence on 
universal instrumentality, resting on the theorem of the supernatural, also produces a 
certain deflationary effect on the role that common sense might attribute to God’s agency 
in the world. To borrow the words of Matthew Lamb, the truth of the statement, “from 
‘all eternity’… God understood and knew and loved such and such to happen,” only 
requires that it happen.1 God’s agency causes every cause, without exception or 
restriction. But then the question arises: if God causes every cause, what difference does 
God’s agency make in the world? This question is at the heart of the first, general 
medieval ambiguity. 
At one level, this question is easy to answer. God’s agency makes the biggest, 
most important, and most fundamental difference there can be: God’s agency causes the 
universe, everything in it, and its order of causal unfolding to be at all. If this difference is 
not made, between existing and not existing, no other differences matter. But is this 
fundamental, binary difference between what is and what is not all there is to it? Now, if 
one affirms universal instrumentality and causal cooperation with God within a 
                                                
1 Rev. Matthew L. Lamb, “Fr. Bernard J.F. Lonergan,S.J.: The Gregorian Years,” in Lonergan's 
Anthropology Revisited: The Next Fifty Years of Vatican II, edited by Gerald Whelan (Rome: G & B Press, 
2015), 57–80. 
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speculative theological context controlled by a doctrine of creation, then one has reason 
to believe that God’s agency, even though it is unrestricted in scope, is still determinate. 
God understood and knew and loved this possible world to be actualized in the temporal 
unfolding of the universe. God intended to cause this world and its various beings, 
causes, and events.  
But if one withdraws from a theological context and enters into a strictly 
philosophical method that explicitly prescinds from religious doctrine, the answer to this 
question becomes ambiguous. It becomes ambiguous, in particular, whether God’s 
agency is determinate or not. From the vantage of the creature’s experience of creaturely 
being, untutored by religious doctrine, the data of experience do not so clearly suggest a 
determinate relationship to the transcendent. After all, if God’s causal agency acts in 
every created cause without limit or exception, what contrast or definition can one trace 
in the available evidence that would suggest whether or not God causes the universe to be 
and to be thus ordered with any kind of determining or determinate intentionality? Robert 
Cummings Neville, for example, comes to the conclusion in God the Creator that God is 
the purely indeterminate act of creation, the ur indeterminacy against which every other 
thing has determination, and so being.2  
Certainly, one can extrapolate from human conceptions of alternative possible 
cosmic orders to divine knowledge thereof, but this approach is vulnerable to suspicions 
of projection: why does the presence of alternate possible cosmic orders in our minds 
necessitate an intentional mind in God whereby God would know those possible worlds 
by knowing our conception of them? And why does it necessitate a choice between them 
                                                
2 Robert C. Neville, God the Creator: On the Transcendence and Presence of God (Albany, NY: 
SUNY Press, 1992). 
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in God? After all, the whole account of free agency provided above rests on the essential 
affirmation that apprehended goods (like possible world orders) are not enough to 
necessarily move a free will to act. It only secondarily involves the determination of 
some means—in this case, the whole unfolding of cosmic process—and perhaps this is 
only a condition of temporal freedom. In other words, perhaps God causes what is, but 
trivially and not at all lovingly. 
Furthermore, if one applies this Thomistic theory of divine agency to what we 
now call the ‘natural scientific method,’ God’s agency applies to every side of every 
explanatory functional equation. It can, therefore, be cancelled off every side of every 
equation without remainder and without making any difference for the correlations, laws, 
frequencies, etc., with which the natural sciences are concerned. God’s agency answers 
two questions that, while relevant to the prosecution of the scientific method, are not 
strictly speaking scientific questions. God’s agency answers whether anything exists at all 
and whether the universe is fundamentally intelligible—that is, whether it has a sufficient 
reason for existing. However, the procedures of natural scientific inquiry operate quite 
happily when these two elements are merely assumed rather than demonstrated.  
Let us suppose (as there is ample evidence to do) that the natural sciences 
emerged from a Christian horizon of speculative theology, passed through a broadly 
Christian period of natural philosophy, only to now emerge in the modern era as a 
separated, thoroughly secularized project. The efficacy of their methods has been well 
proven, both in the annals of natural knowledge and in the arena of applied engineering 
and technological advance. It has carried through all of this the grounding insight into a 
distinct line of reference called “nature,” and fundamental assumptions that skeptical 
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suspicions about the existence of the universe or its basic intelligibility get one exactly 
nowhere. It has, however, quite practically excised the remote principle of these 
grounding assumptions: an account of the transcendent creating God. After all, in this 
limited respect, Laplace was right: the scientist really does have no need of that 
hypothesis to explain the relations among intra-mundane realities (even if he was wrong 
about their mechanistically determinist character).3  
The scientific method, because it assumes the fundamental intelligibility of the 
universe, may come around to ask after its own fundamental assumption. But the 
intended term of this question—the reason there is anything at all and that all of it is the 
way it is—would have to be transcendent at the very least with regard to time and space. 
Consequently, there will be, by definition, no direct data on the term intended by this 
question. There remains what Lonergan calls the data of consciousness on the intention of 
complete intelligibility itself and this could be taken as data on the term of this 
fundamental question. One can, it is true, trust the intellectual thrust of this intention of 
complete intelligibility and so extrapolate from it a heuristic for the transcendent term 
that explains the existence of the universe and its order. This is what Lonergan himself 
does in chapter 19 of Insight.4 
One can also reasonably suspect that it is an act of androcentric projection to take 
this questioning intention of being’s complete intelligibility as evidence that there is in 
fact an answer to one’s fundamental question. One can affirm the intention itself (after 
all, there is data on it among the data of consciousness) and still demand further evidence 
                                                
3 On Laplace’s mistake, see Patrick H. Byrne, "God and the Statistical Universe," Zygon: Journal 
of Religion & Science 16, no. 4 (1981): 345–63. 
4 Bernard Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, eds. Frederick E. Crowe and 
Robert M. Doran, CWL 3 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), 657–708. 
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on its term. But such data, in principle, cannot be forthcoming. Thus one might come to 
the inverse insight that the universe is only intelligible proximate to our evolved 
intellectual powers. When it comes to the fundamental question regarding the explanation 
of existence and the existing cosmic order, there is no intelligibility where one expects it 
to be. At bottom, the existence of the universe is a bare matter of fact and so an absurdity. 
This possibility reveals that there is a general medieval ambiguity and that this is its 
negative pole.  
With regard to the general medieval ambiguity, the answer at which one arrives 
depends upon the basic existential comportment one has towards the question that reveals 
it. If one chooses to trust the thrust of the questioning intention of complete intelligibility, 
one can come to an ontologically affirmative, if formally heuristic answer with regard to 
God and the explicability of the universe. If, however, one chooses to be suspicious and 
distrusting of this same thrust, one is equally warranted in coming to the opposite 
conclusion. In either case, there are no data on the term of inquiry to adjudicate between 
these fundamental options. Moreover, in each case, one can look back at the courses of 
inquiry by which one was led to either conclusion and reinterpret what one knows of the 
universe accordingly. For the first course, one finds a world known, chosen, loved by a 
God transcendently operating in every effective mundane operation. From the second 
existential posture, one can read the universe as a determinate, but accidental being that 
seems to permit us to understand it up to a certain point, but if pushed too far rebuffs our 
human-sized minds and turns a cold shoulder to any naïve, anthropomorphic projections 
of intelligence or intention. The ambiguity resides in the givenness of finite, contingent 
existence as apprehended from the abstractive viewpoint of a separated philosophy. 
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Which conclusion one comes to follows from a pre-philosophical and philosophically 
undecidable decision. 
More importantly, one can look back from the conclusion of one line of inquiry 
and see the possibility of the other. This, after all, is what I have just done. Following 
Lonergan following Thomas, with the aid of the Christian dogmatic context and 
Thomas’s speculative innovations and syntheses, the above spelled out a philosophy that 
takes the complete intelligibility of the universe as its proper heuristic expectation and so 
baptizes the thrust of the human mind towards total explanation. Consequently, a theory 
of transcendent divine agency can emerge to fill in precisely how the existence and 
intelligibility of the universe is grounded. Nonetheless, the very same theory can reveal, 
as it has above, the possibility of an alternative interpretation from within the abstractive 
viewpoint of a separated philosophy. Conversely, because the suspicious cosmological 
nihilist cannot find data to confirm his or her inverse insight into the explicability of the 
universe within the universe itself, he or she is also invited to construct an alternative 
interpretation that cannot be conclusively ruled out. A theory of divine concursus, 
grounded in the theorem of the supernatural, invites philosophy to discover that what 
conclusions it can generate on its own about the fundamental explicability of being are 
unavoidably ambiguous.    
2. The Specific Medieval Ambiguity 
Human action, qua cause, has cooperation with God in common with all created 
causes. In this way, human action participates in the general medieval ambiguity. This 
was already implied above, insofar as the interpretation an inquirer chooses with regard 
to the fundamental explicability of the universe has implications for his or her read of 
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what is already known, but also for how he or she will conduct him or herself as an 
inquirer (and person) in the future. But this only hints at the further, specific medieval 
ambiguity to which the above philosophy of divine agency leads us. Human action 
cooperates with God freely, and so as the underlying question of the general medieval 
ambiguity was, “what difference does God’s action make for created causes?” the 
underlying question of the specific medieval ambiguity is, “what difference does God’s 
action make for free human agency?”  
As before, the question is easy to answer at first. God acts in every free human 
action. God’s action first of all causes free human agents to exist and by the providential 
ordering of the cosmos applies us to our effects. But this is not all. Lonergan summarizes 
the volitional specifications of this general cooperation as follows: 
In the exercise of a formally free act, a person is the cause per se, inasmuch as 
having willed the end and deliberated on the basis of this willing of the end, one 
now moves oneself to willing the means to the end. Yet God too is a cause per se 
of this same exercise of the will. For a cause of a cause is a cause of the effect; 
and God causes the act of willing the end, causes the intellectual light by which 
one reflects and deliberates, and causes all the external circumstances as well as 
one’s interior habits and dispositions. In the specification of this same formally 
free act, a person is the cause per se inasmuch as by willing the end one wills this 
particular practical judgment to be the final one in accordance with which one 
moves to will the good presented by that judgment. Yet God too is a cause per se 
of this same specification of the will, since the specification is itself intelligibly 
contained in the antecedents of that free act. But there is a triple intelligible nexus 
between this free act and its antecedents; therefore, since God causes the 
antecedents, he also causes the specification of the free act.5 
God therefore also causes the act of the will by which human actions are essentially free 
in several ways: first, by kindling in the will desire for some bonum apprehensum; 
second, by making the means to this end spatiotemporally available to us; third, by 
                                                
5 Lonergan, “God’s Knowledge and Will,” in Early Latin Theology, eds. Robert M. Doran and H. 
Daniel Monsour, trans. Michael G. Shields, CWL 19 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011), 329–30. 
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illuminating intellectually the process of deliberation by which means are selected; 
fourth, by having this same causal efficacy upon all our previous actions such that we 
have the dispositions and habits by which we are not just exteriorly related properly to 
our chosen end and means, but also interiorly.  
These specifications are important for properly understanding how the general 
account of cooperation between divine and created causality works in the case of free 
human agency, but they do not eliminate the above, general ambiguity. God causes the 
will and the mind to be according to their dynamic nature, and causes the order of the 
cosmos by which both external and internal premotions apply possible free human agents 
to their effects. This causality is as universal in rational, free agents as it is in mindless, 
physical causes. The same fundamental ambiguity applies, therefore. Is human action 
fundamentally intelligible as a part of the universe or is it only accidentally susceptible to 
the manipulations of our evolved intellectual powers and so only proximately intelligible 
in the final analysis? From a strictly philosophical vantage, the same pre-philosophical 
decision haunts the interpretation of the specific case of free human agency as it did the 
case of created causality in general.  
There is a further issue in the case of free human causality. In addition to the 
radical answer that is God’s irresistible creative action, there is also a proximate answer 
to the question, “why does this action exist?” This action, as mine and free, exists or not 
because of my choice to effect it or not. This is not to deny that only God is proportionate 
to causing existence as an effect, but rather to acknowledge that free human agents have a 
special kind of cooperation with God. Causes that lack freedom, if they are proportionate 
to an effect and they are brought into the proper relation or disposition to the proper 
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material conditions or circumstances, act of necessity. But God may kindle the desire for 
an end in our will, may illuminate our deliberations about some means, may put us in 
both the proper external and internal disposition to some action, and yet we may decide 
otherwise. These fundamental aspects of our liberty mean that, whatever the antecedents, 
free human actions have as their proximate explanation the choices of free human 
persons. Liberty with regard to our actions is not something in excess of God’s action in 
our action. It is precisely that which God effects in irresistibly acting to cause the reality 
of our freedom, both in its essential generality and its effective concreteness. Your 
freedom and mine—as free—is God’s instrument in the universe.  
We are led to what in a speculative theological horizon is perhaps unproblematic, 
but when tackled from within the horizon of a separated philosophy becomes an 
inescapable ambiguity. If one’s inquiry is controlled (as a speculative theology must be) 
by doctrines of creation, of divine justice, and of redemption, then this freedom must be 
considered correlative to the already-affirmed teleology of the moral grain of the universe 
and the eschatology of humanity’s (and all of creation’s) ultimate union with God. 
However, if one withdraws these doctrinal correlates from the inquiry and instead takes a 
separated philosophical approach, one is again faced with a pre-philosophical choice that 
makes all the difference for how one interprets the data of free human action. As in the 
general ambiguity, which interpretation one takes follows from a pre-philosophical 
choice.  
This pre-philosophical act of freedom is part of what shapes the ambiguity itself. 
We might be led by the general ambiguity to suppose that, parallel with its option to 
affirm or deny the fundamental intelligibility of the universe, the specific ambiguity 
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presents the option to affirm or deny freedom in one’s own being. Although such a choice 
would be likewise pre-philosophical, and thus not necessarily ruled out concretely on 
account of performative contradiction, it is at the same time pre-philosophical, and so 
would be recognized as a ‘false start’ to any genuinely philosophical account of human 
being and freedom. If one’s philosophical inquiry into the intelligibility of the universe of 
being leads one to the inverse insight that there is no basic explanation for existence, one 
might be troubled by the circularity in suspecting the intelligence that anticipated there 
should be, but there is no contradiction. However, if one comes to the philosophical 
conclusion that human freedom is not a reality, but then one retrospectively 
acknowledges that this process began in a choice to be suspicious about the being of 
freedom, the circularity is overshadowed by the obvious contradiction.  
The specific ambiguity, however, is not about whether or not there is any freedom 
at all, but the significance of the freedom that is. The parallel with the general ambiguity 
regards the question of ground. In the general ambiguity, one chooses how to 
primordially relate to the intelligible ground of the universe of causes (if any), and in the 
specific ambiguity one chooses how to primordially relate to the intelligible ground of 
freedom (if any). If I take the pre-philosophical posture towards my freedom that I have it 
for some reason, even if that reason is unknown, I can appropriate that agency with an 
aim to discern what that reason is and to exercise my freedom with devotion to its 
purpose, even if that purpose is unseen. On the other hand, I can just as intelligently take 
a posture of suspicion towards my freedom, deciding that in the absence of evidence of 
some ground, I am not justified to suppose it has any ground at all. This suspicion will 
undoubtedly be confirmed, since there can be no direct data on a transcendent ground. 
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From the vantage of this posture, my freedom cannot but be exercised arbitrarily, because 
it exists arbitrarily. My only recourse against the imposition of freedom, then, is to 
appropriate my freedom for what Camus called “rebellion.” Note that, in either 
interpretation, there is no falling for the myth that my freedom is self-grounding, nor any 
dodging the fact that, because I am the cause of my acting or not acting, my actions are 
my responsibility.  Either way, I am free and I must freely choose how to comport myself 
to that fact.  
3. Realizing the Medieval Ambiguities 
To review then, the generic medieval ambiguity concerned the possibility of 
comporting one’s self to the question of a transcendent cause of the universe of causes in 
one of two basic ways: either as a matter of indifference or of fundamental importance, 
on account in either case of the very universality of its efficacy. The specific medieval 
ambiguity concerned free human agency among the universe of causes and in relation to 
a transcendent cause. The specific medieval ambiguity poses a similar alternative to the 
free agent, to comport him or herself to the meaningfulness and purposiveness of his or 
her agency in one of two ways: to suppose it has some meaning and purpose (though 
transcendent, and so unknown) or as an unavoidable, but nonetheless absurd project. We 
also saw how Thomas Aquinas’s solution to the medieval problems of the supernatural 
made cognizance of these medieval ambiguities possible. The transcendence of God’s ad 
extra action leaves any account of its immanent effects—which is to say, any ontology—
open to one of these two basic, pre-philosophical postures: on the one hand, faith in the 
basic explicability of the universe and of human action within it; on the other, suspicion 
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that the universe and so human action within it are both mere matters of fact that admit of 
no fundamental explanation.  
Now, that it became possible to take stock of these ontological ambiguities in 
light of Thomas’s synthesis did not mean that, in the near term, anyone actually did. In 
order that the illumination of the medieval ambiguities becomes not just possible, but 
probable, another factor is required: a modern philosophical mentality. This mentality 
eventually forced the medieval ambiguities down stage in the performance of ontology. 
Although I have called these ambiguities “medieval” according to the era of speculative 
development that made them possible, putting them in the spotlight is a distinctly modern 
achievement. This chapter, then, is our pivot from the medieval ambiguities to the 
distinctly modern form of the problem of the supernatural.  
In what follows, I describe relevant aspects of the modern philosophical mentality 
and how, at the turn of the twentieth century, Maurice Blondel approached the medieval 
problem of the supernatural in an explicitly modern fashion. Blondel’s treatment of the 
problem shows how a modern mentality led him to the medieval ambiguities. I will also 
briefly consider Jean Paul Sartre’s Being and Nothingness as an example of an alternative 
ontology made possible by the medieval ambiguities considered from within the modern 
philosophical mentality. Where Blondel can find no immanent explanation for human 
action, but takes this as evidence that there must be a transcendent and supernatural 
explanation, Sartre reads the absence of immanent explanation for being as an 
inexplicability proper to being in-itself. From the abstractive viewpoint of theology and 
what below I will call a “subordinated philosophy,” both interpretations are supported by 
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the evidence on the universe of human action precisely because God’s ad extra agency is 
universally effective.  
3.1. The Modern Philosophical Mentality 
What is the “modern philosophical mentality?” What about it makes cognizance 
of the medieval ambiguities probable? This modern philosophical mentality has, in my 
view, two salient features. First, it is a “separated” philosophy. Its inquiry does not begin 
from, nor is it ordered towards illuminating any revealed doctrine. Second, it elevates the 
via inventionis—the path of discovery—to a criterion for the validity of knowledge, 
where the quality of one’s investigation serves as the measure of the investigation’s 
results. Perhaps some will feel I have selected idiosyncratic markers of “the modern” in 
philosophy, but these seem to function behind and beneath a number of more 
“traditionally” identified features of modern philosophy. A modern aversion to authority 
or tradition may be read as a bi-product of a more fundamental, post-medieval 
transformation in philosophy’s understanding of its own project. In the modern frame, 
theology’s handmaid is now self-employed. The privileging of the via inventionis can be 
correlated with the turn to the subject for which modernity is so well known, but that 
phrase (“turn to the subject”) carries with it a host of problematically dualistic 
assumptions about consciousness and knowledge that tend to muddy the waters. I will 
briefly address some of those assumptions below, but for now suffice it to say that 
characterizing this focus on the operation of the investigator does not have to be a move 
“inside” our heads, nor a move “away” from das Ding an sich. Rather, it amounts 
foremost to a demotion of the logical criterion for validating knowledge that drove the 
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construction of late-scholastic treatises and early-modern rationalist philosophical 
systems.  
3.2. Subordinated Philosophy 
In the medieval situation, Thomas Aquinas identified two kinds of argument in 
theology. He writes,  
One kind of argument is directed to removing doubts as to whether something is 
so. In such arguments in theology, one relies especially on the authorities that are 
recognized by the persons with whom one is disputing ... 
But another kind of argument is that of the teacher in the schools. It seeks not to 
remove error but to instruct the students so that they understand the truth that the 
teacher hopes to convey. In such cases it is important to base one's argument on 
reasons that go to the root of the truth in question, that make hearers understand 
how what is said is true. Otherwise, if the teacher settles a question simply by an 
appeal to authorities, the students will have their certitude that the facts are indeed 
as stated; but they will acquire no knowledge or understanding, and they will go 
away empty.6 
Speculative theology is concerned with the latter form of argumentation. It begins from 
difficulties understanding the coherence of doctrines that are already affirmed, 
individually and in aggregate, as true by faith and on the authority of the Church. “A 
person who is seeking an understanding of the mysteries is not asking,” Lonergan writes 
in The Triune God: Systematics, “whether there are mysteries or whether they are true.”7 
Instead, speculative theology deploys a subordinated philosophy to better understand how 
these already-affirmed doctrinal elements cohere. Subordinated philosophy, therefore, 
has its program set for it by the speculative theological endeavor. This does not mean that 
subordinated philosophy simply provides logical forms for hashing through the 
                                                
6 Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones quodlibetales, 4, q. 9, a. 3. 
7 Bernard Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics, eds. Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour, 
trans. Michael G Shields, CWL 12 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 15. 
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propositional content of the dogmas. Rather, subordinated philosophy operates with a 
relative autonomy to clarify everything in a theological problem that is not itself the 
mystery believed by faith. When the work of subordinated philosophy is done, “it leaves 
to faith not human problems, nor the human element in religious problems, but the pure 
formulation of the point that cannot be encompassed by the human understanding.”8  It 
leaves, in other words, that element in the problem that is properly hidden in the mystery 
of God. As we saw in the previous chapter, philosophy was not necessarily hampered by 
this arrangement. No small philosophical advances were made from within its unfolding. 
Beyond this direct treatment of the creaturely element in speculative problems, theology 
“also finds in the natural order, as philosophically analyzed, the analogies necessary for 
the scientific conception of purely theological data.”9 In the case of the Trinitarian dogma 
this is especially important, for there is, strictly speaking, no intrinsic human element in 
need of clarification. 
Speculative theology becomes a systematic theology when the questions and 
answers pursued in cooperation with a subordinated philosophy are sapientially ordered 
according to their relative priority. This order of priority can take different forms, but its 
underlying purpose is to provide understanding not of this or that element in a theological 
problem, but of the whole. Lonergan identifies two basic forms of this ordering: the “via 
inventionis” and the “via doctrinae”. Following the via inventionis (as I did in the first 
part of the previous chapter detailing the development of Thomas’s philosophy of 
agency), the material is organized by the process of inquiry and insight to show how the 
                                                
8 Bernard Lonergan, Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St Thomas Aquinas, 
eds. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, CWL 1 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), 171. 
9 Bernard Lonergan, Grace and Freedom,175. 
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required speculative elements came to view such that the final position is now possible. 
Following the via doctrinae (as I did when stating Thomas’s synthetic position on ad 
extra divine agency), one can arrange these elements for the purpose of communicating 
directly the whole position, so that the answer to any particular question does not 
presuppose some answer not already provided. For Lonergan, the via doctrinae “begins 
with concepts that are fundamental and especially simple, so that by adding a step at a 
time it may proceed in an orderly way to the understanding of an entire science.”10 For 
speculative theology the via doctrinae is given pride of place, because its doctrinal 
elements are affirmed with certainty on the authority of the Church and the aim is to 
understand their coherence to the extent our finite minds are able. The via doctrinae is the 
properly systematic presentation of a systematic theology, communicating an imperfect, 
analogical, persistently-obscure-but-nonetheless-fruitful understanding in its present state 
of always-ongoing development.11  
3.3. Separated Philosophy 
A separated philosophy, by contrast, does not receive its marching orders from a 
theology. It is perhaps obvious that the dogmatic context is that from which a separated 
philosophy is separated. Too often, though, this is taken in the flatfooted sense that a 
separated philosophy is liberated from the obligation to come to points of doctrine as the 
ready-made conclusion to its arguments.12 But for speculative theology in Thomas’s 
                                                
10 Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics, 61. 
11 Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics, 15–9. 
12 This seems to explain the short shrift given Thomas Aquinas by Bertrand Russell in his History 
of Western Philosophy. For Russell, Thomas’s subordination of philosophy to a theological program, 
insofar as it seems to reason to predetermined doctrinal conclusions, cannot be considered philosophical at 
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medieval mode, philosophy is never working directly towards the doctrines themselves as 
conclusions. Rather, separated philosophy is separated from its obligations to answer first 
those questions that concern the created element in a theology’s problem(s) of dogmatic 
understanding. Separation from a dogmatic context, moreover, does not mean that a 
philosophy has no doctrines whatsoever, but rather that its doctrines are not accepted with 
certainty on the authority of the Church, of scripture, etc. A separated philosophy’s 
doctrines are accepted in the provisional fashion of the dialectician, which is to say they 
are accepted until they can be established on independent grounds or overturned. In this 
way, for a separated philosophy, credulity and suspicion are placed on equal footing.  
How, then, are the doctrines of a separated philosophy established or overturned? 
As I suggested above, the modern philosophical mentality makes of the philosophical via 
inventionis both a measure for and a form of argumentation about philosophical 
doctrines, considered individually or as a unified system. The ideal of coherence proper 
to the theological via doctrinae is no longer an appropriate measure of a separated 
philosophy’s provisionally accepted doctrines. Separated philosophy installs in its place 
the relative rigor and authenticity of the intellectual labors by which various 
philosophical doctrines have been derived. How one came to this or that bit of 
philosophical insight, for the modern philosophical mentality, becomes a way of 
adjudicating the reliability and validity of the insight itself. Moreover, arguing in support 
of one’s philosophical doctrine becomes, in no small part, a matter of rehearsing the path 
travelled to it. Let us consider below an example of these two elements at work in a 
pivotal work of modern thought. 
                                                                                                                                            
all. See Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1945), 
452–462. 
   
 
136 
3.3.1. Descartes’s The Discourse on the Method 
René Descartes, in The Discourse on the Method, provides a famous early 
example of the modern philosophical mentality for which I have been setting the scene. 
My reading may seem to run counter to the widespread, “received” account of 
Descartes’s Discourse, especially insofar as it minimizes the sense that he effects a 
radical break with medieval metaphysics, trading it in for a skeptical and borderline 
solipsistic subjectivism. This “received” reading has Descartes’s turn to methodical doubt 
yield self-referential certitude for the ego and inferential certitude of God’s existence. 
Once the latter affirmation is revealed as so-much motivated reasoning, however, it is a 
rather straight shot (the story goes) to the critical immanentism of Immanuel Kant’s 
Critique of Pure Reason. Instead, by identifying what I think is a more fundamental shift 
in mentality (philosophy’s separation from a dogmatic context and the installation of the 
via inventionis as its criteria of validity), we can come to see how ontology remains a 
core, even central concern for Descartes, even though ontology as a method has been de-
prioritized in favor of epistemology. Still, as I suggested above, this “turn to the subject” 
is a secondary effect of this more basic transition that Descartes will help us illustrate 
below.  
In the Discourse, Descartes expresses his dissatisfaction that, though “it had been 
cultivated by the best minds for many centuries,” philosophical doctrines were widely 
disputed, with many learned figures defending “different opinions on the same subject.”13 
More than this, he expresses his further dissatisfaction that the fashion in which these 
                                                
13 René Descartres, A Discourse on the Method of Correctly Conducting One’s Reason and 
Seeking Truth in the Sciences, trans. Ian Maclean (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 10. 
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various doctrines were defended amounted to no more than a defense of their 
“plausibility.” Their coherence was asserted by something like what above I called a via 
doctrinae. This coherence only served to show that these positions could be true, not that 
they in fact were. Indeed, this seems to him the chief virtue (read: vice) of the philosophy 
of his contemporaries: it “provides us with the means of speaking plausibly about 
anything.”14 Even logic seems to him a device for rigorously and carefully 
communicating to others what one thinks one already knows, or (worse) speaking 
rigorously and carefully to others about that of which one is ignorant.15 It does not, in any 
case, seem to hold much value for Descartes in generating knowledge de novo. While he 
in many places affirms his devotion to the teachings and authority of the Church, he 
assiduously denies that he has possession of the elevations of grace necessary for direct 
insight into matters theological.16 Because he feels inadequate to evaluate those doctrines 
independently, those teachings cannot themselves serve as the kind of philosophical 
ground for the philosophical doctrines of which Descartes found himself bereft. 
Consequently, Descartes’s philosophy is going to be a separated philosophy.  
As famous as Descartes has become for his methodical doubt, Descartes begins 
the Discourse with an affirmation of reason that one might easily overlook. “Good sense 
is the most evenly distributed thing in the world.” Moreover, “the power of judging 
correctly and of distinguishing the true from the false… is naturally equal in all men(.)” 
Facility in applying reason well, however, is distributed unevenly.17 In other words, 
                                                
14 Descartes, Discourse on the Method, 8. 
15 Ibid., 16. 
16 Ibid., 8, 21, 50. 
17 Ibid., 5. 
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reason as a native power in human beings is unproblematic; the problem comes when 
reason has to be concretized by application to reality. Consequently, Descartes’s 
persuasive procedure consists in sharing with his reader the path he takes on the ways to 
his philosophical doctrines, thereby detailing the application of his powers of reasoning 
to the problem of knowledge. He even gives a kind of short intellectual biography to 
frame his investigation.18 The method by which he derived and (in his own estimation) 
grounded his doctrines features centrally in this rehearsal. Surveying the path to his 
philosophical doctrine and its attendant method will, Descartes tells us, provide what is 
required that “everyone may come to a judgment about it.”19 Notice what Descartes has 
done: he has proposed from the beginning that his via inventionis—his path of 
discovery—should serve as the criterion by which his philosophical doctrines should be 
measured and evaluated. Moreover, he has explicitly appealed to the transcendence and 
so cognitional disproportion of revealed doctrines to human minds to justify pursuing a 
separated, rather than subordinated philosophical project. We have in Descartes, then, an 
instance of the modern philosophical mentality where its two salient features serve an 
integral function.  
Descartes’s philosophical method comes with a host of problematic assumptions. 
He assumes that philosophical principles must function like geometric axioms. He 
assumes that this geometric approximation means a philosophical method can be 
followed automatically insofar as one knows the rules of operation.20 He assumes that 
there is a hard binary in knowledge between what is certain and what is dubitable and that 
                                                
18 Ibid., 7–17, 25–7. 
19 Ibid., 6; for Descartes’s summary of his method, see 17–20. 
20 Ibid., 31. 
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it justifies universal methodical doubt.21 Indeed, he assumes that universal methodical 
doubt is possible at all. He assumes that individual control of thought is obviously to be 
preferred to the communal aggregation of understanding.22 Several of these 
assumptions—about methodical doubt and about the individual control of thought 
especially—lend credence to the impression that the modern philosophical mentality is 
foremost a skeptical turn inward to the subject and away from the world of really real 
things. But Descartes does not come to a philosophical viewpoint “trapped” inside the 
mind of the subject. His basic position is not merely epistemological, but also explicitly 
metaphysical. Cogito ergo sum implies that thinking is indubitable to itself, but also, let 
us not forget, explicitly asserts that thinking is. Thought turned to itself is at once a fact, 
an activity, and an apprehension of being. Thinking recognizes itself in act, and this act 
exists. It exists in that which I cannot but call “I”, and so exists substantially. But 
substantially existing things have essences, and so Descartes determines that the thing 
which I call “I” is a “thinking thing.”23  
It is important, therefore, not to be led too swiftly down a “subjectivist” or 
“immanentist” road by what Descartes is arguing because he is discussing thought or 
because the history of philosophy tends to emphasize it. Having just established that 
thinking can know itself as being, he wonders whether those thoughts a thinking thing 
thinks, because they are about entities other than its own thinking, have an extra-mental 
reality—whether they have what he will later call res extensa, distinct from res cogitans. 
That Descartes imports a dualistic, “in-here” and “out-there” distinction conflicts with his 
                                                
21 Ibid., 17, 25–8. 
22 “… things made up of different elements and produced by the hands of several master craftsmen 
are often less perfect than those on which only one person has worked.” Ibid., 12. 
23 Ibid., 28–9. 
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own insistence that what keeps people from apprehending the force of his arguments is a 
failure to “rise above” the sensible in their thinking, so that “everything which seems 
unimaginable seems to them unintelligible.”24 Descartes’s dualism betrays his own 
failure to follow all the way through on his methodical doubt of the sensible. Although he 
insists himself that it is the insensible intellect that knows being, and not the senses, he 
makes of the extended and sensible a distinct “nature.”25  Nonetheless, though we might 
wish Descartes had taken up a more intellectualist realism in general, the above muddle 
turns out to be beside my main point. Descartes’s foundational position only serves his 
philosophical aims if it is a metaphysical position. To defend his metaphysical doctrine, 
Descartes appeals to his process of inquiry as the criterion for the validity of his 
knowledge. He explicitly deploys his via inventionis as the argument for the verity of his 
position. In this way, Descartes’s project is modern because it operates in separation from 
the dictates of a dogmatic theological project and it gives intellectual operation pride of 
place as its internal criterion of validity.  
3.4. Maurice Blondel’s Modern Philosophical Mentality 
 Let us turn now from that brief illustration of the modern philosophical mentality 
to its substantive influence on the problem of the supernatural and the medieval 
ambiguities of being. If the medieval solution to the problem of the supernatural made 
cognizance of the medieval ambiguities possible and the modern philosophical mentality 
made it probable, Maurice Blondel’s philosophy of action made it actual. On the eve of 
the twentieth century, Blondel made bold to raise the problem of the supernatural in a 
                                                
24 Ibid., 32 
25 Ibid., 31. 
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thoroughly modern way for a modern audience.26 By articulating the medieval solution to 
the medieval problem of the supernatural in a thoroughly modern fashion, Blondel can 
make the attendant medieval ambiguities apparent to the modern mind, preparing the 
ground for the genuinely modern form of the problem of the supernatural to arise. The 
following, then, will ask and answer a series of questions about Blondel’s philosophy of 
action and the supernatural. How is Blondel’s approach modern? How does it raise the 
medieval problem of the supernatural in this modern fashion? How does it answer that 
problem in a modern way? How does it articulate the medieval ambiguities in light of this 
answer? Finally, in what ways does Blondel’s modern philosophical approach to the 
problem of the supernatural fail to be yet-fully-modern? 
3.4.1. Blondel’s Modern Philosophical Method 
Blondel called his philosophical method a “method of immanence.”27 It consists 
in “trying to equate, in our own consciousness, what we appear to think and to will and to 
do with what we do and will and think in actual fact(.)”28 It recognizes that any and every 
idea of the transcendent is just that: an idea, and not the transcendent itself. Therefore, 
                                                
26 We will come to see that Blondel’s philosophy, though its procedure is modern in the ways 
described above, still it does not yet set out to face a modern form of the problem of the supernatural, nor 
does he therefore alight upon a corresponding modern solution. 
27 Blondel’s most famous excursus on philosophical method can be found in an essay written 
shortly after the publication of L’Action (1893) in 1896, “Lettre sur les exigences de la pensée 
contemporaine en matiere d'apologétique et sur la méthode de la philosophie dans l'étude du probleme 
religieux,” since translated and published in English under the somewhat misleading, but rather more pithy 
title, “The Letter on Apologetics” (Maurice Blondel, The Letter on Apologetics and History and Dogma 
[Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994]). Blondel would later become embroiled in the Francophone debates 
about the possibility of Christian philosophy. For an excellent overview and a handful of newly translated 
primary texts, see Gregory B. Sadler, Reason Fulfilled by Revelation: The 1930s Christian Philosophy 
Debates in France (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2011). Henri de Lubac’s 
synthesizing intervention is also well worth tracking down (Henri de Lubac, "On Christian Philosophy," 
Communio 19 [Fall 1992]: 478–506). 
28 Blondel, Letter on Apologetics, 157. 
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short of the transcendent revealing itself to us supernaturally, we must critically 
investigate it by surveying and evaluating our immanent notions and motives.29 Blondel 
specified the method of immanence in distinction from a philosophically unfounded 
“doctrine of immanence.” The doctrine of immanence tries to “make a transcendent truth 
of the negation of the transcendent or of the supernatural… content (with) explaining the 
manifold interdependent and heterogeneous aspects of thought by one another and to 
reintegrate all forms of life into the unity of a single determinism(.)”30 Blondel was 
convinced that a philosophical doctrine of immanence, a priori foreclosing the 
transcendent and supernatural from philosophical discourse, was incompatible with 
thought that proceeds according to modern philosophy’s highest principles and 
aspirations. Moreover, he thought that “the only possible religious philosophy, which is 
truly religious and truly a philosophy, results from these principles.”31 Though he was 
quite explicit that the secularizing doctrine of immanence was modern philosophy’s great 
error, Blondel thought of the method of immanence as one of modern philosophy’s great 
achievements.32 
Blondel was fond of such conceptual pairings, often giving them mnemonically 
impossible appellations: the willed will and the willing will; afference and efference,33 
integrism and integralism,34 mobiles and motives,35 etc. This pair in particular—the 
                                                
29 Ibid. 158–9. 
30 Ibid. 178–9. 
31 Ibid. 158. 
32 See Le Grys, “The Christianization of Modern Philosophy According to Maurice Blondel,” 
Theological Studies 54 (1993) 455–84. 
33 See Michael A. Conway, The Science of Life: Maurice Blondel’s Philosophy of Action and the 
Scientific Method (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 2000), 368–73. 
34 See Maurice Blondel, Une alliance contre nature: Catholicisme et intégrisme, La Semaine 
sociale de Bourdeaux 1910, reprint (Brussels: Editions Lessius, 2000). For helpful context, see also Peter 
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method of immanence and the doctrine of immanence—crystallizes Blondel’s 
philosophical approach. Blondel did not tend to oppose an idea or philosophical outlook 
by brute force. He instead showed how an ostensibly self-standing idea betrays its 
incompleteness by its internal structure. He writes of this technique, 
We must, taking within ourselves all consciousnesses, become the intimate 
accomplice of all, in order to see if they bear within themselves their own 
justification or condemnation. They have to become arbiters of themselves; they 
have to see where their most frank and their most interior will would lead them; 
they have to learn what they do without knowing it, and what they already know 
without willing it and without doing it.36  
When Blondel accused modern, secular philosophies of adhering to a doctrine of 
immanence, he did not just accuse them of being unfairly hostile to religion in general or 
theology in particular. Nor did he merely point out the scotoma of prejudice in their 
worldview and its effect on their philosophies. By pointing out the doctrine of 
immanence at work in modern, secular philosophies, Blondel accused philosophers of 
being insufficiently modern in their approach. Instead of attacking the anti-religious self-
understanding of modern philosophy headlong, Blondel subverted it, insisting modern 
philosophy follow its own core methodological commitments to their limit. There is no 
rectilinear genealogy of decline or wish-dream of repristination at work in Blondel’s 
criticism of modern philosophy. Blondel encouraged modern philosophy to be both more 
philosophical and more modern, not less so. Only in this way could modern philosophy 
show to the modern mind the necessity of making the supernatural a philosophic term 
(albeit in a methodically controlled and, as we will see, strictly heuristic sense).  
                                                                                                                                            
Bernardi, Maurice Blondel, Social Catholicism, and Action Française : The Clash over the Church's Role 
in Society during the Modernist Era (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2009). 
35 Maurice Blondel, Action (1893), trans. Oliva Blanchette (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 2003), 111–20. 
36 Blondel, Action, 12. 
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Blondel’s philosophy of action, then, is self-consciously modern philosophy. In 
what way is it modern? It shares the two basic commitments outlined above as “the 
modern philosophical mentality.” First, it is separated philosophy, unsubordinated to a 
dogmatic context. Second, it treats the philosopher’s via inventionis—that is, his path of 
philosophical investigation and discovery—as the basic criterion of validity, even truth. 
Theologians and Christian philosophers sometimes see these elements of modern 
philosophy as inimical to the prospect of integrating philosophy with Christian faith. 
Separated philosophy seems to a priori rule inadmissible a core Christian commitment: 
that there are revealed and authoritative doctrines and that these doctrines are true. The 
elevation of the via inventionis to a criterion of validity and truth seems a fortiori to 
foreclose the very category of revealed doctrine. After all, if conclusions can only be 
verified to the extent the philosopher can exposit the validity of their derivation, then 
doctrines of supernatural provenance cannot be verified or, in the strongest form of the 
claim, be true at all. The startling genius of Action appears when these basic 
commitments are shown as the very source of philosophy’s necessary affirmation of the 
supernatural in general and supernatural religion in particular.  
Blondel contends that a critical attitude towards the authority of religiously 
revealed doctrines can be the very thing that makes modern, separated philosophy 
practicable for Christians. True, the dogmas of faith cannot be entered into philosophic 
discourse as is, nor can they anymore control its procedure or direct its outcomes. But 
Blondel’s radicalized method of immanence also excludes the philosophical doctrine that 
only purely immanent accounts of reality are admissible as philosophic explanation. This 
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position would arbitrarily privilege certain prospective doctrines over others.37 Modern 
philosophy must be willing to admit doctrines containing transcendent terms so long as 
they have been derived according to the method of immanence. Thus, Blondel’s 
argument in Action shows how the modern commitment to philosophy’s autonomy 
should prevent modern philosophers from excluding the supernatural from their 
philosophies. “It would be strange, therefore,” he writes, “if it were scientific to exclude 
what it is not scientific to admit(.)”38 Taking the separated-ness of philosophy to mean 
that the supernatural, a priori, cannot be a term in modern philosophy makes this 
exclusion itself into an inviolable doctrine, subordinating philosophy to a secularizing 
program. This ironically violates the principle behind an appropriately modern “method 
of immanence” and only gives these philosophies the appearance of separated autonomy. 
For Blondel, modern philosophy gives pride of place to autonomy and autochthony. 
Indeed, his notion of what counts as philosophical immanence is controlled by these twin 
characteristics.39 
We begin to see how Blondel’s is a “method of immanence” for an even more 
basic reason. His refusal to privilege any doctrine presupposes a commitment to only 
considering doctrines insofar as they are the product of human reasoning and willing. 
                                                
37 “Thus, for the problem of action to be raised scientifically, we should not have any moral 
postulate or intellectual given to accept… Thus everything is called into question, even where there is a 
question. The spring for the entire investigation must come from the investigation itself; and the movement 
of thought will sustain itself without any external artifice.” Ibid., 11. 
38 Ibid., 359. 
39 “In a phrase which must be explained but which indicates at once the seriousness of the conflict 
[between philosophy and Christianity], modern thought, with a jealous susceptibility, considers the notion 
of immanence as the very condition of philosophizing; that is to say, if among current ideas there is one 
which it regards as marking a definite advance, it is the idea, which is at bottom perfectly true, that nothing 
can enter man’s mind which does not come out of him and correspond in some way to a need for 
development and that there is nothing in the nature of historical or traditional teaching or obligation 
imposed from without which counts for him, no truth and no precept which is acceptable, unless it is in 
some sort autonomous and autochthonous.” Blondel, Letter on Apologetics, 151–2. 
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True, prospective philosophical doctrines can enter into Blondel’s philosophical dialectic 
from any quarter (including, it turns out, that of supernatural religion). However, only 
those doctrines that can be evaluated and verified according to the native resources of the 
philosopher can survive this dialectic to be affirmed and not merely entertained. From a 
certain angle, this is what it means to call his notion of modern philosophy ‘critical’: it 
can give an account of itself both as a body of doctrine, but also as giving rise to and even 
verifying those doctrines. “The difficulty,” Blondel writes, “is to introduce nothing 
external or artificial into this profound drama of life; it is, if need be, to correct reason 
and the will through reason and the will themselves.”40 But recourse to the via inventionis 
in this way means that all affirmed philosophical doctrines presuppose their own 
proportionality to human powers of reasoning. Hence Blondel’s appellation: a method of 
immanence. 
3.4.2. Blondel’s Modern Form of the Medieval Problem 
Blondel’s “critique of life and science of practice” in Action is modern because it 
proceeds under these twin conditions of the modern philosophical mentality. How then 
does Blondel’s philosophy of action raise the medieval problem of the supernatural in a 
modern way? First of all, we can contrast it with Aquinas’s way of raising the problem. 
Blondel does not a priori privilege or refuse to consider any plausible philosophical 
doctrine. Even more than this, if his via inventionis will demonstrate the truth of his 
conclusion and not just its plausibility, then Blondel must rigorously survey and 
dialectically disqualify other explanations of human action. He writes, 
                                                
40 Blondel, Action, 13. 
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As I approach the science of action, then, I can take nothing for granted, no facts, 
no principles, no duties. It is to strip myself of every precarious support that I 
have been working…We must enter into all prejudices, as if they were legitimate, 
into all errors, as if they were sincere, into all passions, as if they had the 
generosity they boast of, into all philosophical systems, as if each one held in its 
grip the infinite truth it thinks it has cornered.41  
Thus, where Thomas considers alternative opinions in the ancillary space provided for 
objections, Blondel centers the internal logic of a succession of philosophical doctrines 
purporting to provide an adequate explanation of human action on their own. Where 
Thomas incisively reveals the mistaken assumptions behind mistaken objections, Blondel 
goes to great pains showing how these candidates for the complete explanation of action 
fail to meet even their own internal criteria for validity. The aesthete makes a single-
minded purpose of distractedly flitting from project to project.42 The nihilist cannot 
detach his or her denial of meaning from the “something” it denies.43 The positive 
scientist cannot provide sense data on the intelligibilities he or she finds in what is 
observed.44 The secular humanist cannot avoid being superstitious in his or her 
repudiation of superstition.45 Because the rigor of Blondel’s demonstration relies on 
showing his phenomenological procedure, he cannot rely on an analytic argument that 
would exclude these perspectives a priori. According to his method of immanence, 
                                                
41 Ibid., 12. 
42 Ibid., 16–35. 
43 Ibid., 36–50. 
44 Ibid., 56–93. 
45 “Nothing is more true, nothing is more necessary than to look, almost to the point of pride and 
naïveté, upon the metaphysician fascinated with his constructions, upon the artist in love with his work, the 
devotee of the moral ideal, or the apostle of action for the sake of action, as savage fetishists: in each 
instance, it is the same pretention and the same presumption. All are equally persuaded they can make their 
god without God. To lay bare the nothingness of such human effort is to do a work of pious impiety. For if 
he stays only with his negative conclusions, if he takes satisfaction in them, with the hope of having 
confiscated and as it were dissolved the divine, if he is triumphant for having dug within himself an abyss 
deep enough to bury, once and for all, his action and all things, the impious critic is not yet impious 
enough. He still retains the superstition of not having any; he remains an idolater.” Ibid. 285–99. 
   
 
148 
Blondel must take up an a posteriori procedure, and so he moves methodically from 
arena to arena of human action, from doctrine to prospective doctrine, excluding every 
purely immanent candidate.  
It is common to hear expositors of Blondel emphasize how his philosophy 
demonstrates the necessity of the supernatural by following the élan of the human will 
from its interior movement, through its various efforts to satisfy itself, and then out 
beyond the limits of the whole universe, showing that nothing in creation is adequate to 
the native desire of the human will. In the contemporary, anglophone controversy over 
the surnaturel, this is often equated with the theologian’s notion of a natural desire to see 
God.46 Blondel, of course, does in part argue according to this trajectory and did affirm 
something like the natural desire to see God (he called it the “trans-natural” character of 
the human will in his defense of Social Catholicism).47 But if one attends only to 
Blondel’s analysis of the will’s infinite dynamism and desire, one can overlook the way 
in which Blondel installs the medieval problem of the supernatural in the very heart of 
Action.  
Blondel shows how even the most sincere and sophisticated effort to explain 
human action does not just fail in its highest aspiration to explain human destiny per se. A 
                                                
46 See David Braine, "The Debate between Henri Du Lubac and His Critics," Nova et Vetera 
(English Edition) 6, no. 3 (Summer 2008), 543–89; Sean Larsen, "The Politics of Desire: Two Readings of 
Henri De Lubac on Nature and Grace," Modern Theology 29, no. 3 (July 2013), 279–310; Guy Mansini, 
"Henri De Lubac, the Natural Desire to See God, and Pure Nature," Gregorianum 83, no. 1 (2002), 89–109; 
"The Abiding Theological Significance of Henri De Lubac's 'Surnaturel'," The Thomist 73, no. 4 (2009), 
593–619; Raymond Moloney, "De Lubac and Lonergan on the Supernatural," Theological Studies 69, no. 3 
(2008), 509–27 ; Aidan Nichols, "Thomism and the Nouvelle théologie," The Thomist 64 (2000), 1–19; 
Thomas Joseph White, "Imperfect Happiness and the Final End of Man: Thomas Aquinas and the Paradigm 
of Nature-Grace Orthodoxy,” The Thomist 78, no. 2 (2014), 247–89. 
47 On Blondel and Social Catholicism, again see Peter Bernardi, Maurice Blondel, Social 
Catholicism, and Action Francaise. 
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fortiori, he shows that it fails at any and every level of analysis.48 Whether at the first 
stirring of our interior life or our orientation towards creation as a whole or anywhere in 
between, whether one appeals to the positive sciences, the structure of rational agency 
itself, or to the universal moral law or any other doctrine, there always remains missing 
some explanatory element, some required something that cannot be disclosed 
philosophically. The causal circle cannot be rounded off with only immanently derived 
terms. The progressive expansion of Blondel’s inquiry reveals not just the élan of the 
human will, but also the exhaustive, “deterministic” nature of his philosophical survey of 
human action. It is not just that each level of analysis fails to answer the ultimate question 
of human action, but it even fails to give an adequate account of itself at that level. If one 
will admit only immanently derived philosophical terms, one runs inevitably into the 
reality that none of these can provide a complete explanation of human action. Thus 
Blondel raises the medieval problem of the supernatural—albeit generalized and 
undifferentiated—in a distinctly modern fashion. He suggests that the way in which 
modern philosophy championed immanence did not excise the transcendent once and for 
all, but only provisionally bracketed it. Eventually, if what one wants is complete 
explanation, the borrowed explicability of the immanent was always going to have to be 
returned to its transcendent source. Of course, as we will see below in the section on 
                                                
48 In Theology and Social Theory, John Milbank alights on this point and makes a great deal of it 
to characterize Blondel as presaging both Rorty-esque pragmatism and post-structural postmodernism. The 
levels of equilibrium in Blondel’s analysis hang together a bit too tightly for this characterization to ring 
true for those who have spent much time with Action or Blondel’s other works. However, it goes a long 
way to explain Milbank’s possibly puzzling claim in the Introduction that, though he rejects Alasdair 
MacIntyre’s philosophic realism, his thought will assume “a realist cast within (his) final theological 
perspective.” John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason, 2nd ed. (Malden, MA: 
Blackwell, 2006), 5, 212–3. 
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Sartre’s Being and Nothingness, if one is willing to give up ontological explanation per 
se, then the theoretical debt to the transcendent is effectively cancelled.  
3.4.4. Blondel’s Modern Form of The Medieval Solution 
How does Blondel answer the medieval problem posed in his modern idiom? In a 
sense, he responds to the medieval problem with a version of the medieval solution, but 
transformed by the strictures of his modern philosophical method. The aggregation of 
explanatory failures in which his phenomenology of human action results provides the 
warrant for a negative, but heuristic conclusion: there remains “one thing necessary” to 
explain human action and it cannot be produced by human thinking or willing. It is 
something that must be supposed on account of the fact of human action, but that 
philosophy cannot produce according to its via inventionis. This is, for Blondel, the 
philosophical meaning of the term “supernatural”: a heuristic term indicating this “one 
thing necessary.” The term “supernatural” indicates an answer to a question. It is the 
question with which Action begins: “does human life make sense and does man have a 
destiny?”49 Action appears to be free and purposive, and yet we cannot avoid action and 
find ourselves in the middle of it without knowing what its purpose is. For Blondel, the 
supernatural is that which we must will in order to act freely and for our action to find its 
purpose. 
The theologian, however, must not jump too quickly to some ready-made sense of 
the supernatural and its place in the drama of human being. Because Blondel’s 
philosophy is separated from the Christian doctrinal context, his “supernatural” cannot be 
                                                
49 Blondel, Action, 3. 
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read as synonymous with, for example, Lonergan’s ens supernaturale or de Lubac’s 
surnaturel.50 First of all, within the frame set by Blondel’s method of immanence, the 
supernatural is an answer anticipated, but not yet known. Blondel’s investigation reaches 
the very limit of the universe of human action and does not comprehend its term. It seems 
to be an answer that, by a method of immanence, cannot be known. But that there is some 
answer seems a necessary presupposition. Blondel has to his own satisfaction already 
ruled out doctrines of aesthetic indifference and nihilism as prospective answers to his 
question, though we will see below that perhaps this exclusion was not yet sufficiently 
worked out and will return in a more radical and so more serious form. Nonetheless, 
Blondel argues that the answer to the question of action cannot be that there is no answer. 
Though philosophy must anticipate an answer, no answer can be forthcoming. As we will 
see, there is a certain moral squeamishness to Blondel’s conclusion on this point; it may 
well be that both the question and the anticipation that it must have an answer are a kind 
of illusion that modern philosophy’s skeptical aspect ought to expose and repudiate, even 
if it means all philosophy is ultimately self-immolating. But Blondel believes too much in 
philosophy as a practice for this kamikaze line of reasoning. For him, the supernatural 
serves as a heuristic term standing in place of the answer that cannot but be anticipated by 
philosophy. The supernatural, thus, is what modern philosophy would know if it could 
answer Blondel’s question of action.  
This negative implication is not totally fruitless. It has philosophic value in its 
heuristic function: the supernatural is, even as unknown, that “one thing necessary.”51 
                                                
50 Bernard Lonergan, “The Supernatural Order” in Early Latin Theology, eds. Robert M. Doran 
and H. Daniel Monsour, trans. Michael G Shields, CWL 19 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011), 
53–256. 
51 Ibid., 314–29. 
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This one thing necessary is produced in every action. There is no arena of human action 
in which it is not operative. By extension, it is willed in willing any realized action (what 
Blondel calls the “willing will”). Although the human agent cannot fail to will that the 
supernatural be operative in his or her action, the supernatural is not in any action 
because a human agent wills it to be. The will, for Blondel as for Thomas, is an 
intellectual faculty. Thus, when the human agent wills an idea of some determinate action 
(Blondel’s “willed will”), reason presents a manifold of appetites (“mobiles”) to the will 
as a multiplicity of ideas (“motives”) and one of these ideas is promoted by the will for 
execution.52 Consequently, what cannot be willed also cannot be thought, because that 
which is willed is always already presented by reason for consideration. The thought of 
an action never provides the one thing necessary to reason, let alone to action itself. 
Neither does reflection on an effected action comprehend the one thing necessary, though 
reflection must affirm that it is operative. Therefore, modern philosophy cannot 
completely explain human action in general or (per Blondel’s under-appreciated and 
more radical claim) any human action in particular. It cannot provide in its concepts the 
one thing necessary to all, any, and every action. But modern philosophy also cannot a 
priori rule out the supernatural as a heuristic term without violating its own root 
principles that a) all doctrines can be considered, b) no prospective doctrine gets special 
status, c) the rigor and expanse of inquiry is its measure, and d) the soundness of a 
philosophy is the soundness of its method. Thus, Blondel’s notion of the supernatural 
stands as that which would explain human action to thought, in the concrete realizes 
every human action, and yet cannot be produced in and by human volition or thought.  
                                                
52 Ibid., 109–44. 
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Though Blondel does not rely on Thomas for the scaffolding beneath his 
philosophy of action, it turns out his modern form of the answer to the medieval problem 
of the supernatural comports nicely with the solution offered in the previous chapter. 
Every human action relies upon a transcendent term to be rendered explicable. This term 
must be operative in every action for that action to itself be actual. Thus, the reliance of 
every human action upon the operativity of the transcendent term amounts to cooperation 
between the immanent and the transcendent. Blondel does not consider the broader case 
of cooperation between the transcendent agent and finite causes in general. He begins 
with the unique case of human causality and the intensifications that come along with its 
free mode of agency. Thus, the reliance of human agency upon transcendent agency and 
the problem of free, rational cooperation with transcendent agency are carried forward 
together in his investigation. Though the generic medieval ambiguity can only be found 
in Blondel’s Action by implication, it both begins with and culminates quite explicitly in 
the specific medieval ambiguity. We saw above Blondel ask generally about the 
explicability of human freedom, but he comes to specify his question with regard to the 
significance of human freedom before its transcendent cooperator: the supernatural. In 
the next section, we see how Blondel poses the specific medieval ambiguity as an 
existential dilemma brought about by his philosophic recognition of the supernatural.  
3.4.4. Blondel’s Modern Articulation of the Specific Medieval Ambiguity 
Once the supernatural becomes an explicit term in philosophy, it at the same time 
becomes also an active idea in the life of the philosopher. In the mode of this idea, the 
supernatural poses a dilemma to the philosopher as a person: there is necessarily 
something I cannot know or determine at the heart of my action. It is necessary to my 
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actions and may even have been mobilizing my action in some invisible way. But now 
appearing under this heuristic term, the supernatural functions as more than an invisible 
and unknown appetite. It can be a motive for my action, something willed purposively. 
Blondel thinks that every human agent faces this choice in the course of living a life, but 
the philosopher knows this dilemma not by mere implication or with the simple sincerity 
of the morally circumspect. No, the philosopher faces this dilemma with critical rigor. 
Because this choice is present to me as an idea—however slight, however heuristic—it 
can itself be an object of my willing. Because the one thing necessary is necessary in and 
for all human action, I may explicitly and affirmatively will it in and with my determinate 
actions. Blondel speaks of willing the supernatural in this way as “ratifying” the 
supernatural and its place in one’s living. Now, plainly the supernatural cannot be willed 
in and of itself by human agents. It can, at this stage, only be thought and willed as a 
known unknown. But even this formal ratification occurs under a terribly difficult 
constraint: if I choose to explicitly will the supernatural in and with my various finite 
human actions, I must relinquish a certain power to determine what I will. For in ratifying 
the supernatural in my agency, I knowingly will an unknown. Blondel speaks of this as 
the “mortification” of action.53 In order to will what is necessary for my action (and so, in 
fact, to be fully autonomous in the literal sense), I have to include in my willing an 
acknowledgement and acceptance of the fact that my action is not completely my own. In 
order to grasp fully human autonomy, I have to embrace the fundamental heteronomy of 
my action and to submit the significance of my action to something I cannot fully 
determine. 
                                                
53 Ibid., 187–91; 350–4. 
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This already-uncanny alternative, between refusing to ratify the supernatural in 
my action (presumably by somehow acting against its transcendent source) or ratifying 
the supernatural by willing in my human way that the supernatural operate integrally with 
my action (as it necessarily must), comes with a further wrinkle. To this point we have 
considered the supernatural insofar as it is a heuristic term and so the prospect of willing 
the supernatural has been restricted to this notional sense. But if willing the supernatural 
in our finite actions would amount to anything more than an empty formality, changing 
nothing about how we live, we require some mediation of the supernatural. If we would 
will the supernatural in any determinate way, it must be rendered susceptible to the 
proportion of our volitional and rational powers. Consequently, Blondel argues that the 
development of human freedom calls out for not just a notional acknowledgement that 
our action comes from a transcendent source, but what Blondel calls a “literal” 
supernatural practice by which our ratification of the one thing necessary can be 
concretized. In a word, the development of human freedom calls out for religion. In 
religion, the supernatural operates in our agency with the same necessity as always, 
except now we can explicitly or “literally” co-operate with it in the fullness of free, 
purposive agency. We are invited to enact by our willed will more fully that which our 
willing will silently desires and intends.54  
Because this mediation accommodates our finitude so that our lives can carry out 
the ratification invited by the critical acknowledgment of the supernatural, modern 
philosophy can in principle work out a number of further heuristic determinations for its 
character. Blondel, by his own admission, allowed his deeply formed Catholic 
                                                
54 Ibid., 373–88. 
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imagination to overdetermine his derivation of these characteristics in Action.55 But he 
corrects this tendency in a later, revised version of the work, excising these passages and 
substantially reworking them in a volume called La philosophie et l’esprit Chretien. Even 
if the particular content of Blondel’s treatment of this mediating “supernatural religion” 
violates the principles of modern philosophical method in Action (and this point is 
debatable; Blondel’s dissatisfaction may have owed more to persistent misinterpretation 
of these passages than their inherent failure), the task itself fits squarely within his vision 
of the modern philosophic method of immanence pushed to such a radical extent that it 
reveals the impossibility of a doctrine of immanence. In Blondel’s hands, modern 
philosophy has to admit that considering religious phenomena as supernatural is 
admissible, even though philosophy cannot penetrate into the supernatural content 
thereof. Such content would only be available materially in the religious practice as 
concretely lived, formally recognizable only to the eyes of faith. Adequate reflection 
upon it would remain the province of the theologians. 
Blondel does consider what might follow from the alternate choice, to resist the 
influence of the supernatural in one’s action. Action is ineluctable, of course, and so one 
has to take some action to oppose the necessary operation of the supernatural in one’s 
action. But this amounts to implicitly accepting the gift of realized action in order to 
explicitly reject it. This state of contradiction constitutes what Blondel calls “the death of 
action.” One cannot make nothing of the actions realized in cooperation with the 
supernatural, but one wills that—if they cannot be entirely my own—they would not be. 
Blondel considers this a kind of perdition for human agency. These actions, once 
                                                
55 Ibid., xxiii–xxiv. 
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effected, cannot not have been and so have an indelibly eternal valence to them, such that 
Blondel describes our relationship to them as like that of a man tied to his own corpse 
forever.56 It is, as Augustine had it, a kind of living death.  
3.4.5. Blondel’s Contribution 
We can see how Blondel’s conclusions comport with the medieval solution to the 
medieval problem of the supernatural, albeit as transformed by the strictures of a 
separated modern philosophy. The explicability of human action (and the world in which 
it operates) relies upon the efficacy of a transcendent term. So what does Blondel add? 
He contributes the explicit “modern” mentality in which the medieval solution appears 
with its attendant ambiguities. His inquiry begins not from the effort to understand a 
supernaturally revealed doctrine, but the native situation of human action considered 
according to the method of immanence. The results of his inquiry derive their validity 
from their ability to make sense not of supernaturally revealed doctrines in light of 
available philosophical opinions, but of philosophical doctrines that would purport to 
completely explain human action to the satisfaction of human intelligence. His 
philosophical investigation culminates in the anticipation of (indeed, need for) a 
transcendent term explaining what, on Blondel’s analysis, is only proximately, but not 
completely intelligible to human intelligence: the concrete universe of human action. This 
anticipation cannot be unambiguously satisfied, because if there is a transcendent term, 
there can be no human actions that, as human, produce it.   
                                                
56 Ibid., 344. 
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Therefore, Blondel provides the most robust articulation of modern philosophy’s 
basic alternative up to that point. Separated, modern philosophy can either a) deploy the 
discovered necessity of its anticipation to generate a heuristic for the transcendent term 
required for complete explanation, extrapolating from its own proximate successes in 
action and understanding to affirm that, though it cannot be produced within a method of 
immanence, there must be a transcendent term; or b) philosophy can alternatively 
conclude from the absence (and, indeed, impossibility) of immanent data on the 
transcendent term that this anticipation is misleading, rejecting the actuality of a 
transcendent term and so also the demand for complete explanation. Strictly speaking, 
however, one cannot find refuge in agnosticism on this question. One either desires 
complete explanation or one does not. There is no third, neutral position to occupy on the 
question. However, one can simply decide not to ask the question, but this is explicitly 
anti-philosophical and obscurantist/quietist and so amounts to a tacit decision to not 
pursue complete explanation. 
Either option is selected on the basis of the same available data, the same 
methodical outlook, and in response to the same absence of data where one would expect 
some intelligible term. The reason for selecting one option over the other resides, 
therefore, in the free choice of the subject facing this irreducibly ambiguous situation. 
Subsequent to this choice, either option can be intelligently pursued, though the status of 
either option as rational is complicated by the “knock-on” effect of this pre-philosophical 
choice on a philosopher’s operative notion of rationality. This will be of the utmost 
importance in assessing the conflicts between the philosophical positions that follow 
from each pre-philosophical alternative posed by the medieval ambiguities of being. 
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These ambiguities regarding human action and its universe can become the object of both 
modern separated philosophical inquiry (as in Blondel’s Action) and modern 
subordinated philosophical inquiry (as here). Both forms of philosophy can thematize the 
ur-choice from which these two basic postures originate and be clear about philosophical 
differences that emerge from them. In the main, a modern separated philosophy cannot 
decide on the issue in the absence of data and data cannot be forthcoming. Modern 
philosophy can at best come to find these medieval ambiguities already waiting for it in 
the very structure of the medieval solution to the problem of the supernatural.  
3.5. Sartre’s Modern Philosophical Alternative 
Blondel’s analysis of the life and death of action, however, fails to consider 
another framing of the basic option faced by human agency, one that he thought he had 
foreclosed in his discussion of nihilism.57 Blondel’s account of action’s perdition operates 
on the belief that the operativity of the supernatural in human action has been so 
thoroughly demonstrated by his investigation that it cannot be notionally accepted or 
rejected as a conclusion, but only practically accepted through the process of cooperative 
mortification or rejected by an attempt to refuse cooperation with God. Now, Blondel’s 
alternative is one way to frame what I have been calling the specific medieval ambiguity: 
a philosophically undecidable alternative between acting as though human freedom has a 
fundamental, but transcendent meaning or purpose or, on the other hand, acting as though 
the liberty to determine our actions is, in its autonomy, basically arbitrary and 
                                                
57 For Blondel’s discussion why “nothing” cannot be the answer to the problem of action, see 
ibid., 36–53. I am echoing here Milbank’s criticism of Blondel that he does not take seriously enough the 
challenge posed by a thorough going nihilism to any ontology that radically rests its realism on a 
transcendent term. See Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 218. 
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inexplicable, lacking any fundamental meaning or purpose.  But Blondel frames the 
dilemma (as every philosopher must) from the vantage of one who has already, in a pre-
philosophical way, decided with regard to the transcendent meaningfulness of his own 
freedom—and so, by extension, made a decision to operate out of a presumption of 
complete explicability for the being of human action and the being of the universe in 
which it unfolds.58  
One is free, however, to interpret the broad strokes of Blondel’s argument and its 
conclusions another way. Perhaps the gap in explanation that Blondel finds, not just at the 
extremity of action’s orientation to destiny, but in every nook and cranny of its universe, 
does not evince a deficiency in the phenomenality of the immanent. Perhaps it reveals a 
deficiency—indeed, a negativity—in philosophy itself. Perhaps Blondel’s philosophical 
procedure evinces a philosophically unjustified “practical prejudice” in favor of 
ontological explicability. The evidence that supports Blondel’s supernatural realism 
might also support an atheistic, existentialist nihilism. This would not be the simple, 
straightforward nihilism Blondel considered at the beginning of Action that wants to 
wave away the problem of action by cheap appeal to nothingness. No, it would be a 
wisened nihilism aware of its own penchant for illusion and ‘bad faith’, full of the 
knowledge that it cannot but pose a problem for which there is no answer—or better, for 
which the answer is nothing. Blondel wrote of a process of mortification for the sake of 
                                                
58 It should be noted from the outset that this decision is pre-philosophical not in the sense of being 
some explicit and controlling premise from which a philosophy derives conclusions. That would be to 
confuse the very important difference between judgments and decisions. Rather, it is a pre-philosophical 
decision in the sense that, because the derivation of philosophical conclusions is an activity undertaken by 
an agent, the basic orientation of that agent in its active reasoning sets out, in broad strokes, the character of 
the reasoning itself and so of the conclusions that result from it. What I am calling a decision (because it 
pertains to the order of agency) may in many cases not be thematized by philosophers in their writing, nor 
to themselves and may only be inferred on the basis of the activity and products that evince it. 
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liberation, of losing one’s life in order to more fully receive it as a gift. But under the 
weight of his own Christian imagination, he did not (and perhaps could not) consider a 
philosophy that takes death as the limit and measure of its authenticity. One can call to 
mind a philosophy that would transcend every boundary, not in order to approximate the 
boundlessness of God, but to approximate the indeterminacy of human being per se. 
Blondel does not seem to notice that his demonstration suggests this ambiguity running 
deeper than the alternative he envisions. Nonetheless, it is an ambiguity made available to 
modern thought by the medieval solutions to the problem of the supernatural. It has 
stowed away in the very logic of a transcendent cause of every created cause on which 
Blondel’s philosophy of action relies. His radicalization of the method of immanence 
transported this medieval implication into a modern philosophical milieu and, by 
centering the problem of action, lifted it up just below the surface of modern Catholic 
thought. Below, we will consider one version of this alternative alternative, embodied by 
Sartre’s Being and Nothingness. 
3.5.1. The Generic Medieval Ambiguity and Sartre’s Being and Nothingness 
Blondel’s philosophical approach rests on a pre-philosophical commitment to 
explaining completely what is. The various determinations of determinate being need to 
be explained and his philosophy discovers that what philosophy cannot do is explain any 
of them completely. The supernatural is imposed on modern philosophy because it is 
precisely the being of determinate being that needs explanation and no immanent term 
proves adequate to the task. The supernatural is Blondel’s heuristic indication of that in 
which an explanation of determinate being insofar as it is would consist. We might note 
as well that, for Blondel, although the various determinations of determinate being are at 
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least partially intelligible (supposing one sets aside the infinite remainder that is the 
supernatural), determinateness itself needs no explanation. Determinateness (being-
determinate, we might say) is a kind of negative quality born by finite beings, a shadow 
cast by being at all. When thought in terms of a fundamental relation to an infinite 
“supernatural,” determinate being is (to borrow a turn of phrase from Paul Ricoeur), 
“struck with nothingness.” To be finite, temporal, immanent, etc. is to be (again in 
Ricoeur’s words), “surrounded by nothingness.” This nothingness is not and cannot be an 
explanation for determinate being, because, for this philosophical posture, nothing is 
explained by nothing. It is simply the fact of a “radical ontological difference that 
separates the creature from the creator.”59 In sum, then, Blondel’s basic ideal of 
philosophical rationality—resting on his pre-philosophic commitment to completely 
explaining what is—includes the entailments that being needs to be explained and 
determinateness itself need not be explained because it cannot be explained.  
As noted above, this normative ideal of philosophical rationality, embedded in a 
particular posture one brings to the philosophical task as an activity, has an alternative 
and it rests no less on a pre-philosophic decision, commitment, and posture. Jean Paul 
Sartre’s Being and Nothingness is instructive here because it embodies this alternative 
and so helps us to indicate in a more concrete fashion what I have been calling the 
medieval ambiguities of being. For Sartre, it is not the being of determinate being which 
calls out for explanation, but its determinateness. “Being,” he writes, “is empty of all 
                                                
59 Ricoeur uses these formulations when discussing the relationship between time and eternity in 
Augustine’s Confessions, but the same relationship of disproportion holds. See Paul Ricoeur, Time and 
Narrative, vol. 1, trans. Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1984), 25–7. 
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other determination than identity with itself(.)”60 Being, because it is “absolute plenitude 
and entire positivity” seems to need no explanation.61 Determinateness, on the other 
hand, needs some explanation. For Sartre, “being can not be the support of any 
differentiated quality.” Something needs to “release” the “undifferentiated mass of being” 
that it might be a world of particularized and relativized beings.62 What effects this 
release and so explains determinateness for Sartre? Nothingness. “Thus reversing the 
statement of Spinoza,” Sartre writes, “we could say that every negation is determination.”  
At first blush, the difference between Blondel and Sartre on this point may seem 
minor, perhaps a matter of emphasis. After all, one might point out that they agree 
“nothing” explains determinateness. This agreement, however, is merely verbal. Sartre 
and Blondel take opposed philosophical postures and it is my contention that this 
opposition owes a) to differing pre-philosophical attitudes towards the meaning of what is 
and b) a basic ontological ambiguity that poses this choice to any philosopher prior to any 
philosophical act. To reiterate then, for Blondel being is in need of explanation, both in 
general and in its concrete determinations, but the determinateness of these 
determinations does not need to be and cannot be explained. For Sartre, by contrast, 
being in-itself calls for no explanation, but determinateness by contrast needs to be 
accounted for. We can diagnose Blondel’s basic philosophical posture because it is the 
necessary practical presupposition behind his entire argument in Action. What is it about 
                                                
60 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: a Phenomenological Essay on Ontology, trans. Hazel 
E. Barnes (New York: Pocket Books, 1966), 48. 
61 It is telling that Sartre characterizes knowledge as an ekstatic adventure in the affirmation of 
being in-itself by being for-itself, an affirmation that can have no determinate content (indeed, no content at 
all) because it must be an unmediated presence of the world to the self—in other words, a presence that 
lacks the distance of a presence-to. What would be apprehended as a content is not the being of a being, but 
a meaning which has a being of its own, immediately present to consciousness. See ibid., 25–6, 295–6. 
62 Ibid., 48. 
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Sartre’s philosophical procedure, then, that leads me to think he holds a posture opposed, 
even inverse to Blondel’s? 
For Sartre, what can be said of being in-itself is that being is. He writes, 
... being is what is. In the in-itself there is not a particle of being which is not 
wholly within itself without distance. When being is thus conceived there is not 
the slightest suspicion of duality in it; this is what we mean when we say that the 
density of being of the in-itself is infinite… The in-itself is full of itself, and no 
more total plenitude can be imagined, no more perfect equivalence of content to 
container. There is not the slightest emptiness in being, not the tiniest crack 
through which nothingness might slip in.63 
Being cannot be absolutely and at the same time be relative to something, qualified by 
something, or somehow determined. Being cannot, in itself, even be “present to” itself. 
Sartre explains, 
This presence to itself has often been taken for a plenitude of existence, and a 
strong prejudice prevalent among philosophers causes them to attribute to 
consciousness the highest rank in being… Actually, presence to always implies 
duality, at least a virtual separation. The presence of being to itself implies a 
detachment on the part of being in relation to itself. The coincidence of identity is 
the veritable plenitude of being exactly because in this coincidence there is left no 
place for any negativity… Presence to self, on the contrary, supposes that an 
impalpable fissure has slipped into being. If being is present to itself, it is because 
it is not wholly itself.64 
For this reason, being-in-itself is absolutely and can be relative to nothing. This means 
that making being present to itself, being-for-itself (i.e. the being that characterizes 
conscious human reality) brings nothingness to being through the very transcendence of 
its reflexive distance.65 Thus, Sartre characterizes conscious human reality as self-
nihilating—as a nothingness with borrowed being that being can be present-to. It is, by 
extension, through conscious human reality that the various determinations (explained by 
                                                
63 Ibid., 120–1. 
64 Ibid., 124. 
65 Ibid., 17, 50–7. 
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the nothingness of world-transcending consciousness) come to things: possibility, 
necessity, impossibility, and so on. But this nothingness of the determinateness of the 
various determinations is founded upon the fact of a self-nihilating being-for-itself. 
Conscious human reality is separated from being only by this nothing given in its 
transcendence of the world as consciousness. It is the cause of the nothingness of 
determination (i.e. determinateness) and so it can be a term of explanation for 
determinateness “within the limits of the real.”66 Throughout the phenomenological and 
dialectical machinations between the in-itself and the for-itself of Being and Nothingness, 
it is being-dependent “nothingness” which explains the determinateness of determinate 
being.  This nothingness, in other words, is present-to-as-related and so constitutes being-
explicable. No transcendent term can serve this explicability function since all 
transcendence is a relativity, a dependent realm of nothing. Explanation can only come 
from within the world present-to being-for-itself because explicability is constituted 
along with it. Determinateness needs to be explained because determinateness is what 
can be explained.67  
Sartre’s philosophical posture towards being seems on its face to be quite 
ontologically positive. As we have seen, Sartre heaps metaphysical superlatives on being-
in-itself. However, it turns out that nothingness carries the day philosophically, since the 
borrowed existence of nothingness admits attestation of any—pardon the pun—
substantive kind. The being of being-in-itself resists even the assertion of identity (“A is 
                                                
66 Ibid., 56. 
67 This approach is almost precisely inverse to Blondel’s. For Blondel, existence itself is that 
which calls out for explanation because existence is what can be explained (even if philosophy, as a 
practical matter, can do nothing more than affirm this obligation founded on this possibility). The 
negativity that marks determinate being in its determinateness needs no explanation because it cannot be 
explained. What is given but cannot be explained at all is a mere matter of fact. 
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A”), since the unity at the heart of identity is nonetheless a determination introduced by 
being-for-itself.68 Put another way, Sartre’s philosophy lives concretely as a nihilism, for 
that of which it can speak is only the nothingness that it brings to being. It is a nihilism 
despite its avowal to itself that it is an existentialism. It devotes itself to the explanation 
of nothingness and denies that what is can be explained. Moreover, insofar as the basic 
posture of his philosophical inquiry consists in a pre-philosophical attitude that does not 
endeavor to understand being, Sartre’s philosophy in fact has decided to be a nihilism—
or, more accurately, Sartre has decided his philosophy will be a nihilism. In a bit of irony, 
Being and Nothingness turns out to be a work of ‘bad faith’, a great body of philosophical 
argumentation insisting to itself that it is not what it is: the product of a basic, pre-
philosophical decision to act as though being is inexplicable.69  
On the other hand, if I am right that all philosophical ontology must begin from 
such a basic, pre-philosophical decision about how the philosopher shall comport him or 
herself to being, that Being and Nothingness is in bad faith does not compromise the 
internal validity of Sartre’s argument, at least according to the ideal of rationality 
corresponding to such a commitment. We may say descriptively, by way of weighing the 
evidence for the medieval ambiguity of being, that contingency and determinateness give 
a certain nothingness together with the positivity of what exists in the world of human 
reality. A philosophy which reads being as a mere matter of fact and the determinateness 
of what is as a question thus takes a basic interpretative posture vis-à-vis the data on 
offer. This basic posture, however, has to be taken prior to any investigation of 
determinate being, because it constitutes the overall character of the investigation itself. It 
                                                
68 Ibid., 120. 
69 On Sartre’s famous notion of ‘bad faith’, see ibid., 86–116. 
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is, in fact, not so much a decision about the object of philosophical inquiry as it is about 
its operative subjectivity. Through its anticipatory ideals, the posture of the operative 
philosophical subject invests philosophical inquiry with its immanent norms and it 
implies an ideal of rationality against which the results of any inquiry must be measured. 
To critique Sartre’s argument for failing to meet its own ideals is one matter, but to 
demand it meet another ideal notion of rationality is to ask the philosopher to make a 
different existential decision on the basis of ambiguous data—namely, the data on being a 
conscious, inquiring agent. Such a request amounts not to an exercise in philosophical 
dialectic, but rather an invitation to convert to another way of life. The notion of such a 
request also tips us towards the place held by the specific medieval ambiguity in Being 
and Nothingness. 
3.5.2. The Specific Medieval Ambiguity in Being and Nothingness 
By focusing on Sartre’s ontology, I have tried to suggest that Being and 
Nothingness embodies an opposed alternative to Blondel’s account of the generic 
medieval ambiguity from within the modern philosophical mentality. But what of the 
specific ambiguity that regards human freedom and agency? How can holding Sartre’s 
account of freedom and agency up beside Blondel’s help us to better appreciate the 
ambiguity of human freedom after Thomas’s solution to the medieval problem of the 
supernatural? In both cases, we find that the basic posture of their ontology is carried 
through, framing their theory of freedom. Moreover, we will find that both ontological 
postures can be thematized in terms of the theory of freedom by which it is framed, so 
that the circle of reflexion can be closed according to the ideal of rationality immanent to 
either posture.  
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We have already seen how, for Blondel, the being of determinate being calls out 
for explanation, but determinateness itself does not need to be explained. Between being 
and determinateness, philosophy can offer some partial account of the various 
determinations of determinate being in their various equilibria, but cannot ultimately 
provide complete explanation for any determinate being at any level. And we have also 
seen that Blondel frames the inquiry that arrives at this heuristic ontological conclusion 
by a question about the meaningfulness of human action. In Blondel’s case, the 
ontological conclusion is derived by generalizing from the specific case of human 
agency. Because human action has its being and so explanation and so meaningfulness 
beyond itself, but moreover beyond even the universe in which it acts, Blondel is able to 
argue that though the being of our action calls out for explanation like every other 
determinate being, a philosophy of action has to affirm that there is some transcendent, 
supernatural ground to the meaningfulness of our action. However, a philosophy of action 
cannot produce this ground, much as our willing does not of itself produce the being of 
our action. Human freedom, then, provides some explanation for the determinations of 
being in which human actions consist insofar as it places before itself the determinate 
purposes for which it acts. But as to why the whole complex of motives, decisions, and 
actions is, philosophy cannot say. The agent instead faces Blondel’s version of the 
alternative: to act either in a manner that supposes there is some unknown meaning for 
action and aims to cooperate in some mediated and finite way with its supernatural 
purpose or to reject the heteronomy implied by this heuristic conclusion and aim to act in 
such a way that rejects cooperation with any supernatural meaning or purpose.  
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For Sartre, freedom is the being of the for-itself and, though any exercise of 
freedom in action contains causes, motives, and ends, “freedom has no essence.”70 Much 
like being-in-itself, the freedom that being-for-itself is has no explanation. All of the 
ontological superlatives that could be heaped onto being-in-itself can, in freedom, be 
transferred to being-for-itself insofar as it expresses itself in action. As being is what is, 
so freedom is what is free, what “cannot cease being free,” and so is, famously, 
“condemned to be free.” Bad faith can, thus, be understood as the effort of freedom to 
“hide its freedom from itself.”71 The act, like knowledge, can only be a matter of 
affirmation for philosophy: it simply is and is free. Once this “nihilating rupture with the 
world [of the in-itself]” is effected and the act is, then we may speak of the experience of 
the act and the philosophical discernment of its causes, motives, and ends. But we may 
speak of them for the same reason we may speak of any determination of being—because 
its very determinateness is what is explicable. But all of these determinations of action 
are non-being. They are projections in the transcendence of conscious human reality of 
what is not, of non-being. And so Sartre gives the example of the laborer who only finds 
a sufficient reason for revolution in the projection beyond his daily circumstances of a 
different set of circumstances which do not exist and yet, in their nothingness, render his 
life suddenly intolerable.72 But note that the cause of the worker’s will to revolt resides 
not in the being of his circumstances, but only inside himself. He has made himself 
miserable and so he is the true cause of his own will to revolt. Therefore, even when we 
turn to elucidate the determinations of human action, we find that, although they formally 
                                                
70 Ibid., 565. 
71 Ibid., 567. 
72 Ibid., 560–3. 
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admit of explanation, what explains them is “nothing”. For our actions, Sartre says in 
Existentialism is a Humanism, “we are left alone and without excuse.” Once cast into the 
world, we are responsible for everything we do.73 
Above I indicated that one might accuse Sartre’s philosophy of being in bad faith. 
This accusation rests on an internal ambiguity that haunts these modern realizations of 
the specific medieval ambiguity. It is the same internal ambiguity Blondel exploits to 
reveal the insufficiency of every effort to explain action in purely immanent terms. This 
ambiguity resides between a philosophy considered as an intention, a thinking, an activity 
and a philosophy considered as an intended, as a body of thought, as a product. I have 
already said that both Blondel and Sartre adopt a pre-philosophical posture towards the 
practice of philosophical investigation and its object (as I hold every philosopher of being 
or action must). Adopting this posture amounts to a decision, a commitment to follow in 
one’s philosophy a certain course of action. It devotes the philosopher to a way of 
philosophizing. This way of philosophizing, in turn, constrains the sort of philosophy that 
he or she will likely produce. However, because this pre-philosophical decision does not 
determine the philosophical product (for the exercise of intelligence has immanent norms 
of its own that can be corrupted, even subverted, but never entirely suppressed without 
ceasing thought altogether), the philosophy that is intended, thought, produced is all too 
rarely an impeccably apt thematization of the basic comportment to being and/or freedom 
that gave it rise. Indeed, Blondel and Sartre, both in different ways, imply that this 
internal ambiguity is as philosophically undecidable as the ontological ambiguities 
themselves. For Blondel, the impracticable character of the “one thing necessary” means 
                                                
73 Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism is a Humanism, trans. Carol Macomber (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 2007), 29. 
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that any philosophy that includes an element claiming to meet his anticipation of 
complete explanation must be a philosophy inadequate to the reality of even the action of 
thought that produced it. For Sartre, because freedom is prior to thought and freedom is 
always other than what can be said about it, any philosophy of freedom (even, he does 
not seem to notice, his own) has to be alienated from the being of freedom in the 
nothingness of conscious human reality.  
Nonetheless, it turns out that neither Blondel nor Sartre manages to give an 
account of the pre-philosophical condition that constrains his own thought: an exercise of 
freedom with regard to how to determinately realize the task of philosophizing. A more 
fully articulated and genuinely modern philosophy of the medieval ambiguities would 
make explicit the de facto choice faced prior to philosophizing. However, because any 
philosophy must proceed from such a choice, that explicitation would have to be 
expressed via a doubling, in which the alternative is narrated from within one horizon of 
commitment and then re-narrated from within the other. The anticipation at the heart of 
the modern philosophical mentality that the philosopher’s via inventionis will serve as a 
criterion of validity calls out for this rigorous double explicitation. Unavoidably, one of 
these narrations would consist in an act of ventriloquizing that could never quite throw its 
own voice entirely away. In the case of this study, I cannot disavow my own basic 
comportment to being and to freedom as fundamentally, but transcendently explicable 
and I cannot deny that my characterization of Sartre’s alternative is, in ways both evident 
to me and probably subterranean too, marked by my practical prejudice for Blondel’s 
philosophical posture. But there is no need to effect such a disavowal, since the ideal 
norm of rationality governing my philosophical task comes to bear on it from within the 
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horizon opened up by my practical prejudice for explicability. Modern philosophy’s 
separation from a dogmatic context precludes an appeal to the doctrines of a higher, more 
certain science like theology that could settle the matter in the extrinsic fashion 
appropriate to a subordinated philosophy (even if I find Lonergan’s retrieval of Thomas 
on the transcendence of God’s creative and redemptive agency convincing). 
Thus, even when a philosopher gives voice to his or her basic pre-philosophical 
posture towards philosophizing and, subsequent to this avowal, pursues it with single-
minded devotion, still the ambiguity is not extinguished. From Blondel’s perspective, 
such a basic decision does have a reason, but it is precisely this reason that philosophy 
cannot produce by its philosophizing. Rather, a philosophy can only show its faith in the 
reality of some transcendent meaning and purpose by its intellectual works. Philosophy’s 
very resoluteness with regard to the supernatural foundation of its practice and its 
products is a source of instability for an authentically modern philosophy: the most 
important part of its via inventionis cannot be produced to validate itself.  Sartre, on the 
other hand, would deny that, even if the causes, motives, and ends of its determination 
can be experienced and described, the act of freedom in which philosophy begins has any 
essence. It needs no explanation because it can have no explanation. It is simply a matter 
of fact for which the philosopher is responsible, left alone and without excuse.  
4. Conclusion 
 Readers may notice how I have hewed away from the more usual controversies 
about grace in which Blondel’s name is sometimes invoked. I have not, however, taken 
this tack in order to dodge the problematic of grace. Rather, in both this chapter and its 
predecessor, I have considered the relation between divine and created agency that would 
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provide the categories and analogies for a speculative theology of either creation or 
grace. In the previous chapter we considered that relation according to the subordinated 
philosophical approach characteristic of the medieval theological mentality. At the 
beginning of this chapter, I gave some indication of the ambiguity that could result from 
the solution to the medieval problem of the supernatural, but subsequent to a change in 
philosophical and/or scientific method. Then we considered the same relation in light of 
just such a change in method. I have called this the modern philosophical mentality and 
characterized it as a general method in separated philosophy that takes its via inventionis 
for its criterion of validity.  
This has been a transitional chapter, pivoting between a detailed account of 
medieval achievements and the fully modern problem of the supernatural we will finally 
encounter at the end of the next chapter. Here we saw modern philosophical minds 
appropriate the generic and specific ambiguities made possible by theorematic 
achievements of the high Middle Ages. We saw the knock on effects of the medieval 
solution manifest in these modern philosophical ontologies as an irreducible ambiguity. It 
is an ambiguity manifest in the radically different philosophical postures taken by 
Blondel and Sartre. It is an ambiguity manifest in Blondel’s basic alternative in the face 
of the “one thing necessary.” It is an ambiguity manifest in the temptation to ‘bad faith’ 
diagnosed by Sartre. It is an ambiguity manifest in both Sartre’s and Blondel’s failure to 
fully take stock of the philosophically undecidable, pre-philosophical act of freedom 
behind their philosophies of being and freedom. It is an ambiguity manifest in the fact 
that, while narrating these ambiguities, I too had to confess to my own practical prejudice 
in favor of one pole over the other and its effects on my study here.  
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This ambiguity has various elements, but its root grows up from a pair of 
ontological ambiguities faced by the inquiring agent, one generic and the other specific. 
The inquiring agent encounters a world of beings that are not completely explicable on 
their own and must decide to pursue complete explanation or not. The inquiring agent 
must decide, in general, to act from the anticipation that being is completely explicable 
(even if complete explanation perpetually eludes every determinate inquiry) or if being 
simply is a matter of fact, the pursuit of any explanation for which would amount to a 
flight into non-being, to a philosophical problem that arises when language has “gone on 
holiday.”74 The inquiring agent must decide, specifically, if his or her action, originating 
in his or her freedom but realizing itself among every other determinate being, has a basic 
meaningfulness, a fundamental purpose. But every act of freedom has its proximate 
meaning and purpose in the freedom of the agent him or herself, a determinate being the 
fundamental explanation of which always eludes philosophy. The free agent must decide 
whether to act as though his or her freedom has some meaning and purpose (even if that 
meaning/purpose is transcendent and so unknown) or if he or she will act as though 
freedom has no essence and so, like very other being, is a mere matter of fact admitting 
no explanation, and so no meaning and no purpose. This specific ambiguity in turn 
rebounds upon the generic ambiguity, since the free agent’s posture towards his or her 
own freedom includes the prospect of pursuing philosophical inquiry as one of its 
possible exercises of freedom. In this way, the circle of ambiguity closes upon its own 
philosophical undecidability for those who inhabit a modern philosophical mentality.  
                                                
74 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 4th ed., trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. 
Hacker, and Joachim Schulte (Malden, MA: Wiley Blackwell, 2009) 23. 
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It remains to ask: how can it be that philosophers have left behind a medieval 
mentality of speculative theology and subordinated philosophy to inhabit this modern 
philosophical mentality instead? Why, if the modern mentality results in such 
confounding ambiguity, do they not just beat a hasty retreat back into the state of mind 
that served St. Thomas so well? The answer to this quandary will occupy us in Chapter 4. 
The question has to do with the mediation, but especially the constitution of the fully 
human world by human and divine meanings. This further element will usher onto the 
scene what I believe is the genuinely modern problem of the supernatural.

CHAPTER 4: THE MODERN PROBLEM OF THE SUPERNATURAL 
To move from the medieval problem of the supernatural to what I am calling the 
modern problem of the supernatural requires that we make a significant transition. In the 
previous chapter, we explored how the modern philosophical mentality rendered probable 
a philosophical cognizance of the medieval ambiguities of being. This realization 
occurred in an intellectual context at some remove from the medieval theological 
mentality that made the medieval ambiguities merely possible for subordinated 
philosophy. This realization also occurred at the nexus of a set of questions about 
atheism, secularism, individualism, politics, and history. In the first chapter we noted 
some of these questions insofar as they appear in but are also sidelined by the 
contemporary controversy over the supernatural. In this chapter, I argue that the problem 
underlying these questions is distinct from and irreducible to the set of medieval 
questions that made up the horizon of the medieval problem and so the horizon of 
Thomas’s medieval solution thereto. In order to articulate how the modern problem is 
distinct and irreducible, to elucidate its character, and to communicate its force requires 
that we make this transition. It requires I show how the modern problem is insoluble by 
means of the medieval solution or, indeed, any metaphysical theory at all. Indeed, neither 
possession of a solution to the medieval problem of the supernatural, nor a grasp of the 
medieval ambiguities of being, nor a critical, but pre-philosophical commitment to the 
explicability of being and of free human actions can of themselves resolve the modern 
problem. Rather, possessing these at most makes it possible for us to recognize how the 
twenty-first-century questions about the supernatural contain a distinct and irreducible 
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modern problem of the supernatural. I have expressed this problem by the somewhat 
informal question, “What is God doing in free human action?” What difference is God 
making in human freedom and its products? What is God up to in the world generated by 
these? How do we discern the substance of God’s action in a world constituted by freely 
constructed human meanings? 
In the following, I address the more obvious “modern” problem of the 
supernatural—whether there is a natural desire for God—with what may amount to 
scandalous brevity. From there, I consider the more fundamental modern problem of the 
supernatural and whether it can be addressed by means of metaphysical analysis. We will 
see that metaphysical analysis of the modern problem only serves to restate the problem. 
This restatement, however, can be leveraged to show why the modern problem is 
insusceptible to metaphysical analysis as a solution. It can also help us distinguish the 
elements in the problem that undergird this metaphysical insolubility and from these we 
may generate some heuristic determinations of that in which a solution would consist. 
The fifth and final chapter, after some review, will consist in a brief sketch coordinating 
these elements into a heuristic model for the solution to the modern problem of the 
supernatural. 
1. The Natural Desire to Know God  
Belatedly, I might consider an objection to my procedure so far. In this work 
ostensibly on the controversy over the supernatural, we have yet to discuss at any length 
the central point of disagreement both in the francophone debate of the 1940s and its 
contemporary anglophone cousin: the natural desire to know God. Much of the 
contemporary debate over the supernatural has been sparked by Lawrence Feingold’s 
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weighty tome on the topic, The Natural Desire to See God According to St Thomas 
Aquinas and His Interpreters.1 Was it not this very question that de Lubac raised in his 
effort to find the roots of modern secularism, atheism, materialism, etc. in decadent 
scholastic theology?2 If we are now turning to the modern problem of the supernatural, 
then must we not engage with this question of the natural desire for God directly and at 
length? Yes and no. In what follows, I engage the question directly, but only briefly. My 
brevity will owe, ultimately, to my reasoned conviction that in fact this question is a) a 
microcosm of the undifferentiation endemic to the contemporary controversy, insofar as 
it intends to pose a medieval metaphysical solution to a modern problem irreducible 
thereto, but also b) even an adequate metaphysical answer to this precise question can 
only restate the ambiguity to which Thomas’s medieval solution to the problem of the 
supernatural led us by way of the modern philosophical mentality described in Chapter 3.  
Henri de Lubac and others appeal to the Thomist credentials of the doctrine that 
there is a natural desire to know God by his essence (videre Deum per essentium). Both 
Feingold and Steven A. Long make reference to Summa theologiae 1–2, q.3, a. 8 central 
for their framing of the topic.3 The respondeo is worth quoting in its entirety:  
Final and perfect happiness can consist in nothing else than the vision of the 
Divine Essence. To make this clear, two points must be observed. First, that man 
is not perfectly happy, so long as something remains for him to desire and seek: 
secondly that the perfection of any power is determined by the nature of its object. 
Now the object of the intellect is “what a thing is,” i.e. the essence of a thing, 
                                                
1 Lawrence Feingold, The Natural Desire to See God According to St. Thomas Aquinas and His 
Interpreters, 2nd ed. (Naples, FL: Sapientia Press, 2010). 
2 See Henri De Lubac, “Remarques sur l’histoire du mot ‘surnaturel,’” Nouvelle Revue 
Théologique vol. 61 (1934): 225–49, 350–70; Surnaturel: Études historiques (Paris: Aubier, 1946); The 
Mystery of the Supernatural, trans. Rosemary Sheed (New York, NY: Herder and Herder, 1998); A Brief 
Catechesis on Nature and Grace, trans. Richard Anandez (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 1984); The 
Drama of Atheist Humanism, trans. Mark Sebanc (San Franciso, CA: Ignatius Press, 1995).  
3 Steven A. Long, Natura Pura: On the Recovery of Nature in the Doctrine of Grace (New York, 
NY: Fordham University Press, 2010), 15; Feingold, Natural Desire, 3–6.  
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according to De anima III, 6. Wherefore the intellect attains perfection, in so far 
as it knows the essence of a thing. If therefore an intellect knows the essence of 
some effect, whereby it is not possible to know the essence of the cause, i.e. to 
know of the cause “what it is;” that intellect cannot be said to reach that cause 
simply, although it may be able to gather from the effect the knowledge that the 
cause is. Consequently, when man knows an effect, and knows that it has a cause, 
there naturally remains in the man the desire to know about the cause, “what it 
is.” And this desire is one of wonder, and causes inquiry, as is stated in the 
beginning of the Metaphysics (I, 2). For instance, if a man, knowing the eclipse of 
the sun, considers that it must be due to some cause, and knows not what the 
cause is, he wonders about it, and from wondering proceeds to inquire. Nor does 
this inquiry cease until he arrives at knowledge of the essence of the cause. If 
therefore the human intellect, knowing the essence of some created effect, knows 
no more of God than, “that He is,” the perfection of that intellect does not yet 
reach simply the First Cause, but there remains in it the natural desire to seek the 
cause. Wherefore it is not yet perfectly happy. Consequently, for perfect 
happiness, the intellect needs to reach the very essence of the First Cause. And 
thus it will have its perfection through union with God as with that object, in 
which alone Man’s happiness consists, as stated in a. 1, 7 and q. 2, a. 8.  
The very desire that we have by nature to know the quiddity of things is also, in 
the limit, a desire for God. Moreover, because the God we desire to know as cause is 
disproportionate to our unaided ability to know, our natural desire for God is also a 
natural desire for the supernatural, for a communication of the divine nature. Moreover, 
because the will is a rational faculty, the desire of the will for the summum bonum is also 
a natural desire for the supernatural, for some participation in the divine life. The 
theologian knows that this desire is not in vain, because he or she affirms with the 
certainty of faith that the Beatific Vision and so spiritual union with God is promised to 
the elect. When we consider the human being concretely, the neo-de Lubacian contends, 
there is in us by nature an innate desire for the communication of God that is supernatural 
grace. 
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Certain neo-neo-scholastics object to such a prima facie reading of this passage 
and others like it.4 Feingold and Long, for example, observe that the desire described is 
“elicited.”5 This is to say that the desire to know “what” God is has as its condition some 
prior knowledge, i.e. “that” God is cause of creation. Thus it cannot be a natural—which 
is to say, innate—desire to know God by God’s essence.6 A corollary governing 
objections of this kind is that the natural desire, if it is natural and innate, is a priori (even 
unconscious, on Feingold’s read), but if it is “elicited,” then it is a posteriori, and so 
manifestly not natural. Long, in fact, goes further to make the remarkable claim that to 
desire to know God “under the ratio of ‘cause of the world,’” is “strictly speaking not 
truly to desire God, Who is infinitely more than cause of the world.”7 The desire to know 
God as the cause of contingent, finite being may have God as its material object, but does 
                                                
4 Reinhard Hütter, however, trains his sites at length on Summa contra Gentiles III, c. 25 in a 2009 
article (“Aquinas on the Natural Desire for the Vision of God: a Relecture of Summa contra Gentiles Ill, c. 
25 Aprés Henri de Lubac,” The Thomist 73 (2009): 523 – 91), though he couples this analysis to a wider 
historical frame in Chapter 6 of Dustbound for Heaven (“’Thomist Ressourcement’ – A Rereading of 
Thomas on the Natural Desire for the Vision of God,” in Dustbound for Heaven (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. 
B. Eerdmans, 2012), 183–248). 
5 Feingold acknowledges that this term and its opposite, (‘innate’) are contemporary not to 
Thomas, but Suarez (Feingold, Natural Desire, 15). 
6 Feingold, Natural Desire, 13–16. 397–406; Long, Natura Pura, 17, 19, n. 15.  
7 Long, Natura Pura, 20. The concept, ‘cause of the world,’ according to Long, is predicated 
accidentally of God, for it “signifies something in the world, whereas God infinitely transcends the world.” 
First, it is strange for a Thomist to claim that a true statement predicated of God is predicated 
“accidentally.” It seems to me a deeply held Thomist doctrine that the divine being admits of no accidents. 
But what could a true statement predicated of God accidentally impute to God but an accident? It is true, as 
I have said above (see Chapter 2.3.3), that God’s creative agency is predicated of God by extrinsic or 
“contingent” predication, but this is hardly the same thing as accidental predication. However, perhaps that 
is substantially identical with what Long intended, only by an infelicitous term. After all, he is right that to 
be ‘cause of the world’ is predicated of God on the basis not of something intrinsic to God, but the 
contingent fact of something extrinsic to God existing. However, to truly be the cause of the world—which 
is to say, the cause of every finite and contingent thing without exception—is necessarily to be infinite, and 
so it is not the world’s finitude that is implicitly predicated of God by the ratio ‘cause of the world,’ but 
precisely God’s own unrestrictedness. How God’s ad extra unrestrictedness can be ostensibly “transcended 
infinitely” by God’s in se infinitude such that some meaningful distinction between the God who causes 
finite and contingent being and the God who necessarily is (whether He creates or not) can be drawn eludes 
me.  
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not have God’s essence as its formal object.8 How can a desire and its proper fulfillment 
not have the same formal object? By metaphysical analysis, are not operations specified 
by their objects? 
We alert to a fundamental problem here, however. The desire to know as desire 
must always will an end or object, to use Long’s terms, under a ratio that is “accidentally 
denominated” of that which would fulfill the desire. For what is desired is the quiddity, 
but if the intellect could present to the will a concept derived from the desired quiddity, 
the intellect would already be in possession of that which it desires to know. Long’s 
example gives this away. He claims that desiring to know God under the concept “cause 
of the world” is like desiring to know Einstein under the concept “man wearing a 
raincoat.”9 It is true, of course, that desiring to know the man in the raincoat (who 
happens to be Einstein) is only materially, and not formally specified as a desire to know 
Einstein. However, desiring to know “the man called Einstein” is also only materially and 
not formally a desire to know the person who is identical with the famous physicist. The 
proper noun “Einstein” is predicated of the person identical with the famous physicist no 
less accidentally than “man wearing a raincoat.” And, more to the point, if I already know 
the famous physicist, I can hardly be said to desire to know him according to the formal 
understanding on which that knowledge rests.  
Lonergan makes this same point with considerable brevity in his essay, “The 
Natural Desire to Know God”: 
The desire [to know] and its fulfillment must have the same material object. But a 
desire to understand cannot have the same formal object as the fulfilling act of 
                                                
8 “Materially the object is the same, but the formal specification of the desire is quite different.” 
Ibid., 19, n. 15.  
9 Ibid., 20. 
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understanding. A desire to understand is specified by what we already know. The 
fulfilling act is specified by what as yet we do not know.10   
We can see, then, how Long and those who level this objection to the natural 
desire to know God elide the formal object (God as known to exist) specifying the desire 
to know God’s essence and that formal object (Beatific Vision) specifying the act which 
would fulfill that desire. 
 The foregoing analysis considers the desire to know any particular quiddity and 
specifically considers it as desire. But we might also consider the natural desire to know 
in general. The essential and adequate object of intellect is the transcendental ens. 
Whatever can be known is, and besides what is there is nothing. We express our human 
intellect’s desire for this object by two basic kinds of question, “quid sit?” and “an sit?”11 
Not even the doctrinaire Kantian will deny that human beings may ask, “an sit?” about 
anything at all, including God. But a rational and affirmative answer to a question is a 
fulfillment of the desire expressed by the question. However, we affirm that God exists 
by extrinsic denomination, saying that it is true of God that He is the necessarily existing 
cause of every contingently existing being on the supposition that contingent things in 
fact exist.  
Concomitantly, we may ask “quid sit?” about anything at all as well, including 
God. Asking quid sit Deus expresses a desire to know God’s essence specified by the 
knowledge of God’s existence. It is indeed an elicited desire. However, desiring to know 
the essence of any being is a natural operation of the human intellect: it requires no 
                                                
10 Bernard Lonergan, “The Natural Desire to Know God,” in Collection, ed. Robert M. Doran, 
CWL 4 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), 87. 
11 Lonergan, “The Natural Desire to Know God,” 81. See also Lonergan, Verbum: Word and Idea 
in Aquinas, eds. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, CWL 2 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1997) 10, 70, 100, 105, and passim. See also Thomas Aquinas, In Aristotelis libros Posteriorum 
analyticorum, 2, lect. i. 
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acquired habit, nor the aid of supernatural grace.12 Moreover, desiring to know the 
essence of God as specified by knowledge of His existence is not excluded from the field 
of the intellect’s essential object, for besides ens there is nothing. Thus we see that the 
desire to know in general is natural in origin and transcendental in its object. The specific 
desire to know God is no exception when considered as desire. The elicited character of 
the desire to know God by His essence impinges on its naturalness not at all.  
If it is objected that this sense of “natural” is not commonly what is meant by a 
natural desire to know God by His essence, but rather de Lubac and others have in mind 
an apriori tending towards God as end, we can note that the desiring desire to know has 
ens as its object and God is. Indeed, God is infinitely and so “infinitely more” than any 
creature we might inquire about according to some particular desired desire.13 Thus it is 
that we can say the mobilizing wonder diagnosed in human nature by Aristotle in the 
Metaphysics is, as to the formal object specifying its fulfillment, a desire for God.14 
Lonergan again: 
We are not content to ask quid sit solely with regard to material things, and we are 
not content with merely analogical knowledge of immaterial things. We keep on 
asking why, and we desist ultimately not because we do not desire but because we 
recognize our impotence to satisfy our desire. Even the Kantian, who denies to 
speculative intellect any knowledge of God, nonetheless appeals to some 
transcendental illusion to account for our desire. The fact seems to be that, just as 
the natural desire expressed by the question, an sit, has its range fixed by the 
adequate object of intellect, so also the natural desire expressed by the question, 
                                                
12 Lonergan, “Natural Desire,” 81.  
13 This notion of an operative desiring desire distinguishable from an operated desired desire is 
borrowed and adapted from Blondel’s notion of the willing will and the willed will. The human being’s 
willed will is always finite, but the willing will to which any willed will aims to be adequate and a 
fulfillment always transcends it. See Maurice Blondel, Action (1893): Essay on a Critique of Life and a 
Science of Practice, trans. Oliva Blanchette (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1984), 134, 
153, 309, and passim.  
14 Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book I, 1, 980 a 21. 
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quid sit, has an equal range. Since, then, acts are specified by their objects, and 
the object of natural desire is the transcendental, ens, we may say that the desire 
of our intellects is natural in origin and transcendental in its object… [and] the 
question, quid sit Deus, expresses a desire that arises naturally as soon as one 
knows the existence of God. This is but a corollary of the twofold affirmation that 
the desire to understand is natural and transcendental. Moreover, analogical 
knowledge of God does not satisfy this desire completely: not only is this clear a 
posteriori from the fact that natural theology and Trinitarian theory are not 
completely satisfying but only what we have to take because we cannot do better; 
it also is evident a priori since analogical knowledge is knowledge not only of 
similarity but of difference as well, and so of the limitations inevitably resulting 
from the difference. Hence, it is only proper knowledge of God that fully can 
meet the question, quid sit Deus.15 
We must note (as Lonergan does subsequently) that this desire considered as desire 
“neither includes nor excludes the Blessed Trinity,” even if the theologian may affirm by 
an act of supernatural faith that this desire is only properly fulfilled by an act of 
understanding specified by the substance of the beatific vision as its formal object. That 
conclusion, of course, is theological and not properly philosophical. “It can be thought,” 
Lonergan writes, “only because one has the faith, knows the fact of the beatific vision, 
and so must accept its possibility.”16 Affirmation of potency, as ever, is derived from 
act.17  
The philosopher, however, is in a rather different position. Human beings do not 
possess intellect simpliciter. Rather, our intellect comes to be in potency brought to act by 
illuminated phantasm. As Aristotle had it, “intellect grasps forms in images,” which is to 
                                                
15 Lonergan, “Natural Desire,” 83. 
16 Ibid. 
17 If this treatment of Lonergan’s views on the natural desire to see God prove unsatisfactorily 
summary, please see his detailed treatment of the topic in general, “The Supernatural Order,” in Early Latin 
Theology, trans. Michael G. Shields, eds. Robert M. Doran, H. Daniel Monsour, CWL 19 (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2011), 53–255. The entire treatise is to be considered, but those in a hurry 
might turn specifically to Excursus 1 of Thesis 4 of the same (Lonergan, “The Supernatural Order,” 139–
60).  
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say by inquiry into the sensible.18 While the field of the sensible is restricted, the 
transcendental ens is unrestricted, for besides being there is nothing. Thus, the 
philosopher faces a paradox: it would seem that, because the naturally attainable 
fulfillment of our desire to know is restricted, so too should the desire be. But, Lonergan 
observes, “The facts are otherwise.”19 There is nothing about which we cannot ask, “quid 
sit?” or “an sit?” because nothing is excluded from the range of our natural desire to 
know. Thus, the essential object of our intellects qua intellect infinitely outstrips the 
totality of proportionate objects (quidditas rei materialis) of our intellects considered 
concretely. Thus, the wonder mobilizing the philosopher to discovery and reasoning and 
the episodic triumph of rational judgment may, it turns out, itself prove an absurdity. The 
task of finite spirit appears Sisyphean. Such is the negative pole of the general medieval 
ambiguity.  
But if the human intellect has a field of proportionate objects, could we not call 
complete and adequate knowledge of that field a proper end of the human intellect, one in 
which some natural, if imperfect felicity could be found? Could we not have as our 
completely intelligible, but purely natural end knowledge of creatures and of God insofar 
as God is their creator? Could we not worship God as source of creaturely being and 
divine the natural law from the theonomic order among creatures?20 Yes and no. 
Certainly, any knowledge of creatures, of any quidditas rei materialis, brings with it a 
eudaimonic satisfaction. Also, aggregate knowledge of the whole of proportionate being 
is in principle possible for the unaided human intellect. Further, the existence of God may 
                                                
18 Aristotle, De anima, III, 7, 43ib 2. 
19 Lonergan, “Natural Desire,” 83. 
20 A line of reasoning approximating one Long attributes to “some authors,” in a footnote (Long, 
Natura Pura, 20, n. 20).  
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be affirmed on the basis of a valid inference that the totality of contingent finite beings 
must have a necessary and infinite cause. Still, knowledge of what the cause of 
contingent finite being is would necessarily elude us. We can know that there is sufficient 
reason for creaturely being, but not without divine aid what that reason is in itself. And 
this is no merely extrinsic matter to the intelligibility of that which depends upon the 
sufficiency of reason. For if I do not know the sufficient reason of creaturely being, 
whatever else I may know about creatures, I still as yet do not know why they exist, but 
only that they exist and that their existence is in principle intelligible. But if I do not 
know why something exists, I hardly know that thing completely. And so in the end the 
aggregate knowledge of creaturely being, no less than the universal existence of 
creaturely being depends entirely upon God. This dependence is absolute, for the 
difference between existence and non-existence is absolute. As a consequence, if 
separated rather than merely distinguished from its founding relation to the God who is, 
the proportionate end of the human intellect proves to be nothing at all. This, then, signals 
the important role played by natural knowledge of God’s existence: it heuristically 
indicates where the causal order of being continues infinitely beyond the ken of human 
minds, situating the restricted field proportionate to human knowledge within the 
unrestricted intelligibility that provides its proximate integrity.   
If my treatment of this widely controverted point seems terse (and, in places, tart), 
it is because I am convinced that the thesis on the natural desire to know God, especially 
when considered according to separated philosophy, amounts in the end only to a 
restatement of the medieval ambiguity articulated in Ch. 3, albeit in terms of a medieval 
metaphysical psychology. To desire to know God under the ratio of cause of finite, 
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contingent being is simply to have affirmed that there is a sufficient reason for finite, 
contingent being and to ask what it is. If, however, one denies that there is some 
sufficient reason for the existence of finite, contingent being (perhaps on the basis of the 
paradox into which affirmation seems to lead philosophical reasoning), it would be 
absurd to thus ask what that sufficient reason is. Conversely, if there is no sufficient 
reason for finite, contingent being, then being is not at bottom completely intelligible and 
the partial intelligibility one finds is not part of any whole, thus in fact no part at all. 
Being is mere matter of fact. Thus we see that the activity of inquiry itself must be judged 
worth pursuing on the basis of an intelligibility desired, but in principle beyond the 
attainment of the human intellect and so of any separated philosophy. Concretely, what is 
posed to the philosopher conceptually as a paradox is posed existentially as a pre-
philosophical decision for or against the complete intelligibility of being (and so, the 
theologian knows, materially for or against God).  
What has been posed in the last century as the problem of the supernatural is, I 
contend, not the modern problem of the supernatural properly so-called, but a residue of 
efforts to think up to the mind of Thomas Aquinas on the medieval problem, using his 
medieval terms but only rarely achieving his medieval solution. The medieval solution 
consists necessarily (though in the case of grace, not sufficiently) in the application of the 
theorem of the supernatural. We may say without contradiction or competition that God 
acts in all of my actions, making them actual and intelligible. Even when my willing 
outstrips the proportion of my efficacy, it is God that makes my desiring make sense at 
all and so lets it be as desiring. But this conclusion cannot be drawn unambiguously in a 
separated philosophy. This ambiguity, however, fails to invalidate the conclusion. Rather, 
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taking cognizance of the ambiguity allows us to recognize what Blondel insisted on at the 
end of the nineteenth century: that there is infinitely more in action than in thought.21  
If a tidy solution to the quandaries of the natural desire to know God like the one 
sketched above only manages to restate the medieval ambiguity of being, then we have 
still not yet posed the modern problem of the supernatural. Perhaps we can pose the 
question according to Aristotle’s two basic questions. In Chapter 2, we answered a kind 
of ‘an sit’ question. We followed Lonergan’s reconstruction of Thomas’s metaphysical 
argument for divine concursus. We saw elucidated the theoretical conditions for the 
possibility that God is at work in all our actions. We saw that these conditions can be 
affirmed. In turn, we affirmed that God acts in every free human action. But as we may 
desire to know the essence of the God that is the cause of every creature (and who thus 
operates in every created cause), we can more specifically ask after the nature of God’s 
operation in free human action. If we commit ourselves to the pre-philosophical decision 
that such a question is worth asking, if we commit ourselves to the hypothesis that free 
human action is fundamentally intelligible, then the theologian naturally wonders after 
what the philosopher could not hope to know: “What is God doing in human action?” 
This question cannot be answered by more metaphysics. This question does not ask for 
the synchronic and causal conditions of possibility for God’s involvement in free human 
action. Instead, it asks after the diachronic manifestation of God’s providential and 
                                                
21 “For, once reflexion, through the initiative of spontaneous life itself, rises to the conception of 
an ideal order, once we have understood that there is more in human action than all of nature can offer, 
once the will takes over what is autonomous and transcendent within it, it is no longer in the real faces, nor 
even in the ideas that regulate the understanding, that man seeks support and finds the end for his conduct. 
It is in practice alone that he aspires to equal the amplitude of his acting will. And henceforth, action (far 
from seeming a phenomenon conditioned by an infinity of other antecedents, whether objective or 
subjective matters little) appears as conditioning all the rest. Considered in all its purity apart from faces 
and ideas, action commands and produces the ideas and the facts; it organizes itself freely; it creates the 
organs of its necessary functions.” Blondel, Action, 280. 
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redemptive intent in and through human actions. It is, in other words, a hermeneutical 
question.  
Still, if the contemporary controversy over the supernatural has been any 
indication, the abstract universality, the logical control, and the disclosure of formal 
necessity offered by metaphysical analysis will continue to prove too tempting to set 
down, however provisionally. Therefore, in what follows I spell out why the modern 
problem of the supernatural cannot be answered metaphysically.  
2. A Metaphysical Attempt to Answer the Modern Problem 
My effort to elucidate why the modern problem of the supernatural cannot be 
solved exclusively in terms of metaphysics proceeds in two parts. In the first part, we see 
that a metaphysical answer to the question, “what is God doing in human action?” only 
restates the problem. In the second part, we will see that the problem thus restated is 
manifestly and unavoidably diachronic and hermeneutical.  
What is God doing in free human action, metaphysically speaking? Thomas says 
God is “governing” it.22 Lonergan spells out four ways in which God governs free human 
actions. God governs the will’s willing of the end, the specification of the free act as to its 
means, the exercise of the free act once means have been decided upon, and the whole 
series of an individual’s free acts.  
God governs the will willing the end of free human action by what Lonergan calls 
“the direct exercise of power” (immediatio virtutis).23 God is the immediate cause of an 
                                                
22 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 103, a. 5, ad 3m. 
23 Bernard Lonergan, “God’s Knowledge and Will,” Early Latin Theology, eds. Robert M. Doran 
and H. Daniel Monsour, CWL 19 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011), 325. See also “The 
Supernatural Order,” 183.  
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act of willing insofar as God creates and conserves the will. God not only causes the will 
to be itself according to its essence, but also beyond essence in the actuality of its 
operation that wills the end.24 God also governs the intellect in its operation by which the 
end is presented to the will and in this same direct or immediate manner, i.e. through 
creation and conservation. God governs too the will’s willing of the end as mediate cause 
(mediatio suppositi), applying causes to their effects and adapting causes to be 
instruments of His will.25 Thus, God applies the agent objects of sensation to the senses, 
applies the senses in act to the intellect, and applies the agent intellect to the passive 
intellect, thereby illuminating the phantasms impressed there.26 Thus, God governs the 
operation of the will with regard to the end by causing the will and its operations to be at 
all (immediatio virtutis), but also by arranging the spatiotemporal conjunction and 
disposition of the intellect and will with regard to the agent objects that bring them to act 
in space and time through the order of the universe (mediatio suppositi).27  
                                                
24 On the manner in which operation is “beyond essence,” see Bernard Lonergan, Verbum, 115: 
“But there also are elements of reality that are over and above essence; sight is an essence, but seeing is 
more than that essence; still, seeing is not a further essence, for seeing and sight have the same definition, 
which they share as act and potency(.)” 
25 Lonergan, “God’s Knowledge and Will,” 325.  
26 On the role of “agent objects” in bringing operations to act, see Lonergan, Verbum, 106–151, 
but especially 149–50.   
27 Of course, one may object that if God moves our will to the end, both by the immediate and 
mediate exercise of divine power, how may such a willing be said to be free? In one respect, this objection 
loses hold of the medieval solution to the problem of the supernatural. “Now what,” Lonergan asks, giving 
voice to this objection, “does the…will moved by God, when it is moved by God, while it is moved by 
God, confer or contribute?” His response presupposes the transitive relation of causality that is divine 
concursus: “(The will) operates. It wills… The will operates inasmuch as it is the will that is actuated. The 
will contributes inasmuch as an act received in the will has to be a ‘willing.” Lonergan, Verbum, 147. In 
another respect, however, we can note that having simply willed the end is not yet a formally free act, 
according to Lonergan, but only a virtually free act. This is to say, it is free to the extent that it produces a 
formally free act (Lonergan, “God’s Knowledge and Will,” 327).  
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God also governs the specification of our free acts whereby we select the means 
through which to reach our intended end.28 God effects this governance by ordering 
through application all the intelligible factors that contribute to it. God orders the matter 
of the act, which is to say the circumstances that bound feasibility and so the range of 
means really available. God orders the subject of the act through his governance by 
application of our habits and dispositions of the body, the senses, the intellect, and the 
will. He also governs the subject of free acts through his governance by creation and 
conservation of the intellectual light of deliberation and the love for the end motivating 
our deliberations. In the explicitly theological register, we may also add that God governs 
so many of our free acts by the grace that makes them possible, through application in 
supernatural habits and through creation and conservation in the gift of enlightenment of 
our intellect and inspiration of our wills.29 As I argued at length in chapter 2, God also 
governs the exercise of our free actions through the transitive relation of causality that is 
divine concursus. As agents, we are not proportionate to have existence as an effect, but 
the effects of the exercise of our free actions exist. God, thus, causes both this existential 
efficacy in our action, but also the operation by which we commit ourselves to realizing 
it. God causes our causing, and so is cause of our effects. This is no less true when we are 
moved than when we move ourselves.  
Finally, Lonergan argues that God is solely the cause of the entire series of an 
individual’s free actions. Lonergan offers both conceptual and concrete support for this 
claim. Causes, he reminds us, are one in themselves, but an individual’s acts are multiple. 
Therefore, even if one intends and chooses the series as a whole, that act itself would be 
                                                
28 Lonergan, “God’s Knowledge and Will,” 329. 
29 Ibid., 331.  
   
 
193 
part of the series, for “no one act of a person is simultaneous with all that person’s 
acts.”30 Concretely, Lonergan points out, we experience our freedom as effective here 
and now, such that “it is not today’s freedom but tomorrow’s that is going to carry out the 
resolution made today.”31 Indeed, this inescapable temporality rules out the prospect that 
we might have causal mastery of the whole series of our actions. No, God wills the order 
of every ordered series in his infinite wisdom and so is the cause per se of each person’s 
free acts.  
The above elucidation of God’s governance of human action, however 
compendious, only restates the modern problem. Each point in Lonergan’s catalogue of 
God’s governance of free human action serves to specify the formal content of a decision 
to affirm the positive pole of the specific medieval ambiguity, of a decision to operate on 
the heuristic anticipation that free human action is ultimately intelligible. Each point fills 
out a respect in which we affirm, yes, there is an explanation for the being of free human 
action. That explanation is what the theologian means by God. Moreover, by providing 
free human action with its efficacy (and so being), God does not deprive it of its liberty. 
The metaphysical answer tells us that free human actions are intelligible because of their 
dependence upon God and so also that God is acting in them. No doubt we can, by 
learning what human actions are, learn what God is doing in making them to be. This is 
of the utmost importance in answer to an sit questions about the work of God in human 
actions. Nonetheless, it produces a trivial answer to quid sit questions about the same: 
whatever God knows, wills, or does necessarily is, but only with the minimal necessity 
                                                
30 Ibid., 333. 
31 Ibid.  
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resulting from the supposition of itself.32 That triviality with regard to the quiddity of 
God’s ad extra agency grounded the medieval ambiguities of being we saw in Chapter 3. 
If by asking, “what is God doing in human action?” we want to know the intelligible 
nexus between free human action as the freely produced effects of God’s action and the 
end for and towards which they are governed and effected by God, this sheds no light at 
all. We have as yet no purchase on what God is doing in free human action.  
3. The Impossibility of a Metaphysical Answer 
My argument for the impossibility of answering the modern problem of the 
supernatural metaphysically will itself be primarily metaphysical. This might seem odd 
on its face. Although the metaphysical attempt to answer the modern problem only 
restates the problem, we need not consider that approach entirely fruitless. In principle, 
careful exposition of this metaphysical restatement should serve to both articulate the 
elements of the problem and also to communicate its force. We might, through analysis, 
reveal not just the fact that a metaphysical approach cannot answer the modern problem, 
but also reveal some of the reasons why it cannot do so and thereby uncover some 
determinations of the problem itself. 
I have expressed the modern problem of the supernatural by the somewhat 
informal question, “What is God doing in free human action?” Diffusely and at length in 
Chapter 2, but more directly and tersely in this chapter I have considered “what God is 
doing.” I have, in other words, kept the focus on God’s ad extra agency in human action. 
Free human action in itself has gone little defined, except when considered as the object 
                                                
32 Ibid., 279–81. 
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of God’s action. In what follows, a close look at Lonergan’s account of Thomas’s 
metaphysical psychology of volition provides both the needed articulation of the modern 
problem and communication of its force. This close look consists in a metaphysical 
analysis reducing free human action to its principle in free acts of the will, and so 
involves a reconstruction of Lonergan’s Thomist theory of will.  For my purposes, 
underlining the role of meaning in human volition proves most important. The 
constitutive function of meaning in human action, fundamental for human action as free, 
reveals why the modern problem of the supernatural is a) diachronic, b) hermeneutical, 
and c) irreducible to metaphysical solutions.  
3.2 Metaphysical Analysis of Free Human Action 
In Chapter 3, we reviewed Thomas’s augmentation of Aristotle’s theory of action. 
There we saw that within a unitary action, a single ‘movement,’ the patient or effect or 
product is distinguished on the basis of its dependence upon another—the agent—for its 
act. Agency, then, is predicated extrinsically from the existence of an effect really 
dependent upon the agent for its act. Within this general metaphysical framework, how 
are free human actions to be distinguished? First, we need to acknowledge a looming 
ambiguity. Action can be taken to mean the movement as a unitary whole within which 
agent and patient/effect/product are distinguished. We might approximately associate 
Aristotle’s use of poiesis with this sense of ‘action’. However, action can also refer to the 
effect or product itself, and here we might associate, with matching approximation, 
Aristotle’s sense of praxis. I will do my best to be clear about which sense I am 
employing along the way, referring to the former sense with ‘action-as-movement’ and 
‘action-as-effect.’  
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How are free human actions (in either sense) discerned as both free and human? 
There is a temptation, because agents are predicated as such extrinsically, to think we 
must distinguish free human action on the basis of the ‘action-as-effect’ itself. For 
example, we might suppose that those actions that go unimpeded are thereby free. Of 
course, that which is impeded does not come to be at all and without an extant 
effect/product, there is no action to speak of, much less a free and human one. If it is 
objected that there is an effect, but it is simply not the effect intended, this also tips us 
away from the effect/product as the determinant of an action as free. For effects do not 
have intentions, but rational agents do, and so implicitly we must distinguish free human 
actions on the basis of the agent.  
If we cannot distinguish the free and human character of an action-as-movement 
on the basis of its effect/product, then we turn to its other term: the agent. How is agency 
distinguished as free and human from the agent? We will proceed by metaphysical 
analysis, which is to say by reduction to principles. Thus we move from the objects of an 
act to the nature of the act and then from the nature of the power to act thusly to the 
nature of the being that possesses that power. We might begin by positing vaguely and 
heuristically that the object of free human action is “some good.” Now, this does not 
carry us very far, because every being that becomes in time and space tends toward 
“some good.” These goods-as-ends remain in need of specification. Here we find that 
metaphysical analysis takes on a dialectical nature, pivoting between terms to gain 
traction. Thus, we may specify goods by their proportion to the nature of the acts, 
powers, and natures that tend toward them.  
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Humans, we know, tend toward nutritive ends. While this distinguishes human 
actions from the actions of the inanimate, we have this specific tending in common with 
all living things. Humans also tend towards sensible goods (the ‘pleasurable’). Moreover, 
we tend towards nutritive goods under the aspect of their sensible goodness perceived. In 
other words, our desire for nutritive goods depends upon, in the concrete, our tending 
towards sensible goods. However, we have this tending in common with all sentient 
living things and so it gets us only so much closer to specifying actions as free and 
human. Finally, then, humans also tend towards intelligible goods, as evinced by the 
desire to know for its own sake and the love we have for knowledge possessed. This, at 
least according to present knowledge of the cosmos, seems a uniquely human tending. 
Moreover, we tend towards nutritive and sensible goods under the aspect of their 
intelligible goodness as known. In other words, our desire for nutritive goods depends, in 
the concrete, on our tending towards intelligible goods like the goods of order in which 
agriculture consists, for example. Our desire for sensible goods also, in the concrete, 
depends on our tending towards intelligible goods, as evinced by the intellectual 
character of our delight in the beautiful.33  
Thus the objects of human actions are desired or loved under two aspects: 
primarily as good, but secondarily and integrally as intelligible. Of course, intelligibility 
and goodness pertain to everything towards which any being tends, since bonum is 
among the transcendentals of being. This does not help us specify actions as free and 
human, however. Every end towards which a being tends in its becoming is, insofar as it 
is, intelligible and good. Noting that they are desired as good and intelligible does aid our 
                                                
33 Summa theologiae 1, q.5, a. 5. 
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specification, however. We may say that, although free human actions produce effects 
that are intelligible and good (like all effective actions), specifically free and human 
actions follow from prior acts of knowing and desiring as their ontological principle. 
Consequently, the potency for these acts is called a ‘rational appetite.’34 But prattle of the 
Thomist definition for the will only occasionally raises the essential questions: what is 
rationality? How does rationality modify the tending in which appetite consists? These 
questions will occupy us now.  
3.2 What is Rationality? 
Fundamentally, rationality is an intellectual process. But when we think of 
intellectual process, we may think only of the forms of inference “found in an 
abbreviated and very formal textbook on deductive logic.”35 We might, in other words, 
think of rationality as a fairly mechanical process whereby concepts and their contents 
are assembled into arguments according to rules or laws. These rules or laws, then, are 
what we learn in logic courses and rationality would consist in their rigorous application. 
But such a process would be merely intelligible and not as such intellectual. It would be 
what Lonergan calls a “natural process.” He notes three differences between a natural 
process and an intellectual process. He writes,  
(First) the intelligibility of natural process is passive and potential: it is what can 
be understood; it is not an understanding; it is a potential object of intellect, but it 
is not the very stuff of intellect. (Second), the intelligibility of natural process is 
the intelligibility of some specific natural law, say, the law of inverse squares, but 
never the intelligibility of the very idea of intelligible law. Thirdly, the 
                                                
34 David Gallagher notes how Thomas seldom contents himself with anything so straightforward 
as the simple notion of an appetite that follows cognition, so here as throughout, I will be presenting a 
synthesis of “Lonergan’s Thomas” on the will (David M. Gallagher, “Thomas Aquinas on the Will as 
Rational Appetite,” Journal of the History of Philosophy vol. 29, no. 4 [October 1991]: 559–84). 
35 Lonergan, Verbum, 51. 
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intelligibility of natural process is imposed from without: natures act intelligibly, 
not because they are intelligent, for they are not, but because they are concretions 
of divine ideas and a divine plan.36 
Intellectual process, then, will be not just intelligible, but also intelligent. 
Intellectual process is not just governed by laws or rules, but is generative of laws/rules. 
Thus these governing principles are not heteronomous to intellectual process. Intellectual 
process is not just governed by intelligible law, but creates, constitutes, and so grounds, 
“the intelligibility-in-act of law.”37 In this sense, intellectual process is autonomous, 
rather than automatic.  
Even more significantly, intellectual process is not merely the autonomous 
assemblage of ready-made concepts generated through “metaphysical mechanics.”38 
“Conceptualization comes as the term and product,” Lonergan writes, “of a process of 
reasoning.”39 If an intellectual process produces concepts, the autonomous process of 
deductive, syllogistic reasoning is therefore not basic, but a derived form of rationality. 
The rationality of deductive inference rests on a still-more-basic rationality. As I have 
previously argued, any positive philosophy that would come to ultimately unambiguous 
conclusions in ontology operates on the presupposition that “all causation is intelligible,” 
and so “any effect has sufficient ground in its cause.”40 Concepts are the result of a 
process and so are, in that sense, effects dependent on their cause as sufficient ground. 
Moreover, concepts are the result of a specifically intellectual process, and so their 
sufficient ground is not just intelligible, but intelligent. This ground cannot be 
                                                
36 Ibid., 46–7.   
37 Ibid., 47. 
38 Ibid., 22, n. 45. 
39 Ibid., 51. 
40 Ibid., 47. 
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intelligence merely in potency, and therefore the ground cannot be the intellectual power 
as such. No, the ground of concepts must be intelligence in act, for effects receive their 
act from their cause. But intelligence in act is intellectual operation. It is intelligere, 
understanding. The sufficient ground of the concept-as-effect is “a knowing” and it is 
“operative precisely as a knowing, knowing itself to be sufficient.”41  
This intelligent intelligibility, according to Lonergan, is the “basic and essential 
rationality of rational consciousness” to be observed “in all concepts.”42 But here we run 
up against the limits of metaphysical analysis alone. Lonergan argues that Thomas seems 
to have noticed this limitation in his effort to follow Aristotle’s lead on these questions, 
for Thomas abandoned to ti ên einai and its Latin equivalent.43 He notes that Thomas 
only rarely invokes the Latin equivalent of to ti ên einai outside of the commentaries on 
Aristotle. When he makes reference to it there, he often identifies it with essential 
definition itself, though sometimes more specifically with the ground of essential 
definition.44 Lonergan thinks that Aristotle’s by-the-way efforts to isolate the concrete 
apprehension of form from the abstract articulation of essential definition in concepts 
proved unsatisfactory to Thomas and that Thomas consequently chose a different 
strategy. Lonergan explains the difficulty: 
                                                
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Aristotle distinguished essence (to ti estin) from form (to ti ên einai). To ti ên einai functions in 
the logical order for Aristotle. It is that which undergirds what Lonergan calls “the core of identical 
meaning” between a defined term and its definition or concept. But to ti ên einai can also directly name the 
formal cause of a particular thing. Thus, form is not strictly identical with essence for Aristotle. It plays an 
integral role in the kind of scientific, essential definition in which concepts consist. By this procedure, 
however, it remains opaque how understanding why this concrete thing is the thing it is should produce a 
concept of that kind of thing. See ibid., 30–8.  
44 Ibid., 36. In one instance, it is identified with formal cause (Thomas Aquinas, Sententia libri 
Metaphysicae, lib. 6, lect. 2, §764 [paragraph numbers from the Marietti edition]). 
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The Aristotelian term [to ti ên einai] was a logical effort to isolate understanding 
and form, and one has only to consider the difficulties of such isolation to grasp 
why Aquinas dropped this Aristotelian effort as abortive and proceeded on lines 
of his own. Because the act of understanding–the intelligere proprie–is prior to, 
and cause of, conceptualization, because expression is only through 
conceptualization, any attempt to fix the act of understanding, except by way of 
introspective description, involves its own partial failure; for any such attempt is 
an expression, and expression is no longer understanding and already concept.45 
Thomas turned instead to Aristotle’s emphasis on the role of diagrams in 
mathematical discovery, and so augmented the logical technique of metaphysical analysis 
with introspective, psychological description. “We can all experience in ourselves that, 
when we try to understand something,” Thomas writes, “we form for ourselves images, 
by way of examples, in which as it were we inspect what we desire to understand.”46 The 
need for diagrams in mathematics (whereby necessary and immobile forms are 
represented multiply) provided Thomas his heuristic for what would be more generally 
the case: abstract definitions of things are derived from their multiple representation in 
concrete things.47 I will follow Thomas and Lonergan in pairing these techniques, 
metaphysical analysis and psychological description, toward three complementary ends. 
First, it will help concretize the causal relation between intelligere and the emanatio 
intelligibilis of the concept. Second, it will clarify the function of the concept in 
rationality considered more widely, from its origin in sense to its termination in true 
judgments of fact to the development of a scientia. Finally, it will prepare us to speak 
                                                
45 Lonergan, Verbum, 38. 
46 Summa theologiae, 1, q. 84, a. 7 c. 
47 “When the geometer argues about two triangles similar in all respects, he deals with two 
triangles, and not with some one triangle; but if they are similar in all respects, then they do not differ in 
idea, in essence, in nature, or in any accidental characteristic; there is mere material multiplication. In 
Aristotelian and in Thomist psychology, the second 'one' or the second 'triangle' is accounted for, not by a 
second concept, but by the reflection of intellect back to phantasm where the many instances of the one 
idea are represented.” Lonergan, Verbum, 40. See also Thomas Aquinas, Sententia libri De anima, III, lect. 
8, §713 and Summa theologiae, 1, q. 86, a. l; q. 84, a. 7. 
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articulately and with detailed control of the rational element in willing, and by extension 
in free human action.  
I have already noted that concepts depend on intellectual operation to bring them 
to act. Human intellect, however, is not perpetually in act like God’s.48 “We shout our 
rare 'Eurekas' with Archimedes,” Lonergan writes, “but for the most part we have to 
reason(.)”49 What brings human intellect into act, to operation? For Lonergan, following 
Thomas, it is quidditas rei materialis. How does this come about? In and through 
phantasm illuminated by agent intellect. But, again, it is easy enough to trot out these 
terms and their metaphysical determinations and yet to remain obtuse to their meaning. 
So let us break down cognitional process along two lines: according to a metaphysical 
analysis and a parallel psychological description.  
As we noted in discussion of application in Chapter 2, it is not sufficient for a 
cause that it be in act to produce its effect. It must also be in proper disposition and 
relation to the material of this effect, as a lit match cannot ignite a candle’s wick if each 
would remain in its opposed corner of a room. So it is too with the agent object of 
understanding. The intelligibility in act of a material being cannot bring the intellect to 
act unless it is in the right relation to the intellect. Quidditas rei materialis, by virtue of 
its substantial materiality, comes into relation with or disposition to other beings in space 
and time. The intellect, of course, is immaterial, and so does not come into relation with 
or disposition to its objects spatiotemporally. But besides intellect, there is sense. Sense is 
intentional, but also materially dependent on its bodily organ. Thus, integral to the 
                                                
48 “…angelic, and still more, divine knowledge is exclusively that sort of thing, a continuous blaze 
of the light of understanding.” Lonergan, Verbum, 45. 
49 Lonergan, Verbum, 45. See also Thomas Aquinas, Super Ioannem, c. 1, lect. l; Super III 
Sententiarum, d. 23, q. l, a. 2. 
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process by which intellect comes to act is the application of sensible objects to the sense 
powers of a human being, whereby the sensible in act serves as agent object to sight or 
hearing, etc., bringing them to act, to operation. Thus is sensibility, in its intentional 
rather than material mode, able to bring quidditas rei materialis into the proper relation 
with the intellect so that its role as agent object might be realized.  
But the spatiotemporal disposition of material being is not the only instance of 
application needful to bring intellect to act. So also there is needed a proper spiritual or 
immaterial disposition. This, in my view, is the metaphysical function of the agent 
intellect as a specifically efficient potency in the intellectual faculty.50 The agent intellect 
is that which brings the intellect into right disposition to and relation with the quiddity 
now present intentionally in and through sensation. The effect of this disposing function 
falls not only upon the intellect in an illuminating and preparatory fashion, but also upon 
the sensations themselves, organizing and selecting among sensations that which is 
potentially relevant for understanding. It is the effect of this organizing and selecting 
function that distinguishes phantasms from mere sensations. Once the proper material and 
spiritual applications have been effected, the intelligible in act immanent in the sensible 
in act and illuminated by the light of agent intellect may bring the intellect to act.51 Then 
what is sensed is also understood. 
Alongside this metaphysical analysis of powers, operations, objects, and 
application, so too it is helpful to consider a description of the same process under its 
psychological—which is to say, conscious—aspect. One has perhaps had the experience 
                                                
50 “The distinction between agent intellect and possible intellect is a distinction between an 
efficient potency that produces and a natural potency that receives.” Lonergan, Verbum, 149. 
51 As to any controversy over whether sentire, intelligere, and even velle, respectively, can be a 
pati, see ibid., 139–143.  
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of ‘spacing out’ or being ‘lost in thought.’ In such experiences, we do not cease to be 
conscious, nor do we cease to have consciousness of the flow of sensation. We see, hear, 
smell, taste, and feel during such episodes. But it is so little organized, so little selected, 
deemed (if I may speak poetically) of so little relevance to our waxing or waning 
curiosity that it goes un-attended-to and largely unremembered. If, rather than fading into 
twilight consciousness, one puzzles and if one puzzles not over the imagined, but over the 
presently perceived, then one finds the pattern of experience highly organized, highly 
selective according to the heuristic force of some incipient question. This question is 
operative, one may recall in retrospect, as a criterion of relevance that tunes out the hum 
of the HVAC system, but sees the lines of some diagram or hears the words of the lecture 
in sharp relief. Such are phantasms, not as a function or object of metaphysical analysis, 
but as experienced. One may tinker with the relevant sensible matter for as long as the 
tension of inquisitive consciousness can be maintained. One may lose heart and go in 
search of some anesthetizing distraction from the discomfort of inquisitive consciousness, 
but also one may be relieved of this tension by the sudden—indeed, instantaneous—shift 
from perplexity to apprehension, from not-understanding to understanding. This 
transition is from understanding as a live and desired possibility to understanding as a 
reality of one’s conscious experience. It can be the result from a change in disposition 
among the sensed (perhaps one re-organizes the diagrams or fixes upon a new example), 
but it can also result from a change in disposition internal to one’s consciousness (a 
renewed attentiveness, a re-phrasing of the operative question, or a newfound willingness 
to realize the significance of what one has seen or heard all along). In any case, the effect 
is the same: the synchronic ‘flash’ of insight.  
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We are nearly ready now, having considered both metaphysically and 
psychologically the process by which intellect comes to act, to turn back to the basic 
rationality that consists in the process by which intellect in act produces a concept or 
verbum mentis. But first we must make a few notes. Recall that intelligere is, as far as it 
goes, a knowing. It is the immediate apprehension of its object as immanent in 
phantasms. This immediacy, of course, is an integral element in the realism proper to any 
genuinely Thomist theory of knowledge. However, this immediacy has certain limitations 
that can be enumerated both metaphysically and by psychological description. 
Metaphysically considered, that which is immediately related can admit of no further 
application, for any change in relation would deprive the intellect of its agent object, and 
so that on which it depends for its act. In this way, the human act of understanding 
considered in itself and in isolation cannot be called ‘rational,’ for once it is in act, it does 
not admit of process. The act of understanding, even if considered as the actuality of a 
movement from potency to act, is a synchronic instant that cannot serve as part of a 
diachronic process. To borrow Augustine’s language from the Confessions, the act of 
understanding is a pure and complete intending that does not admit of the distention 
required for consciousness of temporal duration.52 Without temporal duration, of course, 
there can be no diachronic process. Finally, intelligibility is distinguished from the 
sensible, and so is insensible per se. Consequently, it cannot of itself be the agent object 
for the human intellect and so cannot produce the effects in the human intellect in which 
an intellectual process would consist.  
                                                
52 Augustine, Confessions 11, §26–7. 
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In addition to these metaphysical limitations, the immediate grasp of quiddity by 
an act of understanding has limits that can be described psychologically. What is 
immediately experienced is experienced indistinctly.53 The experience of understanding, 
the ‘flash’ of insight, is of the understanding itself and also of the understood. One does 
in fact experience a knowing in the experience of understanding. Still, the act and its 
object are not distinguished in the experiencing, as seeing is at once experienced as a 
seeing and also always as a seeing-this. The immediacy of the apprehension and the 
apprehended makes the apprehension itself, as conscious and intentional, necessarily 
indistinct. For, if it were distinct, it would not be immediate, but rather mediated by the 
difference by which it is distinguished.54 Moreover, the change from potentially 
understanding to actually understanding is a synchronic, punctual transformation from 
one state to an opposed state without gradation or overlap. The experience of this 
transition can be remembered, but as remembered it is likewise no longer immediate. As 
immediate and punctual, the act of understanding is not available to serve as the object of 
inquiry’s tension, and so not available to the on-going experience of intellectual process.  
But intellectual process does not terminate with insight into phantasm. As 
Lonergan writes,  
For human understanding, though it has its object in the phantasm and knows it in 
the phantasm, yet is not content with an object in this state. It pivots on itself to 
produce for itself another object which is the inner word as ratio, intentio, 
                                                
53 On the indistinctness of what is immediately experienced see Eugene Gendlin, Experiencing 
and the Creation of Meaning (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1997). See also Charles 
Sanders Peirce, “Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man,” and “Some Consequences of 
Four Incapacities,” in The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings Volume 1 (1867–1893), eds. 
Nathan Houser, Christian Kloesel (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1992), 11–55. 
54 Robert Sokolowski’s centering of distinction making in philosophical method is in this way also 
a centering of the mediating function of meaning in philosophy. See “The Method of Philosophy: Making 
Distinctions,” in The Review of Metaphysics vol. 51, no. 3 (March, 1998): 515–32. 
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definitio, quod quid est. And this pivoting and production… is an operation of 
rational consciousness.55 
 We are now prepared to consider this production of the concept, this procession of the 
verbum mentis in some detail according both to a metaphysical analysis and to a 
psychological description. Metaphysically speaking, there are two kinds of procession. 
There is the emergence of a perfection in and from what is perfected, as when we saw 
above the emergence of an act of understanding in and from the intellect. This is a 
processio operationis.56 There is also the procession of the verbum mentis, of a concept 
from an act of understanding. This is a processio operati. It is the emergence of one thing 
from another. But lest we think of concepts as extrinsically related to the understanding 
that produces them, we need to also distinguish two kinds of acts. There are those acts 
that consist in movement whereby, once the movement is complete, the act ceases. “One 
cannot at once be walking a given distance and have walked it, be being cured and have 
been cured, be learning something and have learned it.57” Such an act is called an actus 
imperfecti. What is moved is in potency, what is in potency is imperfect, and so that 
movement is the act of the imperfect.58 Thus, the reasoning that gave rise to the act of 
understanding, the tinkering with the phantasm under the guidance of inquiry’s tension 
and agent intellect’s illumination, all of this is a movement in the sense of actus 
imperfecti. The act of understanding itself, however, is “the act of something that exists 
in act, inasmuch as it exists in act,” and “the act of something brought to completion 
                                                
55 Lonergan, Verbum., 48.  
56 Ibid., 107. 
57 Ibid., 114. 
58 See Super I Sententiarum, d. 3, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1m; In III De anima, lect. 12, § 766. 
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inasmuch as it is complete.”59 Such is an actus perfecti. Such acts are not intrinsically 
temporal, though we shall see that this transcendence of temporality allows them to have 
a governing function in intellectual process as rational.  
Concepts proceed by a processio operati. They emerge from something else in act 
rather than as an act in and from something in potency. The verbum mentis proceeds from 
an act of understanding and is produced by that understanding as an effect.60 However, 
this procession is, as we said, not only intelligible, but also intelligent. It is the basic 
rationality that belongs to concepts. Consequently, the procession of the concept must be 
simultaneous with the act of understanding.61 If the concept itself is to have the character 
of rationality in its intelligent and intelligible dependence on an act of understanding, 
then the concept must also express the content of the act of understanding.62 But in the 
production of the concept, both of these conditions are met because intelligere is, in and 
of itself, an actus perfecti. Because it is the act of a temporal nature, so long as it is in act, 
it endures through time in act. As enduring in act simultaneously with the procession of 
the verbum mentis, intelligere thus governs the production of concepts.63 This intelligent 
governance of concepts founds their rationality, as I noted above. They emerge according 
                                                
59 Lonergan, Verbum, 114. See also Super IV Sententiarum, d. 49, q. 3, a. l sol. l, ob. 2; Summa 
theologiae, 1, q. 18, a. 3, ad 1m; 1-2, q. 31, a. 2, ad 1m; 3, q. 21, a. l, ad 3m; Super III Sententiarum, d. 31, 
q. 2, a. l sol. 2. 
60 De veritate, q. 4, a. 2 c.; q. 3, a. 2; q. 4, a. 2, ad 7m; Summa theologiae, l, q. 34, a. l, ad 3m. 
61 De potentia, q. 8, a. 1, c; q. 9, a. 5c.  
62 De veritate, q. 4, a. 2 c.; Summa theologiae, l, q. 34, a. l c. 
63 This simultaneity of an actus perfecti with what is produced from that act by processio operati 
will prove, when we finally return to consider the rationality of will as a rational appetite, integral to my 
account of the relationship between willing of ends and willing of means. It may also have relevance, when 
we turn to this governing function’s analogue in volitional consciousness, for Lonergan’s notion of a 
‘dynamic state,’ as he develops it later in his career. See Lonergan, Method in Theology, eds. Robert M. 
Doran, John D. Dadosky, CWL 14 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017),102 – 6, 112 – 118, and 
passim. For the reintroduction of this notion into the context of psychological analogy and Trinitarian 
theology, see “Christology Today: Methodological Reflections,” in A Third Collection, eds. Robert M. 
Doran, John D. Dadosky, CWL 16 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017), 91. 
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to a law, but also according to that which is the source of intelligible law. This 
governance of the concept by understanding also allows the concepts themselves to serve 
as agent objects in the intellectual process of deductive reasoning in a manner that is, by 
extension, likewise rational. Inference is rational not just when it proceeds according to 
logical rules, but when it proceeds according to the autonomy of the intellectual operation 
from which intelligible law issues.  
If the production of the concept, however, is considered only in terms of 
metaphysical mechanics, a point of central importance will be lost. When considered only 
in terms of the conditions of possible causal efficacy, it remains unclear why the 
procession of a verbum mentis should be likened unto the speaking (dicere) of a word at 
all. Where my emphasis on rationality as a process ultimately undergirds my claim that 
the modern problem is irreducibly diachronic, my contention that the procession of the 
verbum mentis is an act of meaning founds my claim that the modern problem of the 
supernatural is irreducibly hermeneutical. The following provides the psychological 
description and analysis of concept production on which that claim rests.  
As the coming-to-act of understanding is experienced, so too is the procession of 
the verbum mentis.64 Above we noted that intelligere is experienced immediately and 
synchronically. Still, this act is intentional and so it has an object, which is to say a 
content, an ‘about.’ This content or ‘about’ can be considered in its objective aspect and 
we can enunciate this consideration by the question, “what did I understand?” Nor is this 
question unfamiliar to the inquisitive, who having labored with the phantasm and the 
tension of inquiry, who perhaps basked briefly in the relief of tension provided by insight, 
                                                
64 “Meaning is experienced.” Gendlin, Experiencing, 44.  
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and yet who may recall the momentary terror that accompanies putting this question to 
one’s self or having it put to one by a teacher or colleague. This is a dramatic moment in 
intellectual process, for the flash of insight can, if neglected, fade into obscurity and its 
content can be ‘lost.’ What did you understand? “Ah, damn, I lost it. I can no longer 
remember.” Fortunately, this question has an answer. The ‘about’ of our insights can be 
formulated, can be expressed both to ourselves and to others.65 
This question, though it verbally resembles a question for understanding (quid 
est?), is in fact a question for recognition and recollection. It cannot be a question for 
understanding, since what it asks after is already understood. Rather, it anticipates and 
directs attention to something in consciousness that is a) distinct and distinguishable 
among the various elements in the flow of conscious experience, b) is both intelligible 
and expressive of conscious intelligence, and c) is available for further reasoning and 
intellectual procedure. In brief, it is a question ordered to consciousness of the verbum 
mentis. The concept, then, is both distinguishable from the act of insight, but it is also 
distinguishable in experience from the immediacy of that act. Indeed, the concept made 
distinct distinguishes the understood from the understanding, but nonetheless 
distinguishes it as understood. If I am attentive to that I have understood, the concept 
selects what I have understood. In this way, the concept is significant in consciousness. It 
both carries and refers to the content of intelligere. It is, in other words, the product of an 
act of meaning. This meaning, because it means what is both intelligible and intelligent 
(i.e. the substance of intellect in act), does not have the extrinsic significance of the 
                                                
65 My analysis here owes much to Gendlin’s Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning, 
especially on the role of and function of symbols in making felt-meanings distinct and available for an on-
going process of inquiry. See Gendlin, Experiencing, 90–137. See also my “Insight is a Body-Feeling: 
Experiencing Our Understanding,” The Heythrop Journal vol. 57, no. 3 (May 2016): 461–472. 
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material sign, which signifies, refers to, and carries meaning by convention. Rather, it is 
the primitive and basic form of meaning. It is important not to miss that the basic 
rationality of the concept consists in a mediation of meaning.  
The above only considers the production of the concept as distinct, as generative 
of distinctness, and as an expression of intelligence. This act of meaning that produces 
the concept, the procession of the verbum mentis is primarily and substantially 
intellectual. But it is at the same time an integrally imaginal, phantasmatic construction. 
If it were not, the concept could not play a role in any ongoing intellectual procedure. It 
could not enter into any process of logical inference. It could not contribute to the 
generation and derivation of a scientia. For we do not stop with the sense that we might 
‘really have it,’ nor even with the enunciation of what it is we have in answer to our 
questions. No, the work of intellect continues. We wonder, for example, whether what we 
have understood in the phantasms is correct, i.e. whether it is adequate as an answer to 
our question(s) and whether that adequacy owes to the truth. Where we considered 
inquiry as asking quid sit? now we recall how we also ask an sit? The apprehension of 
sufficient evidence, the grasp of the virtually unconditioned in which true judgment 
consist is itself an operation of the intellect, brought about by the composition of the 
phantasmatic element of the evidence and the phantasmatic expression of understanding 
that is the concept under the light of agent intellect.66 This reflective intelligere also 
issues in a verbum mentis, only it has the much simpler character of an affirmative or 
negative declaration: yes or no, true or false. Moreover, where we judge our 
understandings correct and so true, we wonder further: what broader significance does 
                                                
66 Lonergan, Verbum, 71–78; see also Insight: a Study of Human Understanding, eds. Frederick E. 
Crowe and Robert M. Doran, CWL 3 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 296–340. 
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this knowledge have? Where does it fit within what else I have come to know and, 
heuristically, what I hope to discover through further inquiry. Such is the role of concepts 
in the generation of a science, not through the automatic derivation of implications by the 
mechanical application of rules, but by yet-more-inquiry and yet-more-understanding. 
Why can the concept play such a role, mediating meaningfully between some 
initial act of intelligere and subsequent reflective inquiry or derivation of a science? The 
answer lies in the originating act of all intellectual procedure: advertence to phantasm, the 
illumination of the agent intellect, and the grasp of intelligibility in images. The verbum 
mentis expresses what understanding apprehends in a mode suitable for its role in the 
ongoing process of inquiry. But this mode is, broadly speaking, phantasmatic. The 
concept is, in addition to being intelligible and an expression of intelligence, also an 
immanent intellectual image, for our reasoning depends essentially on the sensible or 
imaginable. It functions on some loose analogy with the diagram, providing a mental 
object “in which the intelligible species shines forth as an exemplar(.)”67 But some 
images are more suitable to showing forth their intelligibility than others. As any student 
can attest, many supposedly intellectual images are too ambiguous, able to be interpreted 
in too many differing respects. And so the concept is a properly intellectual image, 
specially constructed to convey immanently the substance of the understanding it 
expresses and only the substance of the understanding it expresses. It is precisely in this 
respect that intelligere as actus perfecti governs the production of concepts: it accrues 
only those phantasmatic elements strictly relevant to the intelligible species expressed 
thereby. Still, where the quiddity apprehended is unitary, the phantasmatic is analogous 
                                                
67 Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 73, sect. 38 
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to the material, and so is multiple. Thus, the concept is a construction, both of the 
intelligible with the phantasmatic, but also of available, relevant phantasmatic materials. 
The concept can make present the intelligible species distinctly and in accord with the 
fact what is known no longer needs to be discovered by fresh insight, but only recognized 
or recalled habitually. The intelligible species so recalled, we may proceed to further 
inquire about, to verify, to synthesize into a science what we know by insight into 
phantasms. Without the constructed verba, we would understand in the immediate flash 
of apprehension but could not reason from our understanding, could not verify the 
correctness of our insights, and so could not develop our knowledge unto a science. What 
we have understood would not be available to us to recall or to be carried into our 
reasoning processes.  
Even though the verbum mentis has an imaginal quality to it, it is not, in 
Lonergan’s language, just some “impoverished replica” of the thing understood.68 It need 
not resemble the properties of what is understood, as the word fire is neither hot nor 
bright, but only allow us to recall what we have understood about what is hot and bright, 
and why it is so. Again, one may try, through words that are neither hot nor bright 
themselves, to evoke the heat and light of a flame, but the definition of combustion will 
eschew such descriptions. The search for essential definition that gives rise to concepts 
does not want to know what fire is like, but why combustion is itself. Anything irrelevant 
to expressing our understanding of the essence of combustion is excluded from the 
definition. Now, this verbal parsimony is an effect of the prior parsimony of autonomous 
intellectual process. What the verbum mentis carries forward from an act of 
                                                
68 Lonergan, Insight, 111–2: “So far from being a mere impoverishment of the data of sense, 
abstraction in all its essential moments is enriching. Its first moment is an enriching anticipation of an 
intelligibility to be added to sensible presentations: there is something to be known by insight.” 
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understanding expresses what was apprehended intellectually and only what was 
apprehended intellectually. If one knows the essential definition of a circle (to return 
again to the role of diagrams in mathematics) one can see the uniformity of a plane curve 
and also apprehend the necessity that its radii be equal. But only the uniformity can be 
seen. The necessity is known by an act of understanding, not an act of perception. 
Consequently, the definition of a circle includes equality of radii and neglects to mention 
the uniformity of the curve produced thereby. In this way, the abstractness of concepts 
does not impoverish the rich experience of concrete objects, because concepts do not aim 
to provide a degraded picture of absent things. Instead, concepts inject into the flow of 
experience the fruits of intellectual apprehension and so enrich the field of consciousness 
with rationally constructed objects. Moreover, by expressing intelligence in act with a 
basic and essential rationality, concepts link together acts of intelligere into the derived 
intellectual processes in which both logical inference and scientific elaboration consist.  
3.3 The Rationality of the Will 
If the foregoing has, in its detail and preliminary nature, tried my reader’s 
patience, perhaps allow me to set down the main point of the above: human rationality 
consists in an autonomous intellectual process integrally mediated by meaning and 
productive of constructed verba or concepts. Human rationality, because it consists in a 
process, is irreducibly diachronic. Because the process is intellectual and not merely 
intelligible, it is neither mechanical nor automatic, but rather autonomous. Because the 
nature of intellectual act consists in the immediate and so indistinct apprehension of form, 
intellectual process is mediated by some distinct expression of what has been 
apprehended. The expression of these mediating objects (verba or concepts) is 
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consequently an act of meaning. Finally, because subsequent acts of understanding have 
the same nature as preceding acts—that is, they have quidditas rei materialis for their 
agent object—the mediating objects of human rationality bear, in addition to their 
intelligible content, some phantasmatic element. This allows them to be properly 
disposed as agent object for subsequent intellectual acts, including the acts of true 
judgment in which knowledge of being consists. But the intelligent combination of 
diverse elements into a unity is a construction, a factum. In conceptualization, then, we 
may see how rationality, autonomy, mediation, poiesis, and knowledge function 
integrally.  
Our central preoccupation remains. In what way is the will a rational appetite and 
how does this rationality ground the liberty of human action? How does rationality as 
conceived above modify the tending in which the movement of the will consists and the 
actions follow from it?  
Thomas repeatedly affirms that the operation of the will proceeds from a word in 
the intellect.69 Thus, in addition to reflective insight into the verity of the understanding 
expressed by our concepts and the assemblage of a scientia from the systematization of 
our true understandings, we may append ‘willing’ to the list of subsequent operations for 
which a verbum mentis would serve as agent object. It is tempting to skip to the end of 
our inquiry and affirm that the will is a rational appetite with the borrowed, basic 
rationality of the concept. Thus, acts of the will would be considered free according to the 
borrowed autonomy of the intellectual process that gave rise to them. And this is true as 
                                                
69 See Lonergan, Verbum 109, n. 20. See also Super I Sententiarum, d. 11, q. l, a. 1, ad 4m; d. 27, 
q. 2, a. l sol.; In III De anima, lect. 4, §§634-3; Summa contra Gentiles, 4, c. 24, §12; ibid. 4, c. 19, §8; De 
potentia, q. 9, a. 9, ad 3m; q. 10, a. 2 c.; ad 4m; ad 7m; a. 4c.; a. 5 c.; Summa theologiae, 1, q. 27, a. 3, ad 
3m; q. 36, a. 2 c. 
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far as it goes. What remains opaque is whether a remote and borrowed rationality (and so 
autonomy) is sufficient to render the tending in which our rational appetite consists both 
rational and free.  
A genuine, albeit preliminary advance is made by recognizing that a certain 
freedom is bestowed on our rational appetite by the concept from which its operation 
follows. The concept has been generated by an autonomous intellectual process, and so, 
as object of the act of willing, it is willed in accord with the autonomous principle on 
which it depends. This includes both the autonomy of the agent intellect at work in the 
process of reasoning over the phantasms and the autonomy of construction or poiesis at 
work in the expression of what is understood through the compound of its intelligible 
species and the phantasmatic element to which it is joined. But the will is essentially 
ordered to the summum bonum, and so is itself generative of the intelligible ‘ought’ 
pertaining to willing any particular good. Thus, we anticipate an autonomy proper to the 
will itself.  
Since the concept is the agent object of the will in act, we may ask whether there 
are conditions for the application of the concept to the will.70 Because the human being is 
inherently temporal, there must be some application of the agent object of even spiritual 
acts to the matter of its potentially operated effect. Thus, as with the processio 
operationis of intelligere in the intellect, there is a preparatory disposition of both the 
power and of the object.71 The will, then, disposes itself to the good immanent in the 
phantasmatic element in the concept by its essential tending towards the good in general, 
                                                
70 See Lonergan, “God’s Knowledge and Will,” 321.  
71 “…the act of love with respect to an end is, as proceeding from the will, 'processio 
operationis.'” Lonergan, Verbum, 148. 
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but more specifically and concretely by its antecedent habits. Still even more concretely, 
I would suggest that the will also disposes itself towards particular verified concepts in a 
manner analogous to reflective inquiry and that can also be expressed in a question: ought 
this be? Perhaps the concept, constructed with an eye towards verification, is also well 
disposed towards the evaluative function of the will, but then perhaps not. In either case, 
we may say that the concept itself must be brought into proper disposition to the will by a 
felicitous (re-)construction, coordinating its phantasmatic and valuative aspects. The 
concept, in other words, must be rendered meaningful in an evaluative and not just 
intellectual sense.72 These prior dispositive conditions having been met, then, the good 
incipiently apprehended in the verified concept may bring the will to act such that an act 
of velle emerges in the will. Thus, for Lonergan, “as proceeding from the inner word, [the 
act of love is] 'processio operati.'”73 
From another angle, though, velle is disanalogous to the act of understanding from 
which a concept proceeds. Considered not as the term of a process of something like 
inquiry, and so as the term of an actus imperfecti, but instead considered as an operative 
operation of the will, and so as an actus perfecti in itself, an act of willing is more 
properly analogized to the reflective intelligere from which a judgment of fact 
proceeds.74 The reflective act of intellect consists in an apprehension that is expressed by 
a verbum as well, i.e. by an affirmative ‘yes’ or a negative ‘no’ with regard to the concept 
whose content it borrows. This affirmative act and expression, then, are the knowing in 
                                                
72 “…there can be a twofold apprehension, either of the simple truth or of the truth as it is 
expanded to take in the good and the fitting–and this latter is perfect apprehension.” Super I Sententiarum, 
d. 27, q. 2, a. l sol. 
73 Lonergan, Verbum, 148. 
74 See n. 68 above.  
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which cognitional process properly terminates. The reflective act, as actus perfecti, 
endures through time to govern subsequent intellectual procedure in accord with what is 
actively known and contemplated. By analogy to the affirmative act of the intellect in a 
judgment of fact, the act of willing is an actus perfecti that a) endures through time and 
governs subsequent volitional procedures, b) has a borrowed content in what is meant by 
the concept it ‘affirms’ or ‘negates,’ and c) is basically polar in its response, consisting in 
an unqualified ‘affirmation,’ a total ‘negation,’ or a spectrally delimited state of intensity 
tending towards one or the other.  
Velle is further analogous to a judgment of fact insofar as the movement, the 
tending in which appetite and aversion consist are mediated by an uttered ‘yes’ and ‘no.’ 
In other words, willing in act and as expressed in a judgment of value is analogous to 
reflective intelligere in act and expressed in a judgment of fact. Still, it is only analogous, 
for the affirmative act and expression of the will in act is also a motive, a proximate, 
proper, and rational principle of movement. A judgment of fact may occasion further 
intellectual procedure, but only extrinsically and per accidens. Willing in act and 
expressed in a judgment of value, by contrast, is the per se cause of some movement. In 
turn, the good immanent in the concept is in general the agent object of willing in act, but 
thereby also a mobile, a rationally-generated “object-for-which” of a movement.75  
A number of problems present themselves at this point. Is the borrowed autonomy 
of the concept, or even the proper autonomy of the judgment of value’s ‘ought’ adequate 
                                                
75 Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics, trans. Michael G. Shields, eds. Robert M. Doran and 
H. Daniel Monsour, CWL 12 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 673: “Therefore, the essential 
notion of will consists in this, that it is an inclination	that follows the intellect, so that it not only wills the 
object presented to it by the intellect but also wills it on account of the motive or end for which the intellect 
judges that the object ought to be willed.” On the function of mobiles and motives in the emergence of 
action in consciousness, see Blondel, Action (1893), 112–9.  
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to render the movement following from velle a free act? If the knowledge expressed in 
the verified concept is of what is, then is the action that follows from an act of the will 
and a judgment of value superfluous? If the good apprehended in a judgment of value is, 
what could need to be done?  
What is the movement that manifests the will in act? As knowledge is not a single 
intellectual act, but a compound of acts in an intellectual process, neither is willing a 
single movement, but a compound of movements in a volitional process. First from the 
actus perfecti of the will’s operation there proceeds the affirmative or negative utterance 
of the judgment of value. By the mediation of this affirmative or negative word, the actus 
imperfecti of deliberation about means to the willed good proceeds, which is itself unto 
the actus perfecti of willing the selected means, unto the final practical judgment, which 
is in turn unto the further actus imperfecti by which the whole person labors to realize his 
or her intention.76 Let us consider these in more detail. The object of velle’s motivation is 
some being-conceived apprehended according to its being-valuable, being-good. This 
apprehension, as I said, is manifest in a mediating word and motivated movement taking 
responsibility for the being of such a being-conceived and being-valued according to the 
autonomous ‘ought’ generated by the will in act (understood on analogy with the being-
in-act of intelligible law generated by intelligere).77 This movement from the operation of 
the will mediated by the judgment of value is first to the discernment of means and it is 
governed by the actus perfecti of willing the good and mediated by a judgment of value. 
                                                
76 See Summa theologiae 1, q. 19, a. 4: “for the inclination to put in act what has been conceived 
by the intellect pertains to the will.”  
77 Conversely, the will, its proper disposition in the form of habit, and the act of willing the end are 
prior conditions for the emergence of an act of willing the means. See Lonergan, “God’s Knowledge and 
Will,” 317.  
   
 
220 
Under the government of this enduring operation and through the judgment of value’s 
mediating verbum, a subordinate intellectual process hypothetically constructs means that 
would be both effective and feasible. Alternative means must be evaluated, but this 
process of evaluation also proceeds under the enduring governance of the original act of 
willing. This process applies the good apprehended and affirmed, as well as its borrowed 
intellectual content, to the deliberative process, but also places it under the dual 
autonomy of intellectual process and of the will’s ‘ought’.  
This deliberative process, when considered intellectually, can go on indefinitely. 
There can be no apodictic argument that concludes it with certainty. Any apodictic 
argument would require affirmation of the fulfilled conditions that would render the 
hypothetical relation between means and the end virtually unconditioned.78 However, 
among the necessary conditions, so long as deliberation continues, one remains 
necessarily unfulfilled: a decision to enact the means motivated by the end intended. 
What fulfills this condition, allowing the practical project to go forward? Initially, it is the 
will-in-act moving itself to terminate the process of deliberation and utter a final practical 
judgment as to the selected means. This willing of means is, of course, also a velle and so 
an actus perfecti. Accordingly, it manifests its affirmation first in an uttered ‘yes’ that 
communicates the motivation mobilized by a conceptualized good. In this case, the good 
conceived consists in those means good for realizing what ought to be. Again, this 
decision is not just a notional ‘yes,’ but also a motivated movement. Once means have 
been selected to an end intended, there remains only to decide, “yes, I will act,” and so to 
go forth into matter, and to shepherd into being what ought to be. The compound actus 
                                                
78 For the notion of the virtually unconditioned grasped by a judgment of fact, see Lonergan, 
Insight, 305–6. 
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perfecti of willing the means to the end intended endures through time, governing the 
actus imperfecti by which the entire embodied person moves to bring about the good as 
an existing effect. But to will this compound of volitional acts in an ordered series is to 
will not only that order, but also the principle of order for its own sake as value, the 
terminal object of willing’s ‘ought’.79  
It is a point of philosophical doctrine that this complete, compound movement of 
the will is free. But is it only free because it borrows the autonomy of the concept on 
which it follows? Or is it free ultimately free because of the autonomy of the ‘ought’ the 
will in act generates? The freedom of the complete, compound act of the will is likewise 
complete only in a compound of elements, and so not reducible to a single element. It is 
true that the complete compound act of the will is free with the borrowed freedom of 
rationality’s basic autonomy and the proper freedom of velle’s ‘ought’. But this is to say 
that the will is free insofar as acts of human willing are materially and formally 
constituted by meaning. They are materially constituted by meaning insofar as the 
deliberative process generates its hypothetical means through an intellectual process both 
autonomously generative of constructed, phantasmatic expressions of intellect in act and 
governed by the autonomy of velle’s ‘ought’. Human acts of willing are formally 
constituted by meaning insofar as the process of deliberation is governed by and issues 
from willing brought to act and specified by the good meant in an autonomously 
                                                
79 “For the will is such that it not only desires good ordered in an intelligible way but also desires 
it because of the principle of that order, that is, the end–in other words, it desires value.” Lonergan, The 
Triune God: Systematics, 674. 
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constructed expression of intellect in act. In other words, the very substance of the act of 
willing and so the autonomy of its determinate ‘ought’ is a meaning.80 
The borrowed and originating autonomy of human acts of willing is matched by a 
formal freedom pertaining to the will as operated by itself. Complete and compound acts 
of the will are formally free in two ways. First, there is the freedom of specification. The 
means selected are not necessary on the supposition of anything else. Thus, the selection 
of means in light of this indeterminacy reveals an integral liberty of the will to specify for 
itself the concretization of its own efficacy. Second, there is the freedom of exercise. 
Because the means selected are not selected as the term of an apodictic argument, in 
order for the volitional procedure issuing in a free action to be rational, the will must 
move itself both to the termination of the deliberative process of discerning and 
evaluating means and also to settling upon a practical judgment and a course of action. In 
brief, the complete compound act of the will is free insofar as it includes the decision to 
act or not, and this decision constitutes the outstanding condition on which the action as a 
contingent effect depends.81  
The foregoing has been haunted by an aporia. Does the gnoseological affirmation 
of being in the verified concept, from which an originating act of willing the end may 
                                                
80 This is an elaboration of what I take Lonergan to mean by the ‘virtually’ free act of the will. 
Now, Lonergan means that willing the end is virtually free on the supposition that it produces a formally 
free act of the will. Willing the end, no matter how rationally, cannot be that in which freedom of the will 
per se consists because it is not an act whereby the will moves itself, but in which the will is moved by its 
agent object, the good as immanent in a word. For Lonergan’s distinction between formally and virtually 
free acts of the will, see Lonergan, “God’s Knowledge and Will,” 327. See also Lonergan, Grace and 
Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas, eds. Frederick E. Crowe, Robert M. 
Doran, CWL 1 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), 96–8, 318–21. 
81 “In the exercise of a formally free act, a person is the cause per se, inasmuch as having willed 
the end and deliberated on the basis of this willing of the end, one now moves oneself to willing the means 
to the end… In the specification of this same formally free act, a person is the cause per se inasmuch as by 
willing the end one wills this particular practical judgment to be the final one in accordance with which one 
moves to will the good presented by that judgment.” Lonergan, “God’s Knowledge and Will,” 329. 
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follow, render the action manifesting that act superfluous? For what is willed as an end is 
the good known in a word, immanent in a concept. But what is good by reason of itself is 
a whole and a unity. It is intelligible, complete, and existing, for the good is concrete.82 
The good known in a word, immanent in a concept, can be at most whole, unitary, and 
intelligible. It might even be virtually complete, insofar as the more perfect the act of 
intelligere from which the word proceeds, the more the good known therein will 
approach perfection. But the good known in a word merely as known in a word cannot be 
existing, nor really complete. And if it were, no practical means could prove needful, nor 
any actus imperfecti going forth in matter would be required to realize our volitional 
intentions. We might say, therefore, that the will ‘knows’ the good in a word ‘spoken’ in 
the subjunctive mood. Indeed, precisely because it is uttered in the subjunctive mood, it 
can be willed as the end of a volitional process that contains and, moreover, terminates in 
the actus imperfecti of a practical project.  
A distinction is called for, then, between the ‘ought’ of what is and the ‘ought’ of 
what is not. Admittedly, I have in the foregoing been eliding this needful distinction to 
underline the distinct autonomy proper to the operation of the will. I have, in other words, 
been focusing on the productive element in the will. But we began from the concept 
affirmed in the judgment of fact and it is in the reflective ‘yes’ that being is known as a 
matter of fact. Such verba are not uttered in the subjunctive mood, but in the declarative. 
The convertibility of the transcendentals constrains us to say that the will might come to 
act with regard to the goodness coterminously present in such a word so uttered. But if 
the ‘ought’ that issues from the will in act pertains to that which already is, has this 
                                                
82 Ibid., 299: “That which is good by reason of itself is an existing whole, that is, one, intelligible, 
complete, and existing.” 
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willing become superfluous or even futile on my model of the rational appetite? Not at 
all. We need only distinguish the desire to realize some end in accord with the will’s 
‘ought’ from the love one may have for some reality that similarly accords with the will’s 
‘ought.’ For there is no contradiction or futility in recognizing that what ought to be in 
fact is.  
Of course, this resolves only the objective difficulty. The subjective question 
remains: is willing an already extant end manifest in the same manner as willing an end 
desired? Does love show itself immediately in a movement? And if the movement is to 
that which is and is precisely as in possession of its prior conditions, then is not this 
manifesting movement superfluous or futile? But the Thomist definition of love includes 
a hint to this conundrum. Love, on this view, is to will good to something. There is now 
not just the intentional object of love in the uttered word, the expressed concept, but there 
is also the substantial object of love to which the lover may be really related. Thus the 
originating movement of the will is analogous in the way detailed above to a judgment 
that, as a matter of fact, this extant being is good and to value its being, to recognize that 
it ought to be. Thus, the immanent actus imperfecti that follows from and is governed by 
the will’s originating actus perfecti is not the hypothetical construction of means that 
would fulfill the end’s prerequisite conditions, but rather a kind of commitment, a stirring 
to readiness to serve and support, to contribute to and participate in, to cooperate with 
(insofar as I am able) the continued being of this being that ought to be.83 Human loving 
                                                
83 This is an elaboration of what I take Lonergan to mean when he speaks of love as by nature 
uniting the mind affectively to the object loved. See Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics, 679: “Second, 
it may seem as if the procession of	Love,	like the procession of the Word, is also a generation, since in both 
cases God proceeds from God. But against this is the fact that it is of the nature of generation that there not 
only proceeds that which is similar in nature [to its principle], but also that that which proceeds is similar 
by reason of the procession itself. Now, by its very nature the procession of an inner word is such that what 
is conceived in the word is the very same thing as what is understood by the intellect. But by its very nature 
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is, in this way, a state of waiting-on the beloved, both in the sense of an attentive 
preparedness and in the sense of an other-oriented service. In this way, by love one wills 
a being’s own goodness to it as both object-which is loved and the object-to-which the 
good is willed in love. We might say that such love, insofar as it is in accord with the 
autonomy of the will’s ‘ought’, ratifies the being of a being insofar as it is good.84  
2.3 Some Conclusions About Free Human Actions 
Human actions are free with a human freedom. It is a freedom to act or not to act. 
It is a freedom to determine which of a multiplicity of feasible means will determine 
one’s course of action. It is, in this regard, a freedom of independence. It is also a 
freedom governed by velle’s ‘ought,’ a law it properly produces for itself. Further, it is a 
freedom that proceeds rationally in accord with a borrowed intellectual law. Human 
freedom, in this regard, is a freedom of autonomy. This freedom proceeds both as 
processio operationis and processio operati, for verba produce the exercise of freedom as 
an operation in the will, but also as a product that above I have called “action-as-effect.”  
This has a perhaps startling implication. Where we found human knowledge 
mediated by meaning through the integral process of conceptualization, we here find free 
human actions at once mediated by, but also fundamentally constituted by meaning. The 
key here is the subjunctive mood in which the verba initiating volitional process are 
‘uttered’ (dicere) in a judgment of value. These verba serve a mediating function in the 
                                                                                                                                            
the procession of love is such that it does not reproduce its object in the mind but rather that the mind joins 
and unites itself affectively with the object loved.” See also ibid., 675. 
84 Of course, God does not will to produce creatures out of a desire predicated on a lack, but rather 
out of love, so that God’s love for us causes us to be. See Lonergan, “God’s Knowledge and Will,” 313. 
See also Frederick E. Crowe, “Complacency and Concern in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas,” 
Theological Studies 20 (1959), 1–39, 198–230, 343–395; David Burrell, Aquinas: God and Action, 3rd ed. 
(Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2016), 137–140. 
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exercise of human freedom, mediating between good apprehended and the deliberation 
about means, between the course of action as intelligently conceived and as substantially 
pursued. The verba, however, also serve a constitutive function. They are the agent object 
of volitional process. They govern and so order the series of acts in which the process 
consists. But what intelligibly orders a multiplicity into an identifiable whole (“this 
action”) is the formal cause of that whole.  
Finally, the substantial practical project that proceeds from a complete volitional 
process is governed by and so ordered to this meaning-constituted intention expressed by 
the verba. They function, then, as the essential telos of that project’s being-towards 
essence, its actus imperfecti. We may say, for example, that while fire depends as a 
natural effect on intelligible causal pre-conditions to come to act, the free human action 
called “arson” depends on a meaningful decision to come to act and so into being. In 
other words, arson is arson because of what the action-as-effect means. Human actions, 
then, are independent and autonomous, and so recognizably free. What I have labored to 
reveal above is the manner in which human actions are both mediated, but also formally 
constituted by meanings and that these meanings emerge poetically no less than 
autonomously. Human actions are carried rationally from motivation to reality by the 
mediating affirmations or negations uttered in judgments of value. But prior to this, they 
are founded upon the compound constructions of intellect and imagination that we affirm 
in judgments of fact and that express our insights into our experience. These 
constructions express a meant and express it rationally. Thus, insofar as the will is a 
rational appetite, the constitutive function of meaning in human actions is as integral to 
their freedom as conceptualization and rationality is to knowledge. 
   
 
227 
4. Articulating the Modern Problem of the Supernatural 
At long last, the elements are assembled to articulate the modern problem of the 
supernatural adequately. Heretofore I have expressed the modern problem by the question 
“what is God doing in free human action?” We have explored according to the logical 
techniques of metaphysics and the phenomenological techniques of psychological 
description both “what God is doing…” and “… free human action.” We saw that what 
God is doing is governing human action by creation, conservation, and application. God 
operates our free agency as an instrument of his will. But still this did not reveal to us 
what God is accomplishing by this governance. Perhaps, though, our analysis of free 
human action provided a created analogue for God’s uncreated free action? Could we not 
ask after God’s intended end and motivation for which he acts through our actions? But 
God’s end and motivation is His love for the divine goodness, which is in se ineffable 
and mysterious.85 Could we get somewhere by asking after God’s selected means to this 
transcendent end? We already know the answer to this question: our free actions—in 
concert with the order of the universe as a whole—are God’s selected means. All of this 
we have in other ways asked and answered before. The modern problem cannot be solved 
by metaphysical analysis.  
                                                
85 Lonergan, “God’s Knowledge and Will,” 309–11: “In God’s single act of willing, the sole 
motive, the sole intended end or end of the agent, is the divine goodness itself. We, of course, can will 
means to the end not only for the sake of the end but also for their own sake. So, for example, we will to 
take a sweet-tasting medicine both for the sake of our health and also for its pleasant taste. This is possible 
because the goodness of the means adds to the goodness of the end. But divine goodness is the absolute 
good, and all other good things are good through participation in this absolute good. Since, therefore, 
divine goodness is the source of all other goodness, no other good can add any goodness to it, and since no 
other goodness adds to divine goodness, it is quite impossible that another goodness could provide any 
other motive whatsoever over and above the divine goodness itself.” See also Summa theologiae 1, q. 19, a. 
2, ad 2m, 3m, 4m; a. 4, ad 3m; a. 5 c.; q. 20, a. 2 c. 
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Fortunately, our analysis of free human action has shaken loose an additional 
element: those meanings formally constitutive of our actions. The constitutive function of 
meaning in free human action calls out for a technique we have not yet deployed. 
Metaphysical analysis only tells us that the constituted acts are, are free, and are 
meaningful. Psychological description represents the experience of the various acts and 
their conscious qualities, sequences, etc. A technique specially suited for apprehending 
meanings immanent in the material artifacts of poetical process is needed. Human actions 
go forth in matter, marking the material with our intentions. Moreover, human actions are 
constituted by meaning such that their effects are rendered compounds of the 
intelligibility meant by the action and the materiality in which it is expressed. Finally, 
because human acts are not just formally, but also, so to speak, existentially constituted 
by meaning, the entire field of human action and its effects is by extension produced by 
the constitutive function of those meanings. The field of the meaningful cannot be 
reduced to pure intelligibility, for that would sacrifice the very rationality on which 
theory depends. Nor can it be reduced to the material, for in the field of free human 
action, there are no purely material acts.86  
Still, the totality of human action is not synthesized into a single project. There 
exists no kingdom of ends.87 It is, rather, aggregated into enterprises at various scales and 
of various kinds. These enterprises at once give rise to and are founded upon common 
funds of meaning and value. But a community fund of meanings and values for an 
                                                
86 See for example Paul Ricoeur, “Ideology and Utopia,” in From Text to Action: Essays in 
Hermeneutics II, trans. Kathleen Blamey, John B. Thompson (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University 
Press), 300–16. 
87 On a “kingdom of ends,” see Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, eds. 
Mary Gregory and Jens Timmermann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 41–46.  
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aggregate of persons is a culture.88 As the practical projects of any one person are never 
hatched entirely de novo, but emerge in accord with available experiences, ideas, and on-
going enterprises, so that person’s actions arise in an intelligible nexus of these. Thus, 
free human actions are at once principally constitutive of cultures and also materially 
constituted by culture.   
Whether in regard to my own actions, those of another person, or the aggregate 
whole of the human community, in order to answer the question that expresses the 
modern problem of the supernatural, “what is God doing in free human action?” there is 
required a theological hermeneutics of culture. This prospective technique is theological 
insofar as makes the quiddity of divine meaning in history the object of its investigation. 
It is a hermeneutical technique insofar as it aims, not at elucidating the conditions of the 
factual, nor describing the experience of the material, but interpreting the significance of 
the expressed, the meaningfully accomplished. Finally, it is ‘of culture’ in that it centers 
culture as the matter, the ‘text’ in which the cooperation of divine and human meaning 
immanently resides.   
                                                
88 “Besides the classicist, there also is the empirical notion of culture. It is the set of meanings and 
values that informs a way of life. It may remain unchanged for ages. It may be in process of slow 
development or rapid dissolution.” Lonergan, Method, 4. “More generally, human community is a matter of 
a common field of experience, a common mode of understanding, a common measure of judgment, and a 
common consent. Such community is the possibility, the source, the ground of common meaning; and it is 
this common meaning that is the form and act that finds expression in family and polity, in the legal and 
economic system, in customary morals and educational arrangements, in language and literature, art and 
religion, philosophy, science, and the writing of history. Still, community itself is not a necessity of nature 
but an achievement of man. Without a common field of experience people get out of touch. Without a 
common mode of understanding, there arise misunderstanding, distrust, suspicion, fear, hostility, factions. 
Without a common measure of judgment people live in different worlds. Without common consent they 
operate at cross-purposes. Then common meaning is replaced by different and opposed meanings. A 
cohesion that once seemed automatic has to be bolstered by the pressures, the threats, the force that secure 
a passing semblance of unity but may prepare a lasting resentment and a smoldering rebellion.” Lonergan, 
“Natural Right and Historical Mindedness,” in A Third Collection, eds. Robert M. Doran, John D. 
Dadosky, CWL 16 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017), 164–5. 
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Of course, matter is a principle of individuation. Cultures are, as expression of 
aggregate human communities, de facto multiple. At the same time, the divine concursus 
is universal. Thus, we alight upon that which makes this problem of interpreting divine 
meaning expressed in the concrete multiplicity of human cultures modern. The classical 
ideal of science, that would reduce the contingent to the necessary, suits a classical notion 
of culture. If there is one normative culture, then in human matters one could reduce the 
contingent variations (and ‘deficiencies’) to their necessary principles (or failures of their 
efficacy). But the products of human freedom are necessary only on the presupposition of 
themselves. They are contingent, and moreover contingent upon something which 
contingently moves itself to act. So too are the meanings that formally constitute 
freedom’s expression. As we have already seen, a metaphysical reduction will over and 
over again fail to gain traction on the part of the problem that is of the greatest 
consequence: meaning. 
The modern ideal of science, however, accords with our basic medieval 
commitment to God’s transcendent causality. Modern science in the broad sense speaks 
only of verified possibilities, eschewing the antique division of the cosmos into necessary 
and contingent.89 This, in turn, accords with the empirical notion of culture at the core of 
the problem here articulated. To ask what God is doing in free human action in this 
modern way—the only way that can get any traction—is to ask after the divine meaning 
expressed in every human culture in a field extending indefinitely through time and 
across geography. The technique proportionate to this problem—a theological 
hermeneutics of culture—cannot produce a synchronic theory to resolve, once and for all, 
                                                
89 See Bernard Lonergan, “Dimensions of Meaning,” in Collection, eds. Frederick E. Crowe, 
Robert M. Doran, CWL 4 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 232–45. 
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the modern problem as posed. Nor can it settle for a phenomenology of religious 
experience or the like. Rather, its task is irreducibly diachronic, going on as long as 
human history does. But it is a matter of fact that intelligence intends unity. How can this 
technique address the modern problem of the supernatural in a manner that gives rise to 
more than a mere catalogue of differences? In the subsequent, fifth, and final chapter, I 
briefly suggest how, by reflecting upon its own unfolding procedure, a theological 
hermeneutics of culture might generate and refine a method that will order the series of 
scholarly acts in which any effort to address the modern problem will recurrently consist.  
4. Conclusion 
Perhaps it is clearer now why I gave such short shrift to the more obvious, 
putatively modern form of the problem of the supernatural, the question of the natural 
desire to know God. That specific metaphysical problem and the medieval, metaphysical 
solutions put forward to address it can do no more than restate the genuinely modern 
problem of the supernatural. How are we to discern what God is up to in free human 
action and in its cultural and historical products? Indeed, we pushed the metaphysical 
restatements of this question as far as far as they would go. We considered divine 
governance of human action and found that our question remained. We considered the 
nature of those free acts of the will on which free human actions rest and we considered 
too the rationality on which volitional acts rest. We found again that the question 
remained. What is God doing in free human actions?  
Pushing these restatements, however, was not an act of stubborn futility, nor a 
reductio ad absurdum. It revealed within the metaphysical efforts to address the problems 
of the supernatural, of God’s ad extra agency in free human action, a residue of a higher 
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problem. This residue we found in the function of meaning within the rational and 
volitional processes on which free human action rests. Because meaning has an integral, 
mediating, and constitutive function in the prerequisite processes of free human action, 
we can now see how I made good on my promise to demonstrate that the modern 
problem of the supernatural is diachronic and hermeneutical. Moreover, we were able to 
discern on the basis of this diachronic hermeneutical residue some determinations by 
which to anticipate the solution to the modern problem. A diachronic and hermeneutical 
problem calls out for a diachronic and hermeneutical solution. So I proposed a 
theological hermeneutics of culture that is irreducible to either metaphysical analysis or 
phenomenological description and that in fact must consist in the on-going, cumulative, 
progressive, and critical application of a technique, which is to say of a method. It is to a 
brief sketch of that method’s criteria for adequacy that we turn in the next, indeed final 
chapter.  
 
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
Up to now we have accumulated a number of problems, distinctions, theorems, 
solutions, mentalities, ambiguities, and techniques. As I bring this study to a close, it is 
time to review these and how they coalesce to complete my constructive proposal. There 
are two problems of the supernatural and the modern diachronic and hermeneutical 
problem is irreducible to the medieval metaphysical problem. Moreover, whether these 
problems would be resolved by recourse to a negative or a positive solution depends on 
how one responds to the ambiguities of being, i.e. what pre-philosophical posture of 
human freedom one takes before the problems themselves. Thomas Aquinas’s solution to 
the medieval problem rests upon the decision to construe the world as fundamentally 
susceptible to explanation. Blondel and Sartre showed us two ways in which the modern 
philosophical mentality helped to make this decision explicit rather than tacit. The 
irreducibility of the modern problem to the medieval solution rested as well on a 
commitment to the complete explicability of being, but viewed through the lens of 
Thomas’s affirmation of universal cooperation. From this vantage, we see that 
interpreting “what God is doing in human action” requires explaining all of the data on 
God’s work in history. Moreover, we saw that, because human action is formally 
constituted by meaning, the data on God’s work in history will be data on the meaningful 
products of human agency. To this end, I suggested the development of a theological 
hermeneutics of culture that would investigate what human action has concretely meant 
in its cooperation with God. 





Admittedly, my notion of a theological hermeneutics of culture amounts to no 
more than a heuristic indication of the technique required. We distinguished the modern 
problem from the medieval problem and solution on the grounds that the former must be 
diachronic and hermeneutical, but the latter is synchronic and theoretical. But there are 
many theologies, many hermeneutics, and many cultures. Consequently, these basic 
determinations are not of themselves adequate as criteria for the technique by which to 
address the modern problem of the supernatural. Some further determinations are needed 
to guide in the development of this technique from anticipation to reality. In other words, 
a more developed heuristic is needful. After a brief review of the ground already covered, 
developing such a heuristic will be our task in this short final chapter. My controlling 
image for this heuristic consists in three Cartesian planes, intersecting as a Y-, an X-, and 
a Z-axis. Along the Y-axis one would plot theories of transcendence. Along the X-axis, 
one would plot differences of traditional/cultural context. Along the Z-axis one would 
plot axiologial transformations of intellectual, moral, religious, and theological 
authenticity and so the dynamics of what Lonergan has called progress, decline, and 
redemption.1  
                                                
1 Lonergan explains these “differentials” with an analogy from Newton’s planetary theory: “It was 
about 1937-38 that I became interested in a theoretical analysis of history. I worked out an analysis on the 
model of a threefold approximation. Newton's planetary theory had a first approximation in the first law of 
motion: bodies move in a straight line with constant velocity unless some force intervenes. There was a 
second approximation when the addition of the law of gravity between the sun and the planet yielded an 
elliptical orbit for the planet. A third approximation was reached when the influence of the gravity of the 
planets on one another is taken into account to reveal the perturbed ellipses in which the planets actually 
move. The point to this model is, of course, that in the intellectual construction of reality it is not any of the 
earlier stages of the construction but only the final product that actually exists. Planets do not move in 
straight lines nor in properly elliptical orbits; but these conceptions are needed to arrive at the perturbed 
ellipses in which they actually do move. In my rather theological analysis of human history, my first 
approximation was the assumption that men always do what is intelligent and reasonable, and its 
implication was an ever increasing progress. The second approximation was the radical inverse insight that 






The notion of a theological hermeneutics of culture addressed the subjective 
determinations of the modern problem, insofar as free human actions issue from a 
rational process that is mediated and constituted by meaning. These three axes serve to 
indicate and organize, we will see, the objective data to which a theological hermeneutics 
of culture will be applied. The scale of the task posed by integrating these three axes into 
the unity called for by understanding suggests that the development and application of 
this technique will have to be cooperative. Furthermore, the application of this technique 
will also have to be adaptive to the concreteness of its object. However, because the 
application of the technique will have to be cooperative and adaptive, but also because 
this cooperation and adaptation is to be effected by free human agents, there will be 
needed some reflection on the relative successes and failures of the technique and its 
application. Finally, the products of this reflection will need to be cooperatively and 
adaptively applied to the cumulative and progressive application of the technique to the 
data. Thus, the theological hermeneutics of culture will also need to be a critical, 
cooperative, and methodical theology. 
 The theology indicated by these heuristic determinations constitutes the only 
viable genre of response to the modern problem of the supernatural. Insofar as it is 
                                                                                                                                            
men can be biased, and so unintelligent and unreasonable in their choices and decisions. The third 
approximation was the redemptive process resulting from God's gift of his grace to individuals and from 
the manifestation of his love in Christ Jesus. The whole idea was presented in chapter twenty of Insight. 
The sundry forms of bias were presented in chapters six and seven on common sense. The notion of moral 
impotence, which I had studied in some detail when working on Aquinas' notion of gratia operans in my 
dissertation, was worked out in chapter eighteen on the possibility of ethics” Lonergan, “Insight Revisited,” 
in A Second Collection, eds. Robert M. Doran and John D. Dadosky (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2016), 228–9. 





critical, it can be at home in the modern philosophical mentality and its demand for via 
inventionis validation. Insofar as it is adaptive and methodical, it is open in principle to 
scholarly reflection upon any and every culture. The nature of my integrating “Cartesian” 
scheme does not just allow for, but positively calls for the scholarly coordination of 
inquiries into multiple traditions/cultures insofar as they generate reflections on what God 
has done (and is doing) in history. This is true on the side of the object(s) under scholarly 
investigation, but it is also true on the side of the theologizing subject. Dealing with the 
data that raise the modern problem of the supernatural on the modern problem’s terms 
poses a theological task that, even if we could freeze time and turn off the tap of history, 
fairly drowns the scholarly imagination. Thus, the theological hermeneutics of culture 
must also become a cooperative theology. But before investigating more thoroughly the 
consequences of integrating theology’s three axes, let us review how we came to the 
precipice of a modern solution to the modern problem of the supernatural.   
1. Summary of the Foregoing Constructive Proposal 
In Chapter 1, we jumped into the controversy over the supernatural as it stands 
now, revived in the twenty-first century in much the same terms it was contested at the 
middle of the twentieth. By drawing a parallel between the argumentative strategies 
deployed in the 1940s and in the early decades of this century, I tried to show that the 
debate is if not per se intractable, then de facto at a stalemate. In response to this 
intractability, I proposed that part of the problem with the problem of the supernatural is 
that it consists not in a single, but a pair of theological issues. The first is a long-standing 





medieval metaphysical quandary about how divine and human agency can both be at 
work in creation without crowding each other out. I have called this the medieval 
problem of the supernatural. The second problem asks how this cooperation between 
human beings and God can be discerned not in synchronic metaphysical terms, but in the 
existential subject, in historical process, and in the kaleidoscopic panoply of human 
cultures across both time and geography. I contended, against the overwhelming 
tendency of the literature on the contemporary controversy, that the modern problem is 
irreducible to the medieval one. Thus, possessing a solution to the latter does not of itself 
grant one an adequate solution to the former. I also argued that in order to address the 
modern problem adequately, we cannot simply dismiss the medieval problem. A 
mistaken position on the metaphysics of cooperation between human beings and God will 
set inquiry into the modern problem off on a goose chase for divine action unsullied by 
human taint. This in turn eventually leads some to the skeptical conclusion that God’s 
agency in history cannot be known, because everywhere one looks there are only human 
meanings. And so we saw that both mid-century and contemporary Thomists are correct 
with regard to the indispensability of the Thomist metaphysical achievement, but the 
adherents of the Nouvelle théologie and their neo-de Lubacian inheritors are also correct 
that this achievement is ultimately insufficient to address problems of “our age,” though I 
might construe the historical boundaries of “our age” more broadly than someone like 
Daniélou.  
Having construed the medieval problem in terms of operation, of action, and so as 
a theological problem of divine and human cooperation, in Chapter 2 I engaged in a 





lengthy retrieval of Lonergan’s interpretation of St. Thomas on God’s ad extra agency. 
We considered Thomas’s theory of cooperation in general, with special reference to the 
problematics of grace that occasioned Aquinas’ breakthroughs and to the synthetic 
position on divine and human cooperation it implies. Lonergan showed us how the advent 
of the theorem of the supernatural elucidated a need for grace beyond changes in the 
states of human nature vis-à-vis sin. Human beings have an ontologically fundamental 
need for grace to make us proportionate to acts meriting eternal life, whether we are 
under sin’s law of death or not. This theorem demonstrates its mobility, however, insofar 
as it also indicates the compatibility of this need for grace with the integrity of our 
created freedom. It makes a general theory of concursus possible by which we can say 
how free human action cooperates with God’s providential action without being 
denatured. The theorem of the supernatural also makes a special theory of cooperative 
grace possible as well. By the latter we can say how it is that human beings cooperate 
with God in actions beyond the proportion of our powers without impinging on the 
integrity of our freedom either. Furthermore, we saw how the notion of “entitative 
disproportion” at the heart of the theorem of the supernatural also distinguishes the 
general case of concursus from the specific instance of cooperative grace.  
In Chapter 3, we saw how the general—which is to say, the philosophical—
application of the theorem of the supernatural suggests what I have called the medieval 
ambiguity of being. By divine concursus every created cause is caused as to its existence 
by God, for only God is proportionate to existence as an effect. But this invites one of 
two basic attitudes with regard to the divine causality: either it makes the greatest 





possible difference (for without it, there would be nothing at all) or it makes no difference 
at all (for everything that is exists). One can quite easily take existence for granted—that 
is, take it as a mere matter of fact—and set about investigating the world of finite beings 
entirely without reference to a transcendent agent. One can come to think that the 
question of fundamental explanation is not a question worth asking at all. This decision 
with regard to the meaningfulness of the question of being reflects back upon itself. One 
is invited to read the task of investigating finite being as but one more contingent being in 
the universe for which it is meaningless to demand a fundamental explanation. 
Alternately, one can take a more mystical posture with regard to human inquiry, setting it 
(and all other human action with it) within a cosmos whose ultimate explanation (and so 
purpose) is at once preeminently real but also ultimately hidden in the mystery of God’s 
transcendent self-knowledge. Because both of these postures concern the meaningfulness 
and worthwhileness of asking and answering questions at all, adopting one or the other is 
necessarily a pre-philosophical exercise of freedom.  
Just because the medieval ambiguities of being became possible with the 
appearance of Thomas’s theory of concursus in the thirteenth century did not mean that 
cognizance of it became probable straight away. Thus, I argued that a modern 
philosophical mentality came on the scene, realizing explicit advertence to the medieval 
ambiguities. This mentality is marked by its insistence on a separated, rather than 
subordinated philosophy and the elevation of its via inventionis to a criterion of validity 
for its conclusions. Within this mentality, I turned to two examples of how, according to 
each pole of the ambiguity, the modern philosophical mentality would come to articulate 





the ambiguities of being. In Maurice Blondel we saw a cumulative and progressive 
analysis of the explanatory role that God’s ad extra agency would play if it were not 
excluded by the modern philosophical mentality’s method of immanence. This 
explanatory lacuna persists, Blondel showed us, in every possible arena of 
phenomenological examination and yet cannot be closed except by a pre-philosophical 
exercise of freedom—namely, a commitment to the transcendent, supernatural 
explicability of being in general and human action specifically. Sartre, by contrast, begins 
from an opposed pre-philosophical commitment that being simply is and so (as being) 
admits no explanation. Free human action likewise is and so then is also explained by 
nothing, such that any kind of rationalization of our actions proves a bad faith avoidance 
of responsibility. The explanation of our actions is simply that we freely chose to act. 
With Blondel, I acknowledged holding to the basic, if transcendent explicability of being 
and human action. Thus I could indicate by contrast that Sartre’s philosophy is a 
philosophy in bad faith insofar as it offers philosophical justifications for its basic 
commitment, even though it rests on a pre-philosophic act of freedom. This does not 
make the pre-philosophical choice posed by the medieval ambiguity of being 
philosophically decidable. However, it does unmask the pretension of existential atheism 
to establish itself as the only rational philosophy of action or foreclose the affirmation of 
transcendent meaningfulness as a good faith exercise of human freedom.  
In Chapter 4, after briefly considering the perhaps more familiar candidate for the 
modern problem of the supernatural, the question of the natural desire to know God, I set 
out to show that the genuinely modern problem of the supernatural is in fact insusceptible 





to the techniques of metaphysical analysis. Moreover, I argued that aiming to address the 
question of what God is doing in human action by means of such metaphysical 
techniques would only succeed in restating the problem itself, rather than answering it. 
We turned this apparent dead-end to our advantage, for we were able to develop some 
determinations of the modern problem from these metaphysical restatements. Thus we 
trained our metaphysical analysis on human action itself, determining that, as free and 
human, it issues from acts of the will. We then considered the will in detail as ‘rational 
appetite,’ first by a lengthy excursus on the intellectual process of rationality itself and 
then the rationality of free human acts by extension. We made something of an uncanny 
discovery in this process: human rationality, in its most fundamental form, is mediated by 
meaning. Further, we found that acts of the rational appetite are not just mediated, but 
also constituted by meaning, for they proceed in the first place from a word, a verbum.  
The constitutive function of meaning in human action proved the key to 
articulating the modern problem of the supernatural. Human action is historical. It 
emerges as meaningful from a diachronic process. Moreover, it emerges from a world of 
meaning that also has emerged from a meaning-mediated, meaning-constituted 
diachronic process. Free human agents are formed and constrained by the horizon set out 
by the aggregation of these actions and their products. The shared horizon of a 
community of free human agents is a culture, and so it is in cultures that the evidence on 
what God is doing in free human action coalesces into its matrices of relevance. 
However, cultures are many and explanation is unitary. How then can there be any 
solution to the modern problem of the supernatural? I indicated heuristically a technique 





for investigating these networks of data on the modern problem of the supernatural. I 
called this technique a “theological hermeneutics of culture.” But the unity of a shared 
technique is not enough, for that is only a subjective unity. There is needed also a unity of 
results. For this, the technique must be developed, through reflection and refinement, into 
a method that yields cumulative and progressive results. What remains is to indicate the 
criteria for any methodical solution to the modern problem of the supernatural.  
2. The Axes of Critical Cooperative Methodical Theology 
Which brings us to this final task: spelling out the significance of my heuristic 
scheme for applying a theological hermeneutics of culture to the data on the modern 
problem of the supernatural. Any theology that would meet the modern problem of the 
supernatural should be coordinated across three axes. We will imagine them intersecting 
in the manner of Cartesian planes. First, such a theology must include at least an 
implicitly operative notion by which to speak of God in some distinction from everything 
else. For this, we imagine a Y-axis on which to plot notions of transcendence.2 Second, if 
theology would resist charges of naïveté, chauvinism, parochialism, or special pleading, 
it must further make the critical step of understanding, evaluating, and discerning the 
principle of differences between itself and its others. For this, we imagine an X-axis on 
which to plot cultural or “contextual” differences. Third, a critical theology is not yet a 
methodical theology. A methodical theology takes stock of the conditions under which 
                                                
2 That the Y-axis is for plotting notions of transcendence does not prejudge whether theologies 
will affirm a strong or weak transcendence, or deny divine transcendence altogether. However, insofar as 
the exigency for this scheme rests on Thomas’s medieval solution to the medieval problem of the 
supernatural—namely, a strong theory of divine transcendence—it unavoidably presupposes that other 
doctrines of god will be coordinated with reference to it.  





theologies have made progress and/or suffered decline, aiming to regularize the 
conditions of progress in pursuit of cumulative results.3 A methodical theology has a 
theory of the dynamics of its own intellectual history and aims at taking the relevant 
conditions in hand to guide the process into the future. For this, we imagine a Z-axis on 
which to plot genetic developments according to the differential transformations of 
progress, decline, and redemption. Coordinated across these three axes, a critical 
methodical theology can take shape. Let us take each axis in turn, and then we can 
conclude by discussing why this scheme calls out for an unprecedented scholarly 
cooperation in stern and vertiginous terms.  
2.1. Transcendence 
For a time, the tendency to think of God as a being among beings stymied St. 
Augustine’s inarguably powerful theological mind.4 Still, his breakthrough unto the 
eternality and immateriality of God took a nascent form, operating as a basic doctrinal 
commitment controlled by an operative grammar.5 His apprehension of God’s 
                                                
3 The manner in which I have built the modern problem of the supernatural atop Thomas’s 
solution to the medieval problem of the supernatural would be one example of such speculative 
accumulation.  
4 For Augustine’s first person account of this struggle, see St. Augustine, The Confessions of St. 
Augustine, trans. John K. Ryan (New York, NY: Image, 2014). 
5 By “grammar” here I mean something like what Kathryn Tanner calls “ruled structures of 
theological talk and their function.” For Tanner, “theological statements work to establish Christian 
vocabularies and the usage rules appropriate for those expressions. In doing so, frameworks for discourse 
are constituted within which it makes sense to talk about God and try to conform one’s self to Christian 
truths.” Though Tanner does consider speculative questions of divine agency, she does* so in accord with 
the Anglo-American analytic and pragmatist traditions of deriving theorematic content from the 
relationships among signs in a discourse, rather than by a more empirico-inductive path of analogy proper 
to the Aristotelian and Thomist tradition of metaphysical reasoning. See Tanner, Kathryn, God and 
Creation in Christian Theology: Tyranny or Empowerment? (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 10–13. 





transcendence meant that certain ways of speaking were inadmissible both as dogmatic 
formulation and speculative construction. Still, we can surmise that Augustine was not 
thereby able to articulate a speculative theorem that allowed the cascade of corresponding 
speculative theological problems to be resolved. Recall from Chapter 2 how Augustine 
posits the distinction between operative and cooperative grace without explaining 
precisely how it answered the speculative difficulty driving denial of the gratuity of grace 
and/or the reality of human freedom. It was not until the medieval theorem of the 
supernatural came on the scene with Albert the Great, Philip the Chancellor, and Thomas 
Aquinas that these difficulties could be faced head on. A more adequate theory of 
transcendence allowed whole areas of theological inquiry to fall into a single view—and, 
indeed, within the purview of a series of sufficiently diligent and prolific geniuses.  
We may note several such figures who tip Christian theology into new epochs by 
the force of their commitment to a central, organizing theory of transcendence. 
Schleiermarcher’s insight that the absolute transcendence of God, thought within the 
horizon of a robust philosophical romanticism and idealism, suggested that the absolute 
dependence of creatures could itself be an (albeit indeterminate) state of consciousness 
(Gefühl). The miraculous perfection of this Gefühl in Christ controlled Schleiermacher’s 
entire speculative response to the traditional loci of Christian theology in his 
Glaubenslehre.6 In this fashion, he was able to produce what is among the most 
genuinely systematic systematic theologies, controlled throughout by a single notion. But 
even when they are rather less systematic in structure, all theologies require at least an 
                                                
6 See Friedrich Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, eds. C. L. Kelsey and T. N. Tice, trans. T. N. 
Tice, C. L. Kelsey, and E. Lawler (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2016).  





implied, controlling position along this “Y-axis” concerning transcendence. This is no 
less true if that position involves a denial of transcendence (Feuerbach) or radical 
modification of the notion (Process Theology). Moreover, all theologies necessarily 
benefit from that controlling principle of grammatical control finding theoretical 
elaboration, as we see in the development between Schleiermacher’s speeches and 
Christian Faith.  
2.2. Context  
Any “great man” theory of theological development raises the problem of 
adjudicating between the speculative visions of various theological schools and their 
masters. There arises the intellectual gridlock by which adherents of one system level 
extrinsic critiques at the adherents of another system for violations of their inherited first 
principles. When one speaks of “decadent scholasticism,” one element of the imputed 
decadence consists in this deductive intractability. Moreover, responsible scholarship 
anymore recognizes that one ought not anachronistically or a-contextually hold the 
systems of major figures up to one another for brute comparison. Rather, one should 
make theoretical evaluations in light of the cultural circumstances under which their 
thought was developed and set down. This, at first blush, seems to bring in the question 
of history, but in fact such considerations pertain more properly to questions of what we 
might call “context” or culture.  
We may note that Thomas’s moral theory is conditioned (though not determined) 
by its contemporary controversies in ways that make it only comparable by analogy to, 





for example, Kant’s moral philosophy and its contemporary debates.7 There are genuine 
points of contact, but substantive, even essential differences must be surveyed and 
controlled for. What goes for the agents of a theology goes too for its object(s). Indeed, 
this is the very heart of the modern problem of the supernatural: that God’s work is 
manifest in the artifacts of cultural making precisely as cultural artifacts and in the 
making qua making. Thus, accounts of what God wrought in first-century Palestine can 
be compared and contrasted with what God has done, say, on the Indian subcontinent 
certainly, but only in terms of the cultural artifacts that persist in our world from theirs. 
This brings challenges, though they do not at all constitute an impossibility. Still, a 
certain analogical heuristic has to be followed lest the worst sins of interreligious 
polemics go uncritically repeated.  
These differences in context—whether individuated by historical epoch, 
geographical distance, or simply subcultural/demographic divisions—can be coordinated. 
Because they have a unitary principle functioning as the variable from which their 
variations originate, to the extent that they emerge authentically and are intelligible, they 
possess a necessarily analogical relationship with one another. However, in Chapter 4 I 
argued that theology cannot proceed by reducing these differences to their principle of 
variation and that they cannot be bracketed metaphysically. As a result such artifacts 
must be investigated according to their place in the concrete social, cultural, inter-
                                                
7 See for example Jean Porter’s retrieval of the scholastic concept of the natural law and its 
relationship to modern and contemporary approaches thereto (Jean Porter, Nature as Reason: A Thomistic 
Theory of the Natural Law (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2005), 1–52; see also Susan Neiman’s 
account of the moral theological debates into which Kant’s moral theory emerged in Evil in Modern 
Thought (Susan Neiman, Evil in Modern Thought, an Alternative History of Philosophy [Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2015), 14–83.  





personal, or religious order in which they are situated, which is itself constituted by 
human meanings, values, and actions. 
To represent this vector of investigation, we have the “X-axis.” Along this axis, 
differences internal to a religious or theological tradition/culture would be at turns 
distinguished and catalogued, but also correlated. At the same time, each religious or 
theological tradition/culture would maintain a view to the investigation of parallel or 
adjacent religious or theological traditions/cultures occurring alongside. To advert again 
to the work of David Burrell, we see an example of one such tandem investigation in 
Towards a Jewish-Christian-Muslim Theology.8 Though the Jewish, Christian, and 
Muslim tracks converge on the work of Thomas Aquinas, Burrell is able to show how 
consonant but as-yet-incompatible positions developed under rather different religious 
and cultural pressures. Thus, he avoids the temptation to read later synthesis and 
development back through the traditions, imposing an occlusive sameness upon them. In 
this way, analogous positions can be given their due in terms of both similarity and 
difference and a properly theoretical approach to theology can be wedded to a critical and 
historically conscious theology. 
We should further note that Burrell’s project not only coordinates these 
investigations according to their socio-cultural similarities and differences. To do so 
would reduce theologians to sociologists of knowledge. It is not enough to take 
cognizance of this horizontal, X-axis of religious thought and practice. Its coordinates 
                                                
8 David Burrell, Towards a Jewish-Christian-Muslim Theology (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 
2011).  
 





need to be at the same time correlated, as we see in Burrell, according to the theorematic 
positions on transcendence along the Y-axis. Theology cannot forget to speak explicitly 
of what God has done and is doing in the world, even when it recognizes that it always at 
once speaks of and from diverse human worlds. On the other hand, if I note that the 
failure to take theology’s X-axis into account risks naïveté, chauvinism, parochialism, or 
special pleading, I still leave out the arguably more serious critiques of power that 
mobilize so many “contextual” theologies, but that topic is rather more apropos of the Z-
axis to which we turn now.  
2.3. History 
One might be tempted to identify the X-axis with contemporaneous differences of 
context and the Z-axis with historically discrete differences of context, and so the X-axis 
with geography and the Z-axis with “history.” This should be avoided. First, digital 
globalization has put to the sword the idea that cultural communities are identifiable with 
geographical proximities. Second, history is not strictly speaking reducible to temporal 
succession, but is constituted by meanings and values that are always susceptible to 
configuration. Rather, it has been my intention that the X-axis covers both of these kinds 
of differences, the temporal and the geographic. As mere differences in time and place do 
not make a difference in the applicability of classical physical laws, so mere differences 
of time and place do not make a difference in the explanatory power of well-wrought 
theological speculation. The rather late centering of Thomas Aquinas’s philosophy and 
theology in Catholic thought provides compelling evidence that his thought has relevance 





beyond Paris and the thirteenth century—even if it was shaped by historical, cultural, 
philosophical, and theological conditions at play there and then. This is precisely the 
point. The differences that make a difference are not those of mere time and place, but 
differences in the substance of the cultural world in which God has been at work in the 
religious life of a community and the reflection of its theologians. Consequently, these 
differences may fall along a single axis.  
What does the Z-axis coordinate? Though theologies can be coordinated 
according to both theorematic and contextual differences, they can also be related as 
genetic stages of historical process. They can as such be evaluated according to whether 
they amount to progress or decline. Religions, like any element of a culture, can flourish 
or they can fester, can grow or stagnate, can emerge or collapse altogether. For Lonergan, 
theology becomes methodical when it can yield cumulative and progressive results. Thus, 
a theology needs to take stock of religious development and decline and plot it along this 
Z-axis. Moreover, a theology must also appropriate its own historical trajectory, working 
to contribute to the accumulation and development of theological understanding and 
clarify theological confusion. In this way, a theology needs to take a stand on the relative 
authenticity of religious practice and understanding, but also on the authenticity of past 
scholarly reflection thereupon. This facet of the theological task amounts to a “dialectical 
traditionalism” that appropriates its historical position in a religious and/or theological 
tradition, but also inveighs “yes” or “no” as to whether elements therein ought to be 
carried forward or repudiated. The concrete value of these decisions within a tradition 
constitute the inertial transformations in which progress or decline consist. Methodical 





theologians should not avoid coordinating their evaluations along this Z-axis, and they 
certainly cannot avoid having their evaluations coordinated by both contemporary and 
subsequent theologians in turn. The risk shared by every theology is that these judgments 
may be mistaken and so themselves contribute to a trajectory of decline. But if they are 
correct, resting upon intelligent inquiry, reasonable reflection, responsible deliberation, 
and a loving commitment to the good and its transcendent source, they contribute to the 
flourishing, the development, perhaps the recovery of a theological tradition and those 
‘others’ with which may be in dialogue.  
3. The Demand and Challenge of Theological Cooperation 
Once the theoretical (Y-axis), critical (X-axis) and the methodical (Z-axis) 
exigencies have been introduced to the theological task by the modern problem of the 
supernatural, we come to see that the “great man” theory of theological advancement is 
no longer viable. Theology as a discipline has to transcend, through the generation of 
cumulative and progressive results, the historicity that conditions the individual 
theologians who produce it. To address the modern problem of the supernatural, it has to 
take stock of the work of God in the worlds of human culture across geography, society, 
and history. Moreover, recognizing now that the theorems guiding theological 
speculation are themselves the product of cultural process, theology cannot settle within a 
single theoretical horizon. It has to coordinate and analogically communicate between a 
diversity of theoretical horizons. Our task demands a “speculative pluralism.”9 Moreover, 
                                                
9 Thanks to Ryan Hemmer for developing this notion and appellation. 





theology has to wrangle with the work above and its voluminous data in a way that does 
not simply catalogue what has gone before, but also takes its own stand on which new 
questions need answering, what old answers need revision, and which 
accomplishments—past and present—call out for continued attention and appropriation.  
On the other hand, “theology” cannot perform the above tasks, but only 
theologians—theologians who read, pray, think, and write from their concrete horizons. 
Consequently, no single theologian can perform the whole of the theological task. Indeed, 
no theologian (even as inestimable a theologian as St. Thomas Aquinas) can provide a 
unitary horizon in which all other theologians can then work with the force of his or her 
genius at their collective backs. No, theology at the level of our time can only be done in 
a decentered way, mediating between a religion and its cultural matrix while at the same 
time mediating between cultural matrices and evaluating from its vantage the relative 
authenticity of the religion, the cultural matrices, and the theologies at play in both its 
contemporary scene and that scene’s effective history. If nothing else, the billowing 
clauses of the above sentence should give some sense of the unwieldiness of this task and 
the need for a massive, intercultural, intergenerational, interdisciplinary cooperation in 
theology. This need is at once essential to theology’s self-realization and also rather 
extravagantly beyond its present means.  
Consequently, theologians face the temptation to define their task down by 
excising one or more of theology’s axes. Perhaps we could forgo the existential risk of 
normative evaluation and only concern ourselves with disclosing the decenteredness of 
culturally and historically conscious theology? If theology lightens its load in this 





manner, one might expect to encounter a certain decadent post-modern theology that, if it 
theorizes at all, theorizes exclusively about the absolute alterity of God and the relative, 
but still impenetrable alterity between cultures, times, and even persons. Alternatively, 
perhaps theologians can find some refuge from the staggering expanse of cultural 
particularity in the logical inferences of theological speculation, laying down our 
evaluations insofar as they accord with or contradict our theoretical formulations? But if 
the weight of history is removed from the theologian, the dual circumscription of a 
speculative theology’s abstractive viewpoint is removed. The material circumscription of 
theology’s cultural horizon is occluded, but also the formal circumscription constituted 
by the particular valence of its questions. Theological answers become orphaned from 
their source in the light of agent intellect. Thus, one encounters a decadent scholasticism 
that assumes reality can be rendered entirely transparent by any adequately wrought 
metaphysics. But if metaphysics seems, in its airy speculation, too impractical an 
approach for theology to put front and center, perhaps theology can put ethics and moral 
theory in its place. Perhaps theology can content itself to inveigh for and against religions 
and theologies as they accord with or contradict our convictions about what contitutes 
moral thought or practice, foregoing the self-doubt that afflicts a liberal preoccupation 
with pluralism or the self-indulgent fastidiousness of metaphysical speculation. Such a 
theology, however, cannot but face the charge of idolatry, having decided for itself which 
God seems fit to worship, begging the question, “whence these moral intuitions and their 
criteria?” 





No doubt my readers can call to mind for themselves theologies embodying any 
one or more of these strategies for lightening theology’s load. You may have some 
opinion about which are more forgivable, which more derisable. I exhort us, instead, to 
face the task in its full dimension and, as ever, do what we can with what we have, 
having faith that all these things will be added unto us. Recognizing the need and scope 
of a theological hermeneutics of culture is trouble enough for today
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